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Abstract 
Massimiliano Viel
Listening Patterns. 
From music to perception and cognition.
The research aims to propose a narrative of the experience of listening and to 
provide some first examples of its possible application. This is done in three 
parts.
Part One, “Words”, aims to methodologically frame the narrative by discussing 
the  limits  and  requirements  of  a  theory  of  listening.  After  discussing  the 
difficulties of building an objective characterization of the listening experience, 
the research proposes that any theorization on listening can only express a 
point of view that is implied by descriptions of listening both in linguistic terms 
and in the data they involve. The analysis of theories about listening is therefore 
conducted through a grammatical path that unfolds by following the syntactic 
roles of the words involved in theoretical claims about listening. Starting from 
the problem of synonymy, the analysis moves around the subject, the object, 
adjectives and adverbs to finally discuss the status of the references of the 
discourses on listening.
The Part One ends by claiming the need to reintroduce the subject in theories 
about  listening  and proposes  to  attribute  the epistemological  status  of  the 
narrative to any discourse about the listening experience. This implies that any 
proposed narrative must substitute its truth-value with the instrumental value 
that is expressed by the idea of “viability”.
The Part Two, “Patterns”, is devoted to introducing a narrative of listening. This 
is first informally introduced in terms of the experience of a distinction within 
the  sonic  flow.  After  an  intermission  dedicated  to  connecting  the  idea  of 
distinction to Gaston Bachelard’s metaphysics of time, the narrative is finally 
presented  as  a  dialectics  among  three  ways  of  organizing  perceptive 
distinctions. Three perceptive modes of distinctions are presented as a basic 
mechanism  that  is  responsible  for  articulating  the  sonic  continuum  in  a 
complex structure of expectations and reactions, in terms of patterns, that is 
constantly renewed under the direction of statistical learning.
The final chapter of the Part Two aims to briefly apply the narrative of pattern 
structures to dealing with the experience of noise.
Part Three aims to show the “viability” of the proposed narrative of listening. 
First, a method for analysing music by listening is discussed. Then, a second 
chapter puts the idea of pattern structures in contact with music composition, 
as a framework that can be applied to data sonification, installations, music 
production and to the didactics of composition.
Finally,  the  last  chapter  is  devoted  to  the  discussion  of  the  idea  of 
“soundscape”  and  “identity  formation”,  in  order  to  show  the  potential  of 
applying the proposed narrative to the context of cultural and social studies.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
After having been left for centuries to be hidden within discourses about the 
Word of God or music aesthetics, we can now say that “listening” has finally 
reached the status of a respectable topic of research, although it still hasn’t 
received the honour of being directly involved in the name of a discipline. If we 
consider the statistics of the use of the morpheme “listen-” in book titles (I refer 
here to a  search among the 11 million books listed in  the Internet  Archive 
website),  we  see  a  gradual,  slightly  irregular—yet  constantly  growing—
application of the term over the course of the last century, bringing the initial  
percentage of 0,002 from the first decade up to the 0,0356 in the 80s. But it is  
only  in  the 90s that  the presence of  “listen” in  book titles has reached an 
average plateau of 0,041 % and a degree of appeal of “listening” in written 
texts  have  been  finally  ratified.  These  statistics  are  not  really  meaningful 
because on one hand they do not distinguish, for example, novels from essays, 
nor  do they consider  texts that  are  strongly related to  listening yet  do not 
include the word in their title, a situation that, as we will see, is rather common. 
Nevertheless,  “listening” today has become a highly  discussed topic in  the 
academy because it is situated at the crossroads of myriad disciplines related 
to  music,  (neuro-)  physiology,  cultural  studies  and  computation,  and 
consequently involved in an intense activity of publication.
The reasons for this emerging “appeal of listening”, have to be found in the 
complex articulation of a variety of factors that are related to the individual 
disciplines and involve technological and conceptual advancement, but also, 
3
as  Kuhn  (1970)  has  shown us,  in  complications  of  the  institutional  side  of 
knowledge,  such  as  the  possibility  of  obtaining  funds  or  the  necessity  of 
attracting  students.  However,  I  think  that  another  possible  reason  for  this 
increased appeal of listening might also be related to an emergent sensibility 
towards a mode of sensing, which lets us reach the world in a different way 
with respect to vision and its sensorimotor metaphors.
Marshall MacLuhan’s idea of “auditory space” (1960) as an experiential region 
that  is  not  involved  in  dealing  with  boundaries  or  perspective  seems  to 
connected to the experience of polyphony, of the articulated presence of a 
multiplicity  of  sources  in  a  spherical  non-directional  space,  to  which  we 
respond emotionally. This concept immediately evokes the “internet sphere” 
and especially the virtual sphere of social networks that is instantiated by the 
technologies of  tele-presence,  as a general  term. It  is  therefore possible to 
understand the current turn of research towards “listening”, as a search for a 
paradigm that can account for the peculiarities of meaning making, and for the 
implications of media control, in the age of global hyper-textualization.
This premise is quite general, yet it might stimulate the researcher to turn to 
listening in  order  to  look for  a novel  conceptual  framework to  address the 
peculiarities of contemporary global society. However, I must also add a further 
motivation that moved me to engage in this research. 
In fact, as a musician, a composer and a music teacher, it often occurred to me 
to be involved in discussions about techniques of composition, for example 
those  related  to  serialism,  that  as  being based on the manipulation  of  the 
graphic  symbols  of  notation,  don’t  seem  to  be  sufficiently  rooted  in  the 
sounding  aspects  of  music,  both  as  listened  and  realized  in  performance. 
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Moreover,  when  dealing  with  didactic  methods,  it  is  easy  to  stumble  in 
explicative apparatuses and patterns, such as the very idea of harmony, the 
sensorimotor metaphor of a tension between dominant and tonic chords and 
so on, which often claim an objective existence without any discussion of their 
ontological status.
This prompted me to look at the experience of listening for a weight that could 
anchor  discourses  and  practices  related  to  music,  but  also  simultaneously 
engage a discussion of the conditions that are peculiar to the topic of listening 
and for being able to share those discourses and practices.
In fact, the cognitive and cultural instruments that we use to deal with listening 
cannot  help  but  be shaped by  the paradigms that  emerged from linguistic 
practices in the first  place and have been organised and developed by the 
academy.  As  a  consequence,  the  concepts  and  the  words  we  use  in  our 
discourses about listening seem to mostly not be the best suited for dealing 
with the evanescent auditory world, especially if we aim for a new perspective.
This is why discourses about listening often appear to serve the purpose of 
promoting paradigms and knowledge that are based on assumptions, such as 
the paradigm of the object as it will be shown in Sections 3.6 and 8.8, that we 
need to get rid of if we want to foster an understanding of sounding practices 
as a general term that includes music, which is able to deal with its cultural 
situation,  but  also  to  possibly  acquire  an  innovative  perspective  about 
cognition in general.
The problem at the core of this text can be therefore summarized in two points:
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1) How can we deal  with  the variety  of  discourses about  listening and 
possibly expose the paradigms concealed within them? This problem is 
discussed in Part 1. 
2) How is it possible to propose a discourse about listening that is able to 
account  for  the  variety  of  the  experiences  of  listening  while  also 
fostering new practices? This problem is discussed in Part 2.
Throughout  the first  two parts,  the research therefore starts  by  calling  into 
question the inherited paradigms that are involved in discussing “listening”, 
particularly in terms of linguistic patterns, as sources of understatements that 
are  possibly  absorbed  within  the  academic  research  on  listening.  It  then 
proposes  a  narrative  of  listening  that,  starting  from  the  very  simple  aural 
experience of distinction, follows a path of articulation and complication up to 
a discussion of meaning-forming that has the potential to show how patterns 
emerge in linguistic practices themselves (Section 8.8). 
Finally, the third part is devoted to a discussion of some of the applications of 
the proposed narrative, which are especially directed to topics related to music 
and music teaching. These applications are inevitably related to my practice as 
a composer and as a music teacher. Therefore, the first application is directed 
towards music analysis; followed by composition, the didactics of composition 
and  a  general  discussion  of  the  idea  of  soundscape,  which  is  a  concept 
involved both in (music) teaching and in composition.
The idea of  narrative is  paramount  to this  research as the expression of  a 
methodology  that  is  built  around  the  contingency  of  the  narrator  and  the 
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reader. 
Specifically,  by using the word “narrative”,  I  put  my research in an explicit 
epistemological context by stressing the textuality of academic research and 
therefore inscribing it within the hermeneutic circle. 
In  Chapter  4,  a  narrative  is  characterized  by  authoriality,  contingency  and 
negotiability. The first character implies that, as being narrated by a musician 
and  specifically  by  a  composer  and  music  teacher,  the  narrative  involves 
primarily examples, listening experiences (in terms of mental experiments) and 
applications in the field of music. Nevertheless, the simplicity and openness of 
a  starting  point  (the  experience  of  distinction),  that  is  situated  before  the 
cognitive constitution of music listening maintains the possibility to apply the 
narrative  to  linguistic  practices  and to  other  sensorial  modes.  That  is  why 
“listening” in its very general sense is always in the background, even when not 
explicitly stated, while “music listening” is involved only as an expression of the 
authoriality of the narrative and for the sake of example.
The character of contingency is related to the individuality of the author and it  
therefore implies the incompleteness and temporary quality of the content of 
narration. Negotiability, on the other hand, is related to the relational character 
of a narrative and is the basis of the determination of its “viability”, that is the 
ability  to  “survive”  in  the  world  of  engaged  readers  as  a  source  of  new 
knowledge and new practices. 
And indeed, the third part of this text is meant to underscore the viability of this 
research, involving it in musicological, compositive and pedagogical practices.
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Both the characters of authoriality and negotiability have a resounding impact 
on the linguistic style of this research. The intensive use of the first person 
throughout the text intends to narrate the experience of listening in terms of a 
“first-person” knowledge, while also seeking to engage the reader in a dialogue 
with  the  author.  In  fact,  the  first  person  is  an  explicit  way  to  avoid  the 
suppression of the narrating subject (see Section 3.8), as a typical aspect of 
the  standard  academic  style,  which,  in  its  attempt  to  promote  objectivity, 
contradicts  the  epistemological  claims  of  the  research  (Section  2.6).  It 
simultaneously explicitly evokes personal experiences that can appeal to the 
reader,  who might share or diverge from the narrative, while also remaining 
consistent with an epistemology of the contingent. A brief summary of the main 
arguments of the research follows, which maps the three-part path to propose 
and explore a narrative of listening. 
PART 1 – WORDS. This section discusses the constraints and requirements of 
a discourse about listening. 
Chapter 2 - This chapter intends to establish the context of the whole research 
by touching upon elements that will be dealt with and developed in the rest of 
the text. 
In general, this chapter aims to place the research within an epistemological 
framework that denies the possibility of being objective and fosters its inter-
subjective status by stressing its textual character as the expression of a point 
of  view,  a  narrative.  For  this  reason,  this  chapter  will  be  granted  a  more 
detailed examination than the following one.
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Section 2.1 starts by characterizing listening in terms of subjective experiences 
(qualia) and considers Thomas Nagel’s proposal (1974) of building an objective 
discourse about  them.  The chapter  aims to show the problems involved in 
Nagel’s project by presenting three attempts to build objectivity by connecting 
ontological  subjectivity  (which  is  dependent  upon  the  subject)  to  epistemic 
objectivity in terms of measurements (Searle, 2008). 
In  the  first  attempt  (Section  2.2)  subjective  experiences  are  connected  to 
measurements related to the listening subject (that are in charge of expressing 
objectivity  and  therefore  are  also  called  “objective  references”)  and  are 
immediately  labelled,  in  order  to  be  able  to  deal  with  them,  in  the  most 
inexpressive,  schematic  way.  A  problem  arises  when  trying  to  distinguish 
within the infinite number of possible measurements (the “overall  reference”) 
what  is  meaningful  in  order  to  relate  with  the  listening  experience 
measurements from what is not. In the end it is not only impossible to define a 
finite set of meaningful measurements to reference a listening experience, but 
even  if  it  were  possible,  it  would  still  be  useless  because  it  would  merely 
replicate  the  taxonomy  of  measurements  (which  is  not  objective  in  itself) 
without saying anything about the experience of listening.
As  a  second  attempt,  a  private  language  is  invoked  in  order  to  provide  a 
meaningful taxonomy of labels, so that we can attach objective references to 
listening experiences without the burden of the measurements’ taxonomy. But 
private languages, if even they exist, cannot be communicated because they 
are  possibly  linked  to  hidden  variables  and  unconscious  experiences 
(Wittgenstein, 1953). 
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As a third attempt (Section 2.3),  private languages are substituted by inter-
subjective languages, which can be seen as a system of “common” labels with 
rules of composition. These labels are organized according to a meaningful 
taxonomy, both on a  syntactic and a semantic level,  and therefore can be 
connected both to experiences and to sets of measurements (what I propose 
calling  “phenomenic  dyads”)  in  such  a  way  that  the  researcher  can  say 
something that can be shared about the experience of listening. But of course, 
even the taxonomy of “common” labels cannot but follow an articulation that is 
far from objective. Therefore, the universe of “phenomenic dyads” appears as 
organized in a complex game of relevances and contexts that mirror the way 
natural languages have evolved in time. In the end, even this attempt cannot be 
followed to  build  an  objective discourse  of  the experience  of  listening and 
Nagel’s proposal has to be abandoned.
From  this  point  on,  attention  is  drawn  to  the  very  idea  of  objectivity  by 
addressing three topics emerging from the previous attempts.
The first one (Section 2.4) is the disruptive role of time in building objectivity. 
Not only are experiencing, measuring and labelling asynchronous activities, but 
the  necessary  introduction  of  time in  a  discourse  about  listening  implies  a 
passage to existence, according which experiencing, labelling and measuring 
are contingent actions that happen in time and have to be contextualized in 
order  to  be  properly  understood.  For  this  reason,  the  ideas  of  “biology  of 
cognition” and “epistemology of the observer” (Maturana and Varela, 1980) are 
introduced as a (constructivist) frame that is able to account for the failure of 
building objectivity and will be further addressed in the second part of the text.
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The  second  topic  (Section  2.5)  is  a  discussion  about  the  objectivity  of 
measurements. As science itself is engaged in social practices, measurements 
also emerge in these social practices. But such measurements cannot avoid 
the “paradox of categorization” (Scheffler, 1982), according to which I cannot 
base the objectivity of a reductionist representation on a cultural representation 
and at the same time base the objectivity of a cultural  representation on a 
reductionist representation, without being laden by theory (Heidelberger, 2013). 
The third topic (Section 2.6),  which serves as the chapter’s conclusion and 
introduces the rest of the first part, is the role of natural language. Ultimately, 
an objective discourse about the experience of listening is impossible because 
experiences  are  possibly  still  hidden  in  private  language  descriptions  that 
cannot be connected to a common language.  We only have intersubjective 
(mis-)understandings based on the common labels of natural languages, which 
completely override the organization of measurements and also the possibility 
of talking about experiences.  But labelling is an experience itself  and using 
labels  is  an  experience  that  “logocentrically”  (Derrida  2010)  substitutes  the 
aural experiences with its experiential presence.
Finally:  objectification is  the attempt  to suppress the material  conditions of 
existence  (and  knowledge)  by  organizing  (in  the  categorization  circle) 
measurements  and  experiences  according  to  the  structure  of  “logocentric” 
public  language.  It  is  only  by  reintroducing  the  subject  that  we  can  give 
listening back to its experience in terms of the point of view that the listener 
expresses through their description of listening. 
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Chapter 3 – Once the primary role of how we linguistically deal with the topic of 
listening through fostering points of view has been determined, the text turns 
to discussing the paradigms of listening that emerge in language. This is done 
by examining a series of topics that are fostered by specific uses of parts of 
speech  and  are  representative  of  the  work  of  notable  researchers  and 
musicologists.  
Section 3.1 is dedicated to verbs and to the relationship of synonymy as it is 
involved in the “four listenings” of Pierre Schaeffer (1966). 
Section 3.2 is dedicated to adjectives and specifically to the topic of “modes of 
listening”  in  Schaeffer  (1966),  Michel  Chion  (1994),  Kai  Tuuri  and  Tuomas 
Eerola (2012) and others.
The next five sections are dedicated to the fundamental topic of the object of 
listening. Section 3.3 introduces the opposition between subject and object as 
a relationship that emerges in language that is capable of driving discourses 
about listening. The idea of cognition as the act of “distinguishing”, as taken 
from the epistemology of Humberto Maturana (1988), is introduced as a basis 
for the “paradigm of the object” that underlies our descriptions. Section 3.4 
develops an analysis  of  descriptions in  terms of  their  constitutive  linguistic 
parts, as the premise for the introduction of Harold Fiske’s idea of a “copy 
paradigm”  (1996),  according  to  which  listening  is  described  in  terms  its 
objects. Section 3.5 discusses the object of listening as the source of three 
kind of references, which are typically used in claiming an objective status of 
discourses  about  listening,  namely:  (western)  music  grammar,  acoustical  or 
(neuro-) physiological measurements and linguistic /graphic/ gestural reports of 
listening. Finally, Section 3.6 explicitly presents the “paradigm of the object” as 
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a  product  of  our  language  that  charges  our  discourses  on  listening  with 
cognitive metaphors that, as coming from other senses, risks obstructing an 
understanding of listening as an aural experience.  
Sections 3.7 and 3.8 are dedicated to the subject. First, the philosophical topic 
of “the subject” is introduced as it is presented by the work of Michel Foucault 
(1972) and linguistically expressed by verbs of action and the related adjuncts. 
The idea that the erasure of the listening subject in discourses about listening 
or its substitution with other elements of description can give rise to practices 
of subjections is developed in Section 3.8. Three ways of erasing the subject 
are shown: the use of a generalized impersonal subject (he, she, they), the use 
of an “actorized” verb, as in using “listening” as the subject of a sentence, and 
the substitution of the act of listening with “music” and “sound” as the focus of 
discourses that implicitly involve listening.
Finally,  it  has been shown that  relying on parts  of  linguistic descriptions of 
listening, such as adjectives, synonyms and objects as legitimate sources of 
objective knowledge can risk fostering paradigms might not prove useful  in 
accounting for the peculiarities of listening. Section 3.9 proposes the idea of 
“intransitive listening” as an approach that avoids relying on the structure of 
the objects of listening, in order to focus on the diversity of subjects in the 
attempt of giving back the experience of listening its cognitive strength, which 
operates before the constitution of its objects and its linguistic descriptions.
Chapter 4 – In this chapter, the epistemology of the narrative is presented in 
order to respond to the impossibility of building an objective discourse about 
listening on one hand (Chapter 2) and the proposal of giving back discourses 
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to the subject in spite of a language loaded with paradigms on the other hand 
(Chapter  3).  As  noted  previously,  this  is  a  way  to  deal  with  authoriality, 
contingency  and  negotiability,  which  are  three  ways  of  accounting  for  the 
involvement of a diversity of subjects in the attempt to build “viability” as the 
possibility for a narrative to survive the never-ending emergence of the context 
of applications.
Finally, Fiske’s requirements for a theory of listening (1996) are presented and 
discussed,  by  following  the  idea  of  narrative  and  its  reintroduction  of  the 
subject.
PART 2 – PATTERNS. This part is dedicated to the presentation of a narrative 
of listening. This is done in three chapters (5, 7 and 8), with a brief Intermission 
to discuss Gaston Bachelard’s idea of time (Chapter 6)  and a Coda, which 
intends to apply the narrative of listening to the concept of “noise” (Chapter 9).
Chapter 5 – This Chapter offers an intuitive approach to the proposed narrative 
of listening as a top-down process that takes the complications of the world 
that  we live  in  for  granted.  If  the first  part  dealt  with  listening in  the most 
general way, even if many quoted researchers were specifically involved with 
music, this chapter more explicitly relates to music in the proposed examples 
and mind experiments  as  it  expresses  a  narrative  told  by  a  musician.  The 
chapter therefore attempts to illustrate how the way we deal with and describe 
our  listening  experiences  can  be  rooted  in  a  constructive  process  of 
distinguishing and assembling that is simultaneously cognitive and culturally 
driven.
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Section 5.1 aims to introduce a characterization of the experience of listening 
in terms of the distinction of relevant sounding moments within the sound flow.
Section 5.2 is devoted to a fundamental and complex aural distinction, which is 
usually expressed as the opposition between music and what we consider the 
sounds  and  noises  of  the  world.  In  this  section,  the  idea  of  “noise”  is 
introduced in an informal way, which will be characterized in Chapter 9 as its 
“semantic” meaning, in order to deal with the informal description of listening 
experiences. This use of the word “noise” will be maintained throughout the 
whole chapter.
Section  5.3  connects  the  act  of  distinguishing  to  the  cognitive  ability  of 
segmenting.  Specifically,  the idea that  different  contiguous segments  might 
share a constant  character,  an “identity”,  as the background against which 
they are distinguished because of their “difference” in some other character, is 
introduced for the first time.
Section 5.4 discusses the listening cues for understanding that a music piece 
is finished as the occasion to introduce the ideas of “pattern” and “scheme”.
Section 5.5 aims to develop the idea of “difference”, as the cue for segmenting, 
in terms of change in sonic quality. Examples from music that explicitly avoid 
providing such cues, as a way to promote a subversion of the very concept of 
“music”, are presented in Section 5.6.
Finally, in Section 5.7, the idea of “quality” is exposed as a narrative tool that 
needs to be discussed in order to address the constitutive aspect of listening 
in dealing with the paradigm of a world of objects.
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Chapter 6 – This chapter is meant to be an Interlude, which is not necessary for 
the  proposed  narrative  of  listening,  but  by  making  connections  to  the 
philosophical  discussion  about  time,  and  especially  to  the  work  of  Gaston 
Bachelard, nonetheless opens the narrative of listening to the wider topic of 
cognition and existence. 
Chapter 7 – This chapter, together with the next one, constitutes the core of 
this text, and introduces the narrative of listening as a constructive path that 
starts from what is posed as the simplest experience of  listening up to the 
complexity of our world of music, sound and noise.
Specifically, this chapter is dedicated to exploring the idea of “distinction” and 
places it within the articulation of cognition as a process of expectation.
If the experiences and examples in Chapter 5 were typically drawn from music 
works,  in  this  chapter  and  the  following  one,  they  are  described  as  sonic 
events  that  are  not  explicitly  related  to  music,  but  rather  belong  to  the 
experimental world of psychoacoustics. This is because the constructive path 
of  these  chapters  are  directed  towards  listening  experiences  that  are 
constituted before the distinction between music and speech, or sounds that 
can be related to a cause.
Section 7.1 introduces the idea of “distinction” both as a fundamental concept 
of Maturana’s epistemology and as a basic experience in psychoacoustics. 
In Section 7.2, qualities are finally defined as perceptive dimensions. These are 
formally defined as parameters, so that on one hand they are consistent with 
psychoacoustic  experimentations  and  on  the  other  they  are  open  to  the 
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possible complications of their order structure, allowing a variety of types of 
dimensions, such as binary, partially ordered and nested ones.
Section 7.3 presents the fundamental concept of “perceptive regions”.  These 
are three fundamental perceptive experiences that are connected to the extent 
of changes in a perceptive dimension and to the speed with which they occur. 
These experiences are described in terms of the impossibility of distinguishing 
changes  (the  “chunking  region”  or  CR),  the  ability  to  detect  the  order  of 
occurring changes (the “serial integration region” or SIR) and the impossibility 
of grouping changes as part of the same series of events that result in splitting 
the  series  into  more  “streams”  (the  “parallel  representation  region”  or  PR). 
These regions constitute a key concept in characterizing the cognitive process 
in general as the act of distinguishing a foreground from a background.
Finally, Section 7.4 puts the ideas of “distinction” and “perceptive regions” in 
the context of a narrative of cognition that, even in presenting very basic and 
constructive concepts, is already involved in the complications of existence. 
For  that  reason,  the  cognitive  frame  of  a  dialectics  between  memory  and 
attention is here introduced together with a brief history of the involvement of 
this  theoretical  framework  in  the  study  of  music  cognition,  from  Leonard 
Meyer,  to the “resonance model”.  This section is meant as a bridge to the 
presentation of new concepts in the next chapter.
Chapter 8 – This chapter aims to develop the basic ideas presented in the 
previous chapter,  in order to be able to put them within the context of the 
complications of an operating cognition. While the introduction of the concept 
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of “pattern” gives the whole narrative a leap in scope, this chapter is indeed 
just a natural continuation of the previous one.
Section 8.1 is dedicated to introducing and defining the idea of “pattern” as a 
fundamental  apparatus for  a narrative of  listening.  First  of  all,  it  presents a 
discussion  of  the  technical  meaning  of  the  word  “pattern”.  It  follows  an 
informal definition of “pattern” as “something that we recognize in terms of its 
components”.
Section 8.2 introduces the idea of recognition in terms of the detection of a 
resemblance.  Consequently,  the  philosophical  problems  of  the  concept  of 
resemblance are presented and framed within a process of anticipation and 
reaction  both  in  the  context  of  “intention”  (Husserl,  1970)  and  “structural 
coupling” (Varela, 1992).
The next three sections aim to develop the idea of pattern in a more formal 
manner. This is realized first by introducing the possibility of having hierarchical 
layers of patterns with the concept of “pattern structure” (Section 8.3), then by 
discussing  the  role  of  “perceptive  regions”  at  different  levels  of  “pattern 
structure” (Section 8.4) and finally by dealing with sonic events that while giving 
rise  to  experiences  that  are  consistent  with  perceptive  regions,  cannot  be 
easily framed in terms of patterns, such as the detection of global changes in a 
series of random events. This allows the introduction of “statistical dimensions” 
(Section 8.5) as cues for observing attention in operation.
The  next  three  sections  are  devoted  to  bringing  the  narrative  to  its  most 
complex consequences, such as the emergence of extrinsic listening with the 
idea of sound as the property of an object. For this reason, the narrative now 
turns from the experience of listening towards how we describe it. 
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First of all, in Section 8.6, “statistical dimensions” are connected to the process 
of  learning,  in  terms  of  the  openness  of  an  attentional  window,  and 
consequently  the  idea  of  “statistical  learning”  is  introduced  (Huron,  2006). 
Then, in Section 8.7, the idea that the different instances of a pattern can be 
distant in time from one another is introduced, so that a “dimension” too, in the 
end, seems to be the result of recognition and therefore can be framed as a 
pattern  in  itself.  At  this  point,  the  “misattribution  effect”  (Huron,  2006)  is 
presented and given a role in attributing properties to expected recognitions, 
so that from being the result of the cognitive act of a subject, they are ready to 
become  the  objects,  i.e.  the  instances  of  a  pattern,  that  we  are  used  to 
referring to in our descriptions. As a conclusion, Section 8.8 introduces the 
idea of “bounded patterns” as patterns that are marked by a recognition both 
at their beginning and at a subsequent point that is marked as their end. These 
kinds of patterns, together with the effects of “misattribution”, are given the 
capability of fitting a sensorimotor metaphor that is finally able to concede to 
them the attribute of object and can insert them in indexical relationships, with 
physical events, in a process of building meaning.
The last section of Chapter 8, Section 8.9, is a sort of a Coda. In fact, after  
having  developed  a  narrative  of  listening  from  the  simplest  experience  of 
distinction to meaning formation, the text now turns towards the unavoidable 
topic of meaning in music as a way to circularly link the ending of Chapter 8 to 
the beginning of  Chapter 7, when the issue was the act of recognizing the 
beginning of the performance of a music work. After briefly summarizing the 
history of the debate on this subject, it is proposed that the lack of relevance of  
the topic as a foundational issue, once the process of meaning formation is 
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framed is a consequence of a process of objectification of recognitions, within 
the effects of “misattribution”.
Chapter 9 – This chapter aims to apply the proposed narrative of listening to 
the  topic  of  “noise”.  After  having  discussed  some  common  definitions  of 
“noise”,  the  text  focuses  on  the  fundamental  contradiction  between  the 
characterization  of  “white  noise”  as  the  most  unpredictable  signal  and  the 
apparently  simple  and  very  predicable  experience  of  listening  to  it.  This 
contradiction provides the occasion to introduce the concept of “the indistinct” 
as  a  perceptual  category  that  is  consistent  with  the  idea  of  “statistical 
dimension” and addresses,  when drawn to the higher  levels  of  the pattern 
structure,  the  organization  of  music  in  the  subversive  terms  of  life’s 
unpredictability.
PART 3 – MUSIC. This part is intended to show the “viability” of the proposed 
narrative, so that it can possibly offer the reader a framework for applying it in 
analysing, composing and teaching music.
Chapter 10 – This chapter aims to propose a method for music analysis by 
listening that is shareable, and therefore open to discussion, provided that it 
positively presents a connection between listening experiences and references 
on the “neutral level” (the timeline of the audio track and, if present, the score).
In  Section  10.1,  a  discussion  about  esthesic  (listening)  analysis  and  its 
epistemological  status  is  discussed,  while  in  the  successive  sections,  two 
examples of esthesic analysis are presented, namely: an analysis of the first 56 
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bars of György Ligeti’s “Lontano” for orchestra (Section 10.2) and an analysis 
of Fausto Romitelli’s “Nell’Alto dei Giorni Immobili” for ensemble (Section 10.3).
Chapter  11 – This  chapter  is  dedicated  to  the application of  the proposed 
narrative of listening to music composition and teaching.
Section 11.1 presents a sonic installation, “Ordo Coelestis”, that is based on 
creating  a  connection  between  astronomical  parameters  and  perceptive 
dimension, in terms of the structuring of sounding dimensions that are able to 
account for the structure of astronomical data. 
Section 11.2 focuses on the didactics of pattern composition as a part of the 
wider didactics of compositive “linear functions”. The logic of attending is here 
paramount  for  driving  a  technique  of  composition  that  is  based  on  the 
discontinuities of recognition and is open to arbitrarily complex developments. 
Section  11.3  introduces  a  versatile  software  that  has  been realized  for  live 
performance and is directed to perform “pattern structures” in which the single 
levels are expressed by the attacks of sonic events.
Finally,  Section  11.4  is  dedicated  to  the  analysis  of  the  composition  of 
“Cluster”,  a  complex  work for  fixed media,  that  is  based on  a  strategy  of 
setting  perceptive  dimensions  and  pattern  structures,  which  can  be 
generalized as a technique of composition driven by listening.
Chapter 12 – The last chapter of this text is the application of the proposed 
narrative  to  the  discussion  of  the  very  general  topic  of  “soundscape”,  as 
relevant  both  in  musicology  and  in  the  context  of  contemporary  musical 
practices. The chapter starts from a survey of the most important definitions of 
“soundscape” and then discusses it in the context of the work of Jacob von 
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Uexküll (1934) and of Maturana and Varela’s concept of “autopoiesis”. Finally, 
the idea of “soundscape” is interpreted within the frameworks of perceptive 
regions and ”misattribution”, so that its relevance in terms of identity forming 
can be addressed. The chapter and the research text end with an appeal on 
the active role of the subject in contrasting the processes of subjection and 
identity forming that are engaged in contemporary global society.
In conclusion, the research moved from the need to address the problems of 
dealing with listening, in order to bring the extremely diverse discourses that 
are related to listening under a common analytical framework and to reveal the 
hidden  paradigms  they  conduct.  For  this  purpose,  the  text  proposes  an 
examination  of  theories  of  listening  in  terms  of  the  relationship  between 
grammatical elements as the vehicles of assumptions and metaphors that are 
at  the  basis  of  theories.  A  first  achievement  is  therefore  the  proposal  of 
founding the epistemology of listening on the idea of narrative, in order to be 
able to bring the assumption of paradigms out of possible claims of existence 
and within the observable reaches of “viability”.
However, the most important result of the present research is the proposed 
narrative of “distinctions” / “patterns” as: 
1) it  is  potentially  able  to  be  directed  towards  the  study  of  the  whole 
spectrum  of  the  experiences  of  listening,  from  music  to  speech, 
because it is situated before the constitution, in terms of patterns, of the 
target  of  listening,  and even before  the constitution of  the difference 
among senses (Section 8.8);
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2) it is able to constitute the basis of shareable discourses about listening 
experiences  in  the  way  it  connects  experiences  and   terms  of 
distinctions to singular points on the “neutral level”. For example, in the 
form of a sonogram or a score (Section 10.1);
3) it  is  able to foster  its  viability in a wide range of  practices,  from the 
analysis  of  (musical  or  not)  sonic  events  to  music 
production/composition to the didactics of music (Sections 10.2, 10.3 
and Chapter 11);
4) it is finally able to build broader discourses that extend their perceptual/
cognitive scope to issues that involve higher cognitive aspects of the 
mind, such as the formation of identity and bring the proposed narrative 
of listening within contexts related to society and culture (Chapter 12).
It is not yet possible to ascertain whether the viability of my work will extend 
beyond my personal artistic and analytical practices. Its involvement within the 
didactics of composition has certainly already brought it in contact with the 
artistic urges of students who, in some cases, were also able to incorporate it  
in their work outside the academy. 
This research indeed poses a lot of possible directions for further research, for 
example with the possibility of the algorithmic implementation of the proposed 
model of pattern forming or with a more formalized description of perceptive 
dimensions, that, by projecting the narrative of listening in new contexts and 
environments, will provide new challenges for its viability.
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2. IN SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY
2.1 What is it like to be a listener?
"If no one asks me, I know what it is. If I wish to explain it to him whom asks, I  
know  not"  (Augustine,  Confessionum, 11.14).1 This  very  famous  statement 
about time could well also be made about listening. Most of us are used to the 
experience of listening, to such an extent that we consider it part of our general  
experience of living. Listening appears to be a way to access the external world 
by getting some clues, the sounding clues, of what is happening within it. And 
yet, if a person who was born deaf would ask us "what is it like to hear?” we 
wouldn't know how to answer. Of course, we could explain the experience of 
hearing by linking it to the physics of sound waves or to the physiology of the 
auditory system. We could also try to take advantage of some similarities with 
the  experience  of  seeing  or  touching  by  looking  for  metaphors  and 
comparisons. Nevertheless, we would still  fail  to describe the experience of 
hearing or listening in its peculiarities. On the other hand, even we would not 
have any more luck even if the person who posed the question was sound of 
hearing.  In  fact,  if  we  try  to  go  beyond  the  characterization  of  sonic 
experiences in terms of the objects that provoke them, of some very general 
effects on emotion and taste, or the possibly corresponding notions derived 
from a specific music grammar,  we are mostly  unable to communicate the 
1 “Si nemo ex me quaerat, scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio”. The translation follows 
Outler’s version (Augustine, 1955).
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quality  of  the  sensations we experience while  listening  with  any significant 
degree of detail. 
What  is special  about the sensation of  an octave interval  in respect  to the 
sensation  of  any  other  interval?  How  is  the  sensation  of  a  rising  melody 
different from the descending one? How do we distinguish the sensation of 
timbre from, let us say, pitch?
While the first question exemplifies the difficulties in introducing uneducated 
listeners to “exotic” distinctions related to music grammars, the second one is 
a typical problem met when starting to practice melodic dictation, at the very 
beginning of the music education path. On the other hand, the third question 
is, so to speak, the black sheep of basic music theory textbooks: as timbre, 
which  is  sometimes  also  referred  to  as  “colour”,  cannot  be  expressed  in 
explicit quantitative terms within the western music grammar, there is mostly 
no other way to characterize it besides defining it as a vague “quality” of sound 
or by simply mentioning the name of the playing instrument. For example, in 
Hewitt “tone quality—also called tone colour or timbre—is the property that 
enables the ear to distinguish between the sound of, say, a flute and a violin 
playing the same note” (2008, p. 8). We don’t find more precision in Wright:  
“colour in music is the tone quality of any sound produced by a voice or an 
instrument. Timbre is another term for the tone quality of musical sound” (2000, 
p. 39). 
In  the  end,  the embarrassment  we experience when trying to  describe the 
qualities  of  our  listening  sensations  is  not  very  different  from  the  one  we 
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experience when we recount a dream that has intensely moved us and no body 
seems to share the same emotion. And when we move from the simplicity of a 
single tone to the complexity of a music work, we are still engages in a useless 
struggle of trying to convince someone to appreciate a music piece that we 
love by describing how we feel while listening to it.
The problem is the same whenever we have to deal with subjective states that 
we lack the proper  words for—because words are  formed as the result  of 
collective interactions in the first place. Thomas Nagel concluded his seminal 
article  on  consciousness  by  admitting  that  “at  present  we  are  completely 
unequipped  to  think  about  the  subjective  character  of  experience  without 
relying  on  the  imagination—without  taking  up  the  point  of  view  of  the 
experiential  subject” (Nagel, 1974). Almost half  a century later we still  don’t 
have a common agreement on how to deal with subjective states if we do not 
want to surrender to denial  as the cost to pay for a “serene reductionism” 
(Dennett, 1991) or to the necessity of posing their existence as a fundamental 
issue, which needs no explanation (Chalmers, 2010).
Dealing with our subjective experiences, which are sometimes also addressed 
with the words “qualia”, “phenomenal consciousness” or simply “experiences”, 
as I prefer by following Chalmers (2010, p.5), implies first of all the ability to 
distinguish  among  them,  so  that  we  are  able  to  reference  them  in  our 
discourses  with  the  least  ambiguity.  In  other  words:  we  need  a  shared 
vocabulary that is capable of directly connecting a satisfying number of labels 
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to an objective phenomenology of experiences.2 The requirement of objectivity 
is paramount to allow a discourse on subjective experience that, by holding a 
scientific epistemological status, can be publicly shared, as otherwise it seems 
we don’t have an reliable way to compare the experiences of different listeners. 
We will therefore try to follow Nagel’s request of setting the conditions of an 
objective discourse on qualia, in terms of the experience of listening, even if it  
will  take the form of  a  reductio ad absurdum.  In  fact,  Chapter  2 is  entirely 
devoted to showing the problems that emerge from trying to build an objective 
discourse about listening, in order to set the context for the proposition, in 
Chapter 4, of narrative, as the necessary epistemological status of a research 
on listening.
We  will  begin  by  linking  the  character  of  our  subjective  experiences  to 
elements  that  are  able  to  grant  each  subjective  experience  an  objective 
reference, such as a description that relies on some reductionist analysis, as 
some physical relata (see for example Chalmers’s informational principle for a 
theory of consciousness in: Chalmers, 2010). 
The  idea,  following  Searle’s  distinction  between  ontological  or  epistemic 
subjectivity/objectivity (Searle, 2008), is to link an ontological subjectivity (an 
experience  whose  existence  depends  on  the  subject)  to  an  epistemic 
objectivity (a proposition whose truth value is independent from the subject). In 
order  to  attain  this,  we  need  to  assume  that  an  objective  set  of 
2See again Nagel, 1974.
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descriptions/observations is possible if we follow some stipulated conventions 
within a community, which may possibly be the entire world.
2.2 From data to experience and back
We  could  say  that,  as  soon  as  we  are  conscious,  our  experiences  are 
something that characterize our life in each one of its moments. Moreover, as 
we are immersed in a never-ending sonic flow, which does not cease even if 
we are standing in a completely silent space, we always have some experience 
of hearing. 
This claim is related to John Cage’s well-known experience inside an anechoic 
chamber in 1951 at the Harvard University. This is a room that was primarily 
built  for  research  purposes  following  two  requirements:  it  has  to  be  as 
acoustically  isolated  as  possible  from  the  external  world  and  its  internal 
surfaces have to be the least reflexive as possible for the sounds emitted within 
it. This means that when no sound is made and everybody is standing still and 
noiseless, no sound should be perceivable. 
Yet, as Cage pointed out in his “Experimental Music” text: 
[I] heard two sounds, one high and one low. When I described them to the 
engineer in charge, he informed me that the high one was my nervous 
system in operation, the low one my blood in circulation. Until I die there 
will be sounds. (Cage, 1961) 
Even if we focus on the experience of listening, we are always open to it, even 
if, apparently, nothing happens acoustically, because  we are happening: our 
31
cognition  is  inevitably  embodied  in  our  noisy  organism.  Concerning  our 
experimental  purposes,  this  means  that  we  always  have  the  possibility  of 
experiencing something. And even if this possibility is modulated by the ability 
of consciousness to report experiences, we might also consider the process of 
experiencing as  independent  from these  reports,  as  unconscious,  forgotten 
experiences or even extra-body experiences (or OBE) and locked-in syndrome 
seem to suggest.
We could therefore make an attempt to reach objectivity  in  our  discourses 
about listening by first taking the measurements related to the experiencing 
subject at a given time, in order to objectively specify the hearing experience 
the subject must necessarily have at that very moment. Measurements as a 
whole constitute the references of that experience, but in order to easily use 
them in our discourses we may label them with a simple arbitrary text, such as 
an inexpressive, so to speak, catalog style text string, formed by letters and 
numbers, for example: “X458T”. 
A problem arises immediately in the way we set the borders of the context 
influencing our experiences: when do we stop measuring in order to reach a 
minimum set  of  parameters  that  will  account  for  an experience? In  fact,  in 
order  to  maintain  their  subjective  character,  experiences  must  constitute 
themselves  independently  from any public  language,  such as  the analytical 
language  of  the  objective  descriptions  or  the  natural  language  we  use  to 
express labels. The experience of, let us say, a note is indeed different if we 
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change the acoustics of the room, the environment, the position of our body, 
the time of the day, the ability of the performer, the way we are dressed, the 
way we stand, our state of health. Moreover, two experiences can never be 
equal because each experience is also influenced by past experiences, which 
constantly accumulate as a reservoir that is peculiar to each subject.
Accordingly, there are no pure experiences in hearing, as in some experiences 
of “pitch” or “space position”, because the way we extract a single aspect of 
an experience is linked to the way we describe it in our public language, which, 
in order to preserve the originality of the experience, must intervene only after 
we have had our experience. For the same reason, there is not even a pure 
experience of hearing that can be separated from other sensory modes without 
losing  its  original  character.  In  this  sense,  experiences  have  a  holistic 
character.
As  a  consequence,  if  we  want  to  account  for  the  very  individuality  of 
experiences, it seems that we need to include within each objective reference 
the entire world that is somehow contingent with the subject at the moment of  
the single experience, provided that a definition of “contingent” is stipulated. 
Each overall objective reference will therefore be, so to speak, the snapshot of 
the world surrounding the subject at the time of an experience.
Unfortunately, a set of labels that has been compiled from objective references 
will not tell us anything about experiences, as it restricts itself to replicating the 
syntax of objective descriptions. There is no need for experiences to rely on 
such a description of  the world.  The label  does not  express subjectivity:  it 
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simply replaced it.  Therefore,  if  we want to establish a connection between 
experiences and references, we have to engage another strategy, which starts 
by establishing the character of an experience and only later by attaching an 
objective reference to it.
Of course we have access to the character of an experience while having it, but 
we still have to rely on some labels in order to publicly communicate it. As we 
had to give up the strategy of moving from references, we can’t lean on the 
objective metrics of measurements to compare experiences. This means that if 
we want to go beyond the simple determination of an infinite number of labels, 
pointing to an infinite number of unique experiences, we need to propose a 
way  to  articulate  the  whole  range  of  our  experiences,  relying  on  the 
discriminatory  ability  of  the  experiencing  subject.  We  therefore  start  self-
observation of the subject, who will label their experiences in order to express 
a possible metrics of experience that is subjectively determined and can be put 
in relation with the objective metrics of references. In other words, we ask the 
subject  to  connect  the  context  measurements  to  the  words  of  a  private 
language he/she must set up. 
This  problem  has  been  widely  debated,  especially  with  regards  to  its 
presentation within the paragraphs from 244 to 271 of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations. The philosopher’s claim that a private language is 
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simply not possible has stimulated an intense and complex discussion over the 
last fifty years.3
In this context, it is not important to determine whether it is possible to engage 
in a solitary linguistic practice that, in order to be a deeply private one, needs 
to emerge from a conscience that does not have a prior knowledge of any 
linguistic practice. Nor to verify if the simple knowledge of a shared language is 
already  able,  with  its  communicative  dialectics  and  its  morphological 
structures, to deteriorate, so to speak, the privateness of a new language.
What matters here is that building a private language in fact consists of the act 
of connecting labels to subjective experiences, which leaves out not only the 
possibility  for  other  subjects  to  validate  the  proposed  subjective  metrics, 
because both the choice of labels and the labelled experience are subjective, 
but also the possibility for the subject itself to verify his belief in a world of  
experiences that is constant and stable: 
‘Well, I  believe that this is the sensation S again.’—Perhaps you believe 
that you believe it! (Wittgenstein, 1953, §259). 
According to Wittgenstein, the act of labelling experiences starting from the 
subject’s  impressions  is  just  a  matter  of  appearance:  these  labels  are  just 
“sounds which no one else understands but which I ‘appear to understand’” 
(Wittgenstein, 1953, §269). A private language is really useless to anybody but 
its  inventor,  who  is  lost  in  a  hall  of  mirrors.  If  moving  from references  to 
experiences renders experiences in the image and likeness of the structure of 
3For a general presentation of this debate see: Candlish and Wrisley, 2014.
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parameters,  the  opposite  path  lets  the  references  depend  on  the  arbitrary 
topology of  a  subjective  metrics,  which  obscures  a  possible  connection  to 
parameters that the subject is unable to detect. Even if this is enough for the 
subject to build a repertoire of practices, which will prove their efficacy within 
the context of their realization, it seems to be impossible to use a set of private 
labels in order to trespass the boundaries of the subject to build anything but a 
soliloquy, which might be artistically interesting, but proves useless in terms of 
objectivity.  We  tried  to  build  an  objective  phenomenology  of  subjective 
experiences  by  giving  our  private  intuition  the  responsibility  to  choose  the 
relevant measurements that we can link to the experience of listening. But we 
ultimately  must  abandon  this  project  because  we  cannot  rely  on  private 
language in order to find criteria of relevance that can be shared. 
2.3 Here comes the natural language
If  we can rely  neither  on measurements  nor  on the character  of  subjective 
experiences in our project to build an objective phenomenology of subjective 
experiences,  we  are  just  left  with  labels.  We  have  already  ruled  out  the 
“inexpressive” labels of the catalogue of references, as a useless replica of 
references, therefore all  we can do is to look into the public discourses we 
make in our natural  language whilst describing our experiences.  In fact,  we 
already  have  at  our  disposal  a  whole  world  of  labels  we  normally  use  to 
address the variety of listening experiences. What we are looking for are the 
indexes  that  we use to  address  the  quality  of  experiences,  both  in  simple 
36
“atomic” form, as in “red”, and in compound “molecular” locutions, such as “a 
fortissimo central A”. In both cases, we are dealing with the members of an 
organized and stipulated system of labels, which includes the rules for their 
correct composition in order to properly connect them to experiences. They 
might consist of the words of the ordinary vocabulary of our natural language 
or in an additional set of words that enriches our natural language for more 
sophisticated needs, as is the case of music grammar.
Let’s take as an example the experience of consonance.
This experience is invisible to objective measurements, in the sense that it has 
to be revealed by “enriched” ordinary language in  order for the process of 
objectification  to  be  oriented.  The  octave  interval,  besides  the  mere 
concordance of notes and pitches in unison, has always been considered in 
the western musical tradition as the highest example of the maximum possible 
consonance between different pitches, the consonantia perfecta.4
Over the centuries and precisely as a consequence of its peculiar character, 
this interval has been always granted a special role in western music practices, 
both, so to speak, as a positive one, as it  happens for tonal harmony5 and 
4For a general discussion of the idea of consonance and the role of the octave interval see, 
among the vast literature on the subject: Kolinski, 1962 and: Di Stefano, 2016.
5Without the assumption of an identity between two pitches at an octave interval that in fact 
share the same note name, a definition of tonal chord would be impossible. The assumption is 
so strong that one of the most common analytic systems for non-tonal music, the so-called 
Pitch-Class Set Theory,  considers the interval  between two notes independently  from their 
register (i.e. their octave transposition) as identified by the same pitch class (Forte, 1964). This 
is despite research that  claims that  the octave identity  might be culturally  shaped (Keuler,  
1999).
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traditional  orchestration,6 and  as  a  negative  one,  in  dodecaphony,  as  an 
interval to be avoided (Eimert, 1950).
And  yet,  when  objective  measures  are  left  alone,  the  octave  interval, 
numerically expressed by a ratio of 2:1 between the two pitch frequencies, is, 
as an objective reference, more similar to 15:8, which is the very dissonant 
major seventh interval than to 3:2, the consonant major fifth interval, which is, 
in terms of consonance, much closer to the octave than the major seventh. 
This  happens  because  the  possible  metrics  of  consonance  differ  from the 
metrics of frequency and it is not possible to apply the latter instead of the 
former when labelling our experiences without losing the adherence to the way 
we are used to describing them. 
In other terms, the opposition between consonance and dissonance emerges 
at the same time in the way we express our judgments on pitch intervals as 
more  or  less  pleasant  or  “usable”  in  our  compositions and in  the way  we 
measure the ratio between the frequencies in a pitch interval. A causal relation 
in  which  the  judgement  is  a  consequence  of  the  interval  ratio  has  often 
connected  these  two different  descriptions  of  the  same phenomenon.  This 
causal relation has been extended in the last 150 years to physiology, first in 
terms of the ear’s anatomy and lately in terms of the brain’s structure. Yet, it  
seems that what we consider the objective causes of consonance are rather 
the effects of the experience of consonance, which drives mathematics and 
6The octave doubling of instrumental parts is the most used device in orchestration. See, for 
example: Rimsky-Korsakov et al., 1964.
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physiology  in  search  of  a  reason  for  the  experience.  This  search  has  to 
confront the incompatibility between the metrics of the listening experience, 
which  is  an  ever-changing  one,  and  the  metrics  of  rational  numbers  and 
physiological models. Descartes already realized it when he pointed out in a 
letter to Marsenne:
I need […] to point out that all these calculations are only made to show 
which consonances are the simplest ones or - if you want - the sweetest 
and  more  perfect  ones,  but  non  necessarily  the  most  pleasant  ones. 
(translated from: Di Stefano, 2016, 65)
Nevertheless, once we decide to accept this causal relation we might discover 
that some judgments don’t fit our expectations, so that we might be tempted 
to normatively distinguish the correct judgments from the incorrect ones.7
Moreover, the power of the continuum, which characterizes the mathematics of 
objective measurements, is blind to the discontinuous categorization of words 
of the natural language. This is true, for example, when experiencing “red”: the 
objective  light  spectrum  in  fact  shows  a  continuity  between  infrared  and 
ultraviolet,  which  is  left  to  our  natural  language,  resulting  from  our  social  
practices, to be broken into culturally defined segments that we call  colours, 
which eventually appear to us as crossfading with each other in the spectrum. 
The same is  true for  pitch intervals,  which,  while  being a very clear  set  of 
discontinuities within the octave, differ in the exact numerical ratio according to 
7See, for example, an attempt to scientifically demonstrate the superior value of classical music 
over contemporary music, represented by the dodecaphonic school, in terms of physical and 
physiological analysis in: Frova, 2006.
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tuning practices so that a precise numerical definition of intervals is impossible 
without defining a context.
On one hand, our experiences are “experienced” before we can express them 
in language (as with children before they can speak, as well as in the moment 
before  we can  focus  on  an  experience  to  describe  it).  Therefore,  they  are 
neither shareable—because we use language to share them—nor classifiable, 
as classes emerge through language.
On the other hand, the labels of our natural  language are necessarily finite, 
even if we include the compound locutions. This means that labels must be in 
an under-determined relationship with the reference they represent. Moreover, 
this under-determination is already expressing a metrics in terms of the set of 
references  addressed  by  each  single  label.  Let’s  take,  for  example,  the 
possible diversity of accounts in labelling an identical reference and assume 
that one subject labelled that same reference as “a tone”. The reference is 
clearly  under-determined  by  that  label,  because  a  “tone”,  in  order  to  be 
experienced by listening, needs to be emitted by an instrument that produces a 
complex event, which also exhibits at least a timbre and a degree of intensity. 
The measuring apparatus will  therefore provide the complete information on 
the acoustic context attached to the “tone” during the determination of the 
related objective reference. Nevertheless, if we ask the subject to attribute a 
label to what someone might have labelled as a “tone”, the choice of that label 
will  depend on the subject’s sensitivity and expertise in using a specialized 
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vocabulary.  For  many people  the simple “tone”  label  will  be enough,  while 
skilled musicians with an absolute ear might prefer to label their experience as 
“a central c sharp played fortissimo on a clarinet with the duration of a quarter 
note at  about  100 beats  for  minute”,  which can be translated as  well,  not 
without some work, in objective parameters.
As a consequence, we can say that this kind of label (which we could confer  
the  name of  a  “common”  label  to  remind us  of  its  stipulated character)  is 
connected  by  means  of  metric  thresholds  to  domains  of 
experiences/references,  which are different  for each label.  For example,  the 
scope of  the “tone” label’s  domain is  larger  than the scope of  the domain 
related to the “tone played fortissimo” compound label, because the extension 
of the former includes the extension of the latter. 
We have started from the idea of  holistic  experiences connected to overall 
references, but as soon as we introduced natural language, possibly extended 
by specific vocabularies, we met the necessity to deal with the possibility of 
distinguishing  within  different  experiences:  a  possibility  that  is  the 
consequence  of  the  rules,  which  form  compound  locutions  from  “atomic” 
labels. Not only we are able to label with “a tone” what other subjects might 
prefer to label as “a tone played fortissimo”, but there might be even someone 
who labels such experience as merely “a loud sound”, without even mentioning 
if it is a tone or a noise. Or someone might even label that same reference by 
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addressing only the reverberation of the hall in which the sound is emitted, thus 
avoiding expressing the whole experience of the sound character.
If we want to account for this wide range of possibilities, we need to set up a 
mechanics  of  relevance  that  is  able  to  align  the  uniformity  of  objective 
parameters towards the subjective distinctions we express in our descriptions. 
We may, for example, distinguish within the overall reference a primary set of 
parameters  as the focus,  which will  be expressed by the label  against  the 
background  set  of  the  context.  In  this  sense,  we  may  regard  the  overall 
reference as a structure of parameters that can host a virtually infinite number 
of focus and context subsets, so that we can finally account for the common 
practice of differently labelling the same experience.
The  experience  of  “red”  connects  with  other  experiences,  such  as 
“transparency”  or  “saturation”,  which,  while  being  independent  from  it, 
nevertheless also contributes to the whole experience: in the same way the 
experience  of  a  “tone”  heard  during  a  concert  may  also  be  lived  as  the 
experience of the timbre of the performing instrument or as the cough that 
disturbs it, or as any other character that is connected to the infinite variety of  
the possible focus and context sets.
We  can  therefore  consider  the  correspondence  between  experiences  and 
references as an infinite number of what can be called “phenomenic dyads”, 
namely  connections  between  a  single  experience  and  its  related  overall 
reference.  Moreover,  each  of  the  “dyads”  are  linked to  sets  of  “common” 
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labels, which are articulated according to their proper language syntax, within a 
system of a complex articulation of constraints and liberties expressing the 
way references can bear different focus and context sets.
2.4 Observing the cognitive actor.
The  attempts  to  foster  objectivity  in  discourses  about  the  experience  of 
listening  have  evolved  in  a  very  complicated  direction  in  order  to  confer 
objectivity to our experiences. To meet this challenge we need to analyse the 
relationship between the simple and compound indexical locutions that we use 
in our natural language to describe experiences, which ultimately constitute the 
taxonomical  structure  of  a  world  of  connected  labels  that  our  language 
describes.
And  this  abstract  taxonomy  of  labels,  once  it  has  passed  through 
objectification by being linked to references,  seems to suggest an ontology 
that  mirrors the way we talk about it.  Experiences receive in this way their 
ticket to a common reality in which two individuals can share the same focus 
reference in the same way two individuals can listen to a same note that is 
performed by the same instrumentalist. Finally, the world is now populated by 
phenomena,  the  experience  of  which  can  be  described  with  different 
taxonomical  chains  of  labels  submitted  to  the  system  of  constraints  and 
liberties, which rule not only the possibility of labelling experiences differently, 
but  also  the  very  possibility  of  having  different  experiences  of  the  same 
reference. We could now assume that the experience of a tone might well be 
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described by the same listener as the experience, for example, of a squeaky 
sound or of a car horn because that phenomenon was consisting in all  the 
three experiences at the same time.
But we have ruled out the possibility for one subject to have alternative labels 
for the same phenomenon that is connected to an objective reference. In fact, I  
have said that experiences exhibit  a holistic character that, as it constitutes 
itself  before  language,  can  hardly  be  split  in  components  or  be  compared 
publicly to other experiences, because this would involve a private language. I 
have also doubted that two successive labelling acts could have the same 
reference  because  the  subject  has  meanwhile  changed  and  therefore  the 
objective context of the experience has changed as well. On the other hand, 
references  that  are  related  to  two  simultaneous  experiences  cannot  be 
identical because a subject cannot have two experiences at the same time and 
therefore  two  different  subjects  must  make  the  two  experiences 
simultaneously, each one bringing his own repertoire of previous experiences, 
which again changes the context of experiences.
Moreover, the act of labelling an experience necessarily happens at a time that 
is different from the time of the experience, because the labelled experience is 
always already in the past with respect to the linguistic identification of the 
label: the experience connected to the label is always a memory. 
This is true even if the experience extends to the labelling act, because the 
experience  of  labelling  something  must  necessarily  be  different  from  the 
experience of what is labelled. 
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With the introduction of time we made a passage to existence, which involves 
the presence of an operator, a cognitive actor, which may be defined in terms 
of a cognitive faculty such as attention or intentionality and operates organizing 
objective data, for some necessary or contingent reason.
Remembering is nevertheless related to an experience, which is the experience 
of remembering an experience. Thus we could say that within a “phenomenic 
dyad”, references are not connected to experiences, but rather to experiences 
of memories—or better to the class of all the experiences of remembering that 
experience. 
At  this  point,  the  work  of  Humberto  Maturana and Francisco  Varela  bears 
mentioning, as it is very important for this research and it will  be constantly 
referenced  throughout  the  text.  The  two  Chilean  neurophysiologists,  who 
established  the  basis  for  the  constructivist  theory  of  mind  starting  from a 
definition of living being in terms of an autopoietic system,8 are mainly relevant 
here for their discussion on the epistemological status of science. This can be 
derived from the fundamental idea of “biology of cognition” as the  “study of 
cognition as a legitimate biological problem” (Maturana and Varela, 1980, p.xv).
Indeed,  by  calling  upon  a  mental  faculty  such  as  memory,  objectivity  is 
projected in a “biology of cognition”, which constrains the necessary character 
of objectivity to depend on the contingent materiality of our body and inserts 
the process of knowledge in a loop between observer and observed. However, 
this necessarily mines the idea of an objective knowledge:
8For a fundamental presentation of autopoiesis see Maturana and Varela, 1980. This concept 
will also be very shortly presented in Section 8.2.
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The  basic  claim  of  science  is  objectivity:  it  attempts,  through  the 
application of a well-defined methodology, to make statements about the 
universe. At the very root of this claim, however, lies its weakness: the a 
priori assumption that objective knowledge constitutes a description of 
that which is known (Maturana and Varela, 1980, p.5).
If we think that the measurements we use as references are necessary entities 
that populate a world that is not contaminated by history, then the knowledge 
of our experiences is only limited to the parts of that idealistic world that we 
have not yet accessed. On the other hand, we need to trust our capability to 
access sooner or later that world of immortal ideas in its entirety, in order for us 
to  reach  objectivity.  This  capability  puts  us,  our  species,  our  scientific 
community, in a special place of the universe as the guardians, so to speak, of 
objectivity. But when we realize that we ourselves are the object of the same 
measurements we apply in studying any other biological phenomena and that 
we cannot find, at the moment at least, that unique element that puts us in 
such a special position in the universe, we lose our faith in the objectivity of our 
methods of investigations, of measuring. It  is not simply a matter of having 
precise instruments, of course, but rather of finding the right parameters of 
measurements, of discovering the topology of structures that involve hidden 
variables.  Maturana’s  and  Varela’s  “biology  of  cognition”  is  therefore  the 
attempt to put that world of ideas, our knowledge, which we choose as the 
warrantor for objectivity, in contact with the methods of investigation that we 
apply  to  the  contingent  world  in  an  attempt  to  understand  its  structure. 
Knowledge therefore becomes the unnecessary, contingent result of our living 
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in the world, of our both phylo- and onto-genetic history caught in a mise en 
abîme of contingency, resulting from applying contingent methods in studying 
contingent subjects. And the first result of this loop is the dialectics between 
the observer, which is not Science or Knowledge, but a human being in flesh 
and blood, and another observer:
everything said is said by an observer to another observer that could be 
him or herself. (Maturana, 1988, 27)
2.5 The language of science.
It  seems  that  the  project  of  building  objective  discourses  about  subjective 
experience is  undermined in  its  foundations because we cannot  ignore the 
materiality  that  is  at  the  core  of  objective  knowledge,  a  materiality  that  is 
typically  repressed  and  substituted  by  a  timeless,  immaterial  geometry  of 
ideas. We have given to the process of measuring the role of connecting this 
immaterial world of ideas to the earthly world of experiences, in spite of the 
uncertainty of the possibilities for the abstract system of parameters we rely 
on,  to  account  for  the  contingency  of  matter  and  ultimately  of  cultural 
phenomena such as language. In fact, we only resort to language because the 
physical parameters are not able to address the metrics of our experiences 
without being driven by our descriptions. And only at the end of objectification 
is the data able to trace back the experiences that engaged their recording in 
the first place.  Such experiences are now only a consumed memory of  the 
original one—or better the promise of their future occurrences, in case of a 
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repetition of their objective conditions, in the form of a topology that articulates 
the reference parameters.9
But the relationship between science and natural language is much more strict 
than we would like to admit. In most aspects of research a scientific language 
cannot avoid interacting with natural languages: not only in “transporting” data 
to the receiver of scientific communication as a “passive vehicle which merely 
conveys information” (Ford and Peat, 1988), but also in a range of practices 
from the public release of scientific information on media to the actual linguistic 
framing in the development of new theories (Bohm, 1981). 
Science is in fact engaged in social practices, in which natural language has a 
primary  role  in  accompanying its  development  adrift  in  time.  Here we deal 
again with the temptation of repressing temporality, which comes around in the 
personal  genesis  of  scientific  ideas,  in  the  collective  development  and 
overtaking of paradigms (Kuhn, 1970) and, in the end, in the life of scientists 
and all  the people around them. It  is therefore no wonder if  the process of 
connecting the experience of listening to a tone with the label “central A”, so 
that  we can look  for  an  objective  reference  as  an  instance of  parameters’ 
metrics, is not too different from the process of connecting the experience of 
watching an indicator that stops at a certain point of a scale with the label that 
results from certain operations of framing and visually organizing that scale, for 
example “440 Hz”.
9For a classic example of a complex topology driven by experience reports, see Shepard, 
1982.
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We can call these labels “categories”, which do not have to be intended in the 
ontological sense, but rather as descriptive devices that are able to distinguish 
equivalence classes within the infinity of experiences that can be memorized. 
But if these categories are built from the cognitive act of an observer, even if it 
is  a  community  of  observers,  even  if  all  of  humanity  has  decided  to 
unanimously adhere to those categories, they cannot be the warrantor of a 
description of reality that is independent from the observers.
As Scheffler states in his paradox of categorization:
if my categories of thought determine what I observe, then what I observe 
provides no independent control over my thought. On the other hand, if 
my categories of thought do not determine what I observe, than what I 
observe must be uncategorized, that is formless and nondescript—hence 
again incapable of providing any test of my thought. (Scheffler, 1982, 13)
We are therefore forced to face the theory-ladenness of our references as an 
important and unavoidable part of the process of objectification, which we can 
now downgrade to  a  less  ambitious process of  parameterization.  The term 
“theory-ladennes” was introduced in the late 1950s in order to characterize 
scientific observation as driven by the prejudices and misconceptions that are 
capable to of leading scientist to erroneous results. The work of Kuhn, Hanson 
and Duhem, the “founding fathers of theory-ladennes”, has distinguished this 
vice of scientific observation in two forms: 
according  to  its  psychological  form,  perceptions  of  scientists,  as 
perceptions  of  humans  generally,  are  guided  by  prior  beliefs  and 
expectations,  and  perception  has  a  peculiar  holist  character.  In  its 
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conceptual  form  it  maintains  that  scientists’  observations  rest  on  the 
theories they accept  and that  the meaning of  the observational  terms 
involved  depends  upon  the  theoretical  context  in  which  they  occur. 
(Heidelberger, 2013, p.138) 
A theory-ladennes of measurement is not necessarily a bad thing. After all, it is 
our certainties that drive our quest for knowledge, when we are not able to find 
a convincing way to talk about our experiences with language. For Kuhn (1970) 
scientific  knowledge advances  precisely  because  theory-ladenness  forms a 
wall,  so to speak,  that unaligned observations come up against until  to the 
point that the wall itself falls down. In other words, even if our certainties do not 
have  an  epistemic  value  per  se,  they  might  still  realize  a  systemic  role 
(Wittgenstein,  1969),  which  serves  the  advancement,  maybe  adrift,  of 
knowledge.
2.6 Points of view.
Constructing  an  objective  phenomenology  of  the  subjective  experience  of 
listening ultimately seems like an unattainable task because there can be no 
certain knowledge in dealing with shareable labels that have been arbitrarily 
connected to our subjective experiences. On the other hand, we can still go on 
taking  measurements  of  sounding  phenomena  and  listening  (physiological) 
acts, but we must resign ourselves to an objectivity that cannot rid itself  of 
subjectivity,  because  the  process  of  objectification  constitutes  itself  as  a 
cognitive process in the contingency of the organic materiality, in a temporal 
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stretch that we might call memory and attention, and takes place within the 
individual existence. And the labels we use in driving objectification belong to a 
public language, possibly enriched, of somehow stipulated words, which we 
use even if we do not have access to each other’s experiences. As long as our 
linguistic practices do not go too far in violating the consensual rules, so that 
they stay within the possibility of being recognized and usable, we can interact 
with each other because everyone has experiences to connect with the labels 
we use in our interactions. In this was, we exercise “subjective understanding” 
by using a language in which everyone is “thinking he understands, attaching 
some meaning to the word, but not the right one” (Wittgenstein, 1953, §269), 
because both  the  speaking and the listening subjects  cannot  validate  their 
beliefs against an “independent control”.
This  description  of  experience  is  in  the  end  shareable,  yet  it  is  based  on 
misunderstanding. It offers the illusion of objectivity, but it is ultimately founded 
on subjectivities, on points of view, that emerge from our subjective experience 
that  we  use  to  fill  the  void  (which  are  our  experiences  of  the  other's 
subjectivity). If we must abandon the proposal to build an objective description 
of the experience of listening, we are nonetheless left with something: we still  
have the labels included in the “enriched” public language we use to describe 
our experiences of listening.
These are the “common” labels that, in a simple or compound form, express 
the qualitative characters of experiences as contingent choices of adjectives 
and nouns within  the linguistic system of  possibilities.  The connection they 
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enact with experiences may be a stipulated one, such as the terms of music 
grammar, or it may be synesthetically inherited from other experiences, as is 
the  case  of  “height”  as  an  attribute  of  pitch.  It  might  also  come  from  a 
relationship—for  example,  a  causal  or  metonymic one—that  the experience 
holds with the abstract or concrete objects that populate our world. In fact, we 
do not always want to talk about our experiences by describing them exactly 
as they present themselves to us, because it might not suit the context well. 
For example, we might prefer to say that we heard an “alarm sound” rather 
than  specifying  that  we heard  a  “repeated  high  pitched tone with  a  harsh 
sound-colour”. It’s a way of labelling listening experiences that is sometime 
referred as to “extrinsic meaning” (Nattiez, 2002) and is realized by relying on 
our  belief  in  a  world  of  objects  and relations  constrained by their  material 
ontologies, which are mirrored by the articulation of our natural language. In 
this way, our labels are, so to say, naturalized, so that our system of labels 
opens to the infinities of “naturalized” descriptions.  
Our  “enriched”  natural  language  has  finally  reached  a  supervenience  over 
experience up to the point that it is hard to discern the boundaries between the 
idea that we use to label our experiences and the idea that we experience what 
we can label. This casts doubts upon the status of the possible experiences we 
cannot label, such as the unconscious experiences that are possibly due to 
momentary or permanent failure of memory related to altered states and on the 
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status of labels that blur the “naturalistic” separation between the subject and 
the world experienced. 
This latter case is related to the problem of the “naturalized” interpretation of 
simultaneous experiences between two subjects related to references which, 
beyond certain thresholds, can be considered as being the same one, or stated 
otherwise: the experiences that two subjects have of a same sounding object.
I have already pointed out that two subjects necessarily bring along different 
reservoirs  of  past  experiences,  which  conditions  how  they  experience  the 
present. This implies that a complete reference set, such as the physiological 
measurements of the subject’s body, should not lack the parameters that are 
related to the memories of past experiences. This is particularly clear when we 
deal with labels that address taste or emotions.
Let us take the example of a “sad melody”. The attribute of “sad” is related to 
the melody as if  it  were an object in the world and for this reason we can 
describe the label as a “naturalized” one. But what is sad about the melody? 
Where do we find the parameters that define the “sadness” of this melody? It is 
very difficult to find these parameters in measurements related to the melody 
because a happy melody is, as concerns the raw parameters, indistinguishable 
from a sad melody. We could drive our research in the same way we did with 
consonance and dissonance, but it seems that even if we might be able to 
detect some complex parameters that are related to “sadness”, it might be 
difficult to distinguish a proper set of focus references because “sadness” is 
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the property of an entire melody, rather than the quality of a single note or 
chord. In this respect, I need to mention the Italian composer Giuseppe Chiari, 
a member of the Fluxus artistic group, who in 1967 composed “Triste”, which 
translates as “Sad”, for solo piano. In this philosophical work the performer is 
supposed to only play a single note, in order to engage the paradoxical effort 
of expressing sadness with just one musical element that is inexpressive per 
se, a short note. The pianist goes on playing it until he reaches an agreement 
with the audience, often caught humorously by his pretension, on the satisfying 
level of sadness that he was able to express.
Of  course,  Chiari’s  work  also  addresses  the  problem  of  the  subjective 
character of sadness, as it is almost impossible that an entire audience might 
agree on the level of sadness of a single work, not to mention of a single note.  
We  have  therefore  to  look  into  the  physiological  measurements  on  the 
subject’s side, in its internal reference, not only to detect its degree of sadness, 
but also in order to look for those parameters that can be connected to the 
“sadness”  of  that  particular  melody.  Even  so,  how do  we  find  the  proper 
parameters to put into the focus set? And even if we are able to find them, this 
would only mean that the experience is independent from the melody, whose 
reference parameters would lay in the context set. Thus, it ultimately seems 
that the subject, so to say, is experiencing itself under the context of a melody. 
This actually holds true for all of our experiences, as any perception is first of 
all a modification of our own body and the focus reference must therefore be 
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sought within it. If the focus reference is external to our body, we can resort to 
our world ontology as expressed by our language to detect it. On the other  
hand,  it  is  quite  difficult  to  discern  the  pertinent  parameters  that  can  be 
connected to our labels in our physiology: there is no physiological parameter 
or neuron of the clarinet sound.
Looking for  the focus that  is  connected to a  label  in  the internal  reference 
means transferring the ontology that is expressed by natural language to the 
analysis of objective data related to our physiological states, so what I observe 
provides  no  independent  control  over  my  thought,  therefore  engaging  the 
paradox of categorizations.
Of  course,  we need to  put  our  cognitive  actor  in  a  temporal  process  that 
somehow builds the experience of sadness while listening to that melody. But 
again, I want to not that “self pointing” labels, as we could call them, are the 
models from which “common” labels are built. In fact, objectivity requires that 
all the factors involved in experience must be accounted for and the possibility 
of  sharing  labels,  which  descends  from  the  possibility  of  having  two 
simultaneous experiences of the same reference, is just a “naturalistic” appeal 
to the belief in a shared world. Natural language results de facto from the co-
presence  of  private  languages  that  share  their  words,  so  that  the  mere 
presence of a label, for the simple reason it is shared, brings the possibility of 
having a related subjective experience. Every word is a “floating signifier”, a 
term first proposed by Claude Levi-Strauss (1950) to account for words/signs 
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that  do  not  have  a  specific  referent  and  are  applicable  to  a  variety  of 
discourses. Therefore every word, when inserted in a system of rules of use, is 
able  to  allow  interactions  between  subjects  and  to  provide  the  illusion  of 
understanding each other’s experiences.
But labelling is an experience in itself. When we deal with a label, for example 
by  pronouncing  it,  we  renew its  connection  with  the  memories  of  labelled 
experiences,  together with the memories of labelling those experiences and 
with the constraints and liberties that  rule the uses of  that  label  within  the 
system of labels, within the enriched natural language: actions we take as the 
consequence of having pronounced that label. This is why the label is on one 
hand experienced  with  the  stigma of  the  presence,  which  we  are  used to 
attribute to objects of the world, just because it is an experience itself, and on 
the other hand it steals the place of the experience that it is connected to,  
whose presence, whose actual experience, becomes the promise enacted by 
the system of constraints and liberties that realize the context of our actions 
(Derrida, 2010).
This is also why it is so difficult to discuss subject experiences, why we need to 
appeal  to  zombies  and  hallucinations  (Kirk,  2005)  to  possibly  separate 
experiences from the words that describe and label them, in order to possibly 
allow us to grasp what the experience attached to its label is—minus the label.
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In  conclusion,  the  process of  objectification  can only  be  framed within  the 
context of a discourse that, because it rooted in the contingency of the subject, 
cannot express anything besides the context comprised by its repertoire of 
experiences and therefore necessarily expresses a point of view, even when it 
is stipulated by a community, such as the scientific one.
This  is  ultimately  not  surprising.  Most  of  the  time,  we  engage  the  public 
practices of our language, a practice concealed within the projections of the 
naturality it fosters. Following Derrida, we could call this practice “writing” and 
accuse it of suppressing its material conditions of existence in order to elevate 
itself as a replica of the world, lost in the charm of logocentrism. Nevertheless, 
we  have  characterized  the  arrangement  of  the  labels  of  our  vocabulary  of 
subjectivities as an experiment of shareability. We do not need to reach the 
thing-itself, because subjective experiences, as traces of transcendence, are 
autonomously completed by the speaking subjects. We do not even need to 
pretend that naturalized labels hide themselves as natural objects in the world, 
as  they  are  placeholders  for  something  very  different  from  the  objectual 
structure  of  the  world  that  is  described  by  objective  references:  they  are 
indexes for the aural experiences that are related, mostly but not necessarily, 
by causal relation, to the world’s logocentric objects. 
So, when we say that whilst talking about listening we merely deal with our 
public language, we mean that we do not have to deal with objectivity (as we 
cannot)  but  that  our  interest  rather  goes  in  the  direction  of  forming  and 
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detecting  points  of  view  expressed  by  a  language  based  on  shared 
conventions. We do not deal at all with what listening is, but rather with how 
we describe listening, in search of a description that is most usable.
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3. WHAT DO WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT 
LISTENING
3.1 Hearing, listening, and other dangerous things.
Up  to  this  point  I  have  interchangeably  used  the  words  “listening”  and 
“hearing”; it is now time to make a distinction between the terms. In his “Per 
una  teoria  dell’ascolto  musicale”  (2015),  the  Italian  musicologist  Marco  De 
Natale aptly  described the intricate  game of  mirrors  at  play in  defining the 
referent of these words. In fact, on one hand, the domain of listening emerges 
in relation to the activity of the auditive system, by a remotion of its role within  
the synesthetic continuum, which involves its haptic aspects, for example.  10 
On the other hand, the word listening is inserted in a process that moves from 
the vegetative threshold of, in De Natale’s terms, the aural to the  audial.  In 
other words, discourses about listening seem to oscillate between considering 
it as a fact of the body, the aural, be it in biological, (neuro-) physiological or 
behavioural,  and considering it  as a fact  of  the mind related to sound and 
music, the audial. This happens in a process of re-contextualization both in 
terms of its relationship to an object, or better to the process of constituting 
that object, and in terms of the social receptive environment that interacts with 
the process itself.  There is no wonder then that it seems so difficult to talk 
about listening without referring to a grammar of musical objects if listening is 
often addressed within the context of other related topics.
10See: Mazzeo, 2000.
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Through a swirl of linguistic inventions, Marco De Natale ultimately proposes 
the idea of auditio, as a dynamic layer that drives the transition between the 
aural  and  audial aspects  of  listening  and  engages  the  “acquisition  of 
experiential referents, that (…) are brought back to symbolic meanings in the 
context of music” (translated from: De Natale, 2015, p.44).
This  is  the  plan  that  concerns  this  text.  Not  because  music  is  its  primary 
concern, but because De Natale’s  auditio is outside the continuum between 
aural  and  audial, like a narrative that claims its objectivity and is realized as 
such in the onto- and phylo-genetic drift of the social narrative of the mind. It is 
therefore within our shared discourses, in the relationships between the words 
we use, that a referent of “listening” and “hearing” can be found. “Listening” is 
therefore the mark of a region (in Husserlian terms) of experience with blurred 
boundaries,  relating  to  a  constellation  of  other  words,  in  the  process  of 
realizing an ontology. This is how I use the word “listening” in this text, in an  
attempt to expose the unconscious narratives that listening is involved in.
A set of words of some natural language, even when meant to exhaustively 
represent the different aspects of a category, is not a very good ontology (Hirst, 
2009) because the subcategories it enacts are rarely disjointed. 
For example synonymy, in spite of its definition as an identity of meaning, is 
hardly realized as a clear and clean relationship among words. In fact, it has 
been proposed (Cruse, 1989) that degrees of synonymy could be established, 
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as ranging from absolute synonymy, the very rare case that two lexemes can 
be  exchanged  in  all  the  possible  propositions  of  a  language,  to  cognitive 
synonymy, which links two lexemes to equal truth-conditions when exchanged 
in the same proposition, and to  plesionymy or  near-synonymy,  in which the 
truth-conditions are unequal.
It is doubtful that the majority of what we are accustomed to calling synonyms 
fall into the category of cognitive synonymy or near-synonymy. What is certain 
is  that  on  one  hand  a  number  of  semantic  relations,  such  as  hyponymy, 
meronymy, troponymy and many others, can modulate the lexical context that 
differentiates pairs of synonyms, while, on the other hand, it is the syntagmatic 
context (Geeraerts, 2010) that is able to articulate the use of words.
If  it  is nearly impossible to avoid the inherent  polysemy of natural  language 
words, so that we can set distinct borders among the lexical fields of the words 
(I am borrowing here, with some freedom, the term introduced in 1931 by Jost 
Trier), detailing the same wider field of meaning, it is nonetheless possible to 
organize them in a functional relationship with each other.
In the context of the analysis of lexemes related to perception, for example, it 
has been proposed (Viberg, 2001) that the lexical field of perception could be 
organized according to the five traditional sensory modes, together with the 
functional  relationships  of:  activity,  the  degree  of  control  by  the  perceiver; 
experience, the degree of automation; and being source-based, as in syntagms 
where the perceiver is omitted. The research concludes with the claim that the 
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perceptual  lexicon  is  organized  by  following  one  direction,  from  vision  to 
listening,  followed  by  touch  and  smell/taste,  in  which  the  lexemes  of  one 
sensory mode are extended from the lexemes of the preceding one within the 
line, which behave as sensory prototypes.
Sweetser (1990) enforces the idea of a hierarchical structure of sensory modes 
by claiming that further extensions related to more abstract concepts such as 
“knowledge”, for vision, “obedience”, for hearing, and “internal self” for taste, 
are the realization of what she calls the “mind-as-body” metaphor (see also: 
Ibarretxe-Antuñano, 2002).
If we turn to the specific analysis of lexemes related to the regional experience 
of listening, we can still  try to determine a series of functional relationships, 
which we can organize in a structure that is possibly consistent with their use. 
Koprytko,  for  example (1990),  proposes seven coordinates  that  he uses by 
characterizing a number of verbs of sensory cognition in terms of specificity, 
result/success,  volition,  state  of  affairs,  exhibited  attitude,  direct,  intensive, 
furtive or active manner of perception, and finally duration. As a result, he gets 
to reduce the number of relevant parameters to four and is able to select three 
categories  of  resultative,  intentional and  existential verbs,  according  to  the 
respective predominance of the resulting degree, the combination of volition 
and  activity  degrees,  with  the  “state  of  affairs”  exhibited  by  the  object  of 
perception. 
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The three categories  are  related to English verbs as follows:  “to hear”  is  a 
resultative  verb, “to harken”, a second use of “to hear”,  and “to listen” are 
intentional  verbs,  and  “to  ring”,  together  with  “to  sound,   related  to  the 
category of existential verbs. Other missing verbs, such as “to eavesdrop” and 
“to overhear” need to be accounted for by the secondary parameters that have 
been left out.
The  coordinates  proposed  by  Pierre  Schaeffer  in  distinguishing  his  “four 
listenings” (Schaeffer, 1966, p.112 and following) should now be mentioned. 
It  should  be  noted  that,  on  one  hand,  the  universal  validity  of  both  a 
parametrical/structuralist analysis and the setting of (cognitive) metaphors in 
interpreting the meaning of lexemes are debatable: primarily, because they are 
made by lexemes and therefore a circle is implicated that must be accounted 
for. It is not the validity that is questioned per se, but its presumed universal 
character. 
On the other hand, the claim of universality seems to rely on phenomena that 
come from the  consequences  of  colonialism.  While  it  has  been  found and 
confirmed that verbs related to vision are typically the most used in languages 
across  the  globe  (San  Roque  and  others,  2015),  there  is  no  proof  of  a 
hierarchically  preferred  role.  Even  Sweetser’s  claim  of  a  “knowledge” 
universally  driven  by  vision  has  been  contradicted  by  the  hypothesis,  for 
example  in  Australian  languages,  of  the  prevalence  of  the  ear  as  the 
metaphorical  organ  of  cognition  (Evans  and  Wilkins,  1998).  It  seems 
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unsurprising  that  the  universal  claims  of  the  primacy  of  “vision”  are  a 
Eurocentric cliché (Aikhenvald and Storch, 2013).
Similar arguments can be made for the analysis of a lexicon in terms of the 
subcategories of a single sensory mode. In fact, it is easy to detect semantic 
gaps or non-corresponding widths of lexical fields between lexica in different 
languages. For example, in Italian there is no equivalent for “overhear” while 
there is “origliare” for “eavesdrop”. In Spanish, “sentir” is used for “hear”, but 
also for “feel” and “feeling sorry”, amongst other meanings. There are many 
more examples that cannot be accounted for here, such as the Dutch “horen”, 
which  besides  “hear”  is  also  connected  to  interrogating  and  fitting;  or  the 
Greek “αφουγκράζομαι”, which relates to sensing (for example somebody’s”,  which relates  to sensing (for  example somebody’s 
needs).
Consequently, if  we want to avoid the risk of projecting the categories that 
emerge in individual languages, even when shared within a wider international 
community, the analysis of a lexicon can only refer to the language it belongs 
to, together with the syntagmatic context that defines its use.
With these observations in mind, we can now consider Schaeffer’s articulation 
of the most important French verbs related to the lexical field of listening. In 
spite of Claude Lévi-Strauss’ Structuralist critique of musique concrète (1969, 
pp.22-23) (see also: Goldman, 2010) and of the programmatic adherence of the 
“Traité des objets musicaux” to the themes of  phenomenology, Schaeffer’s 
scheme of the “four listenings” is definitely in debt to linguistic Structuralism, at 
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least  for  the  application  of  componential  analysis (Geeraerts,  2010).  This  is 
conducted along two dimensions that are based on oppositions: the first one 
between  subjective  and  objective,  the  second  one  between  abstract  and 
concrete.  The scheme entailed by the combination  of  the two coordinates, 
which in the “Treatise” is expressed by the “Tableau des fonctions de l’ecoute” 
(Chart  of  listening functions)  lists  four  possible  categories  (Schaeffer,  1966, 
p.116): the abstract and objective, the abstract and subjective, the concrete 
and objective and the concrete and subjective. 
Figure 1: table of the listening’s functions (Schaeffer, 1966, p.116).
These are intended to articulate listening according to the possibility of turning, 
during the perceptive process, towards the object of perception (objective) or 
to the activity of the perceiving subject (subjectivity) on one hand, and to the 
focus of listening as meaning (abstract) or as the immediate given (concrete).  
We therefore have four verbs that point to the four combinations that result  
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from this analysis, inscribed in a “circuit” that numbers them circularly starting 
from the objective and concrete perception. 
The first one is “listening” (“écouter” in French), which is described in terms of 
the identification of the source of sound, by treating the sound as an index, a 
trace of this source. The second one is “perceiving” (“ouïr”), the instantiation of 
a subjective and concrete perception. This is “the crudest, most elementary 
level of perception” (Chion, 2009, p.20); a passive process directed to the raw 
sonic data that we do not try to listen to or to understand. The third one is 
“hearing” (“entendre”): a subjective perception that also abstracts sonic events. 
We have here the intention to listen, and therefore a choice regarding what we 
listen to in  order  to  make a description.  Finally,  we have “comprehending” 
(“comprendre”), an objective and abstract perception, which means “grasping 
a meaning (…) by treating the sound as a sign, referring to (…) a code.” (Ibid.) 
It is not relevant here to verify whether we are in the presence of lexical gaps or 
in the presence of  a meaning overlapping, in comparing Schaeffer’s  use of 
verbs and their ordinary use in French; all the more so that Schaeffer himself 
advises the reader that his table might appear too synthetic, because it has just 
“the methodological goal to describe targets that correspond to the specific 
functions of listening” (translated from: Schaeffer, 1966, p.113). In this respect, 
the  “four  listenings”  each  realize  a  targeted  act  of  perception  that  the 
composer interprets as a communication: it  is therefore a semiotic process, 
which can be described in the terms of Charles Sanders Pierce’s semiotics.
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It is not easy to summarize Piercian sign structure without overly simplifying, as 
the author constantly developed both theory and terminology.11 Yet a basic 
triadic structure can always be found, in which a sign, or representamen, is 
related to an object by means of an interpretant. If  representamen and object 
are in a relationship that is close to the well-known one between  signifier and 
signified, the idea of interpretant acts as a sort of mediation between the two 
so that  it  can be considered  as  the representation of  the relation  between 
representamen and object.
On one hand, the interpretant as being a representation in itself, that is a sign, 
can be caught as another representamen in a further triadic relationship that 
gives rise to a infinite set of triads, an infinite semiosis. On the other hand, it is 
possible to find recurrent schemes in the relationship between representamen 
and object so that it is possible to list them in terms of types of representamen: 
namely,  icons  (signs that  resemble their  object),  indexes  (signs that  have a 
correspondence in fact,  such as a causal  one,  with their  object)  and  icons 
(signs that represent an “imputed character” of their object).
Schaeffer  himself  seems  to  refer  to  this  semiotic  model  by  posing  an 
opposition  between  indexes and signs,  as  the semiotic  actualization  of  the 
opposition between abstract and concrete listenings (Schaeffer, 1966, p.119). 
In  Peircian  terms,  the  sonic  phenomena  are  dealt  with  intentionality  by 
selecting a representamen, such as the brute qualities of sound in “perceiving”, 
or  the  abstract  qualities  that  we  have  learned,  for  example,  from a  music 
11For a  concise account of Perice’s semiotics also from the point of view of its development 
see Atkin, 2013.
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grammar in “hearing”. The chosen representamen can therefore be expressed 
in terms of objects, along the infinite semiosis, so that they can be referenced 
by further  representamen,  such as  the  source  in  “listening”  or  the  musical 
content or even the linguistic meaning in “comprehending”.
The passage between the two representamen, or better between “perceiving” 
and “listening”, needs to be conducted as a process of abstraction driven by 
another semiotic instantiation so that we can connect an abstract element as a 
representamen to the object of “brute sound”, because this is how we connect 
the linguistic class of a word or a note to the tokens of the possibly endless 
variety of their instantiations. In this sense, the passage between “perceiving” 
and “hearing” is mediated by extending the original domain of the object and 
selecting an interpretant. In the end, the original object in the chain of semiotic 
processes  is  the  same  for  all  the  four  “listenings”  and  consists  of  the 
experience of a sounding phenomenon, which can be described in terms of 
measurements  resulting from the engagement  of  a certain  kind of  semiotic 
processes in the experiential  domain that we call  science.  Each listening is 
therefore the enaction of a semiotic process that, starting from a same object, 
engages  the  shaping  of  a  semiotic  chain.  In  other  words,  each  “listening” 
needs to be expressed by a linguistic description and therefore it cannot avoid 
the engagement of a semiotic process: there is no “listening” in terms of sound 
objects,  as  is  the  case  of  “perceiving”  (see  Schaeffer’s  “reduction  to  the 
object” in: Schaeffer, 1966, p.261 and following), without a verbal description 
of  the listening experience according to a grammar,  or  better  a  solfege,  of 
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sound objects. So, even when dealing with “brute sound”, a “listening” enacts 
a  description  of  experience that  refers  to  “brute  sound” as  the label  of  its 
interpretant. In the end, there is no “concreteness” as opposed to a degree of 
“abstraction” in listening, unless we consider them a narrative at the service of 
a discourse about music production.
In fact, Schaeffer appeals to Husserl in order to address objectivity, in terms of 
the “transcendence of the object” (Schaeffer, 1966, pp.262-264) by quoting the 
widely  known example  regarding  the  perceptive  constitution  of  the idea  of 
“table” (Husserl, 1983, p.86). On the other hand, he prefers to rely on some 
objectivity  of  the (sonic)  world without  dealing on one hand with a  passive 
synthesis, whose role is directed to show how objects are constituted in the 
conscience (Husserl, 2001) and, on the other hand, with the social practice of a 
public language as the requisite for a theory of consciousness.
Moreover, his idea of a sound object shows a tendency to rely on a hyletic 
adherence to sensorymotor, and therefore spatial-oriented, cognition, which by 
hastily relying on the Husserlian example of the “table”, seems to avoid the 
discussion  of  a regional specificity  of  listening.  Schaeffer  ultimately  cannot 
avoid a naturalistic approach to listening, in which the paradigm of a world of 
objects is still not entailed by sound sources, by sounding objects as physical  
objects  in  a  3-dimensional  world,  at  least  until  the  semiotic  process  of 
“listening” is engaged. And yet listening still relates to the distinction of sound 
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objects within the sonic flow, a distinction that follows a grammar based on the 
reception of emerging technological practices, a “solfège des objets sonores”.
Finally, the discontinuity of lexemes brings us to a discontinuity of “listenings”. 
Even if the “four listening” are intended to possibly overlap with each other, 
according to the composer, it is not clear what it means to engage different 
semiotic processes simultaneously, especially if the lexical fields of verbs do 
not entirely overlap. And yet, how is it possible to think about listening without 
relying on the verbs we use when talking about listening? Can we imagine a 
way of sensitively dealing with sound as it relates to the sensory mode labelled 
by  “listening”  without  the  use  of  “listen”,  “hear”,  “harken”,  “overhear”, 
“eavesdrop”,  but  also  “audition”,  “auscultate”,  and  without  relying  on 
metaphors  or  articulated  locutions?  For  example,  is  “sound  massage”  still 
listening?  And  what  about  dealing  with  environmental  music  or  with  the 
unconscious recognition of a song amidst the din of a  (cocktail) party? Is being 
habituated to some sound still a form of listening? 
Of course, if we connect subjective experiences with verbal descriptions, we 
always face some kind of a semiotic process, as this is a hermeneutic scheme 
that can be involved whenever we have any process of connection. Moreover, 
as  we  have  seen,  we  cannot  deal,  with  subjective  experiences  without 
connecting them to labels that we can use in our public language.
It ultimately seems that, from the semiotic point of view, our aural experiences 
need to depend on an  interpretant  that should be pragmatically selected as 
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appropriate  in  relation  to  the  context  of  that  experience in  order  to  be 
meaningful. 
On one hand the range and articulation of the possible contexts suggest that 
the  “listenings”  might  lie  on  a  continuous  and  multidimensional  spectrum, 
which is modulated by the possible pragmatics. 
On the other hand, the process of selecting the appropriate interpretant for a 
context  suggests  that  a  more  usable  analysis  of  listening  might  be  better 
conducted by starting from the way we deal with those contexts.
But if “listenings” are connected to pragmatics, it might be possible to deal  
with  listening as a  core process that  can be modulated and articulated by 
pragmatics. This means that we should step back from a semiotic perspective 
and turn towards some elementary aspects  of listening that do not rely on 
cultural taxonomies and rules such as language or music grammars, but are 
nonetheless still able to show how listening emerges in discourses as a part of 
the “praxis of living”. 
3.2 Modes of listening.
If  using near-synonym verbs to articulate the category of the aural mode of 
perception is the main way that we deal with the different aspects of listening 
in  our  daily  conversation,  at  least  since  the  work  of  Schaeffer,  the  use  of 
qualifying “listening” as a technical term, by associating it with adjectives, has 
been followed in this text.
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I have to mention that, if we look at a criterion of distinction between “listen” 
and the other audition verbs in the ordinary use of English, a search in lexical 
databases for  English language,  such as WordNet  or Dante,  gives us back 
what  at  least  a  native English speaker  already knows: “listen” is  related to 
“hear” with the qualifications of attention, intention or care. It seems therefore 
that “hear” is often dismissed as a homogeneous cognitive activity that does 
not  need any  further  specification.  Even the  prepositions and adverbs  that 
occasionally  go  with  this  verb  are  typically  addressed  to  the  relationship 
between the subject and the object of hearing, often in terms of its source or 
its content, rather than qualifying the process of hearing in itself.
On  the  other  hand,  if  “listen”  is  related  to  a  certain  increase  of  attention 
towards  a  target,  it  seems  consequent  that  it  might  be  connected  to  the 
strategies  engaged  in  order  to  appropriately  address  that  target.  As  a 
consequence,  “listen”  becomes  “listening”,  a  substantivized  verb  that  is 
specified by adjectives. 
This is  an ordinary process in the English language,  but in the cases I  am 
presenting,  it  is  a  relevant  aspect  of  creating  technical  terms  within  the 
research on listening. 
In fact, in several cases the association between the adjectives and “listening” 
would be unusual within the ordinary use of English and is therefore directed 
towards naming particular ways of listening  that  emerge  from  specific 
cultural contexts, such as with the use of particular technologies or with social  
environments.
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As  early  as  his  “Treatise”,  Schaeffer  proceeds  with  the  analysis  of  the 
distinctive traits of listening by connecting the four “listenings” to a couple of 
oppositions: the first one between natural and cultural listening and the second 
one between  ordinary and  specialist  listening  (Schaeffer,  1966,  pp.120  and 
following).12 It is not important here to go into the details of the single couples 
of  adjectives  and  substantivized  nouns,  because  it  would  involve  the 
discussion  of  individual  theoretical  contexts.  What  is  important  here  is  the 
differently pursued urge to render the continuum of listening in discrete slices.  
The result is a collection of ways of listening, which are often called “modes of 
listening” (Chion, 1994), “types of listening” (a locution especially used in the 
mottled literature about counselling and therapy) and sometimes also “styles of 
listening” (Clarke, 2005, although Tuuri  and Eerola, 2012, distinguish  modes 
from styles of listening) or “listening strategies” (Huron, 2002). These emerge as 
a constellation of objects that fragment the continuum of listening and leave it  
with gaps. And this happens because we articulate listening by fostering some 
instances  of  listening  within  the  ontology  that  emerges  from  our  natural 
language: those instances that are useful for our theoretical context. 
We have therefore reduced listening (Schaeffer, 1966), to 
the listening attitude which consists in listening to the sound for its own 
sake, as a sound object, by removing its real or supposed source and the 
meaning it may convey (Chion, 2009, p.30)
12I  have  to  mention  some  affinity  between ordinary  and  specialist  listenings and  Theodor 
Adorno’s  notorious  analysis  of  types  of  listeners  in  his  Sociology  of  Music (1976).  In  this 
respect, the passage from Adorno to Schaeffer is well marked as a passage from a person 
whom is characterized in social-cultural terms and the cognitive process of listening.
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to which Chion adds, as part of a “trinity” of listening: causal listening, that is 
related to Schaeffer’s “listening” directed to indexes, and  semantic listening, 
that is related to Schaeffer’s “hearing” and “comprehending” (Chion, 1994).
On the other hand, Denis Smalley, when introducing Schaeffer’s research to 
the English speaking world, diverts it, so to speak, by introducing within the 
listening  “perceiving”  process  a  reference  to  concepts  that  come  from  a 
technological approach to sound, such as the idea of spectrum and the use of 
sonograms,  whose  uses  involve  other  sensory  modes.  And  here  we  have 
technological listening (Smalley, 1986).
We also have,  in  open order, active listening  (Roden,  2005),  deep listening 
(Oliveros,  2005),  cumulative  listening together  with  the  opposition  between 
linear and  non-linear listening  (Kramer, 1988),  autonomous  or  heteronomous 
listening (Clarke, 2005) and finally structural listening (Subotnick, 1988). These 
are only a few examples drawn from the literature about listening, but there is 
virtually no limit to the number of possible listening types, as is also witnessed 
by  the  proliferation  of  locutions  used  in  the  world  of  counselling,  such  as 
discriminative,  comprehension,  critical,  biased,  evaluative,  appreciative, 
sympathetic, empathetic, therapeutic, dialogic and relationship listening. I have 
taken  this  list  from  one  of  the  many  websites  about  counselling 
(ChangingMinds), only to show the extent of possible variations in inventing 
new types of listening. 
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There must be therefore some humorous intent in David Huron’s proposal of a 
list  of  21  modes  of  listening:  distracted  listening,  tangential  listening, 
metaphysical  listening,  signal  listening,  sing-along  listening,  lyric  listening, 
programmatic  listening,  allusive  listening,  reminiscent  listening,  identity  
listening, retentive listening, fault listening, feature listening, innovation listening, 
memory scan listening,  directed listening,  distance listening,  ecstatic listening, 
emotional  listening,  kinaesthetic  listening and  performance  listening  (Huron, 
2002a). And of course, the author concludes, “this list is not intended to be 
exhaustive”!
What  we  can  learn  from this  proliferation  of  listenings  is  perhaps  that  we 
should not describe listening in terms of descriptions of the targets of listening 
acts, but we should rather pursue an explanation of some kind that is able to 
show how these targets are constituted within the act of listening in the first 
place. 
In this respect, the approach of basing an articulation of listening modes on a 
model of sensory cognition might help to resist the temptation to formulate a 
theory  of  listening  that  simply  mirrors  our  aesthetic  or  technologic 
assumptions. Kai Tuuri and Tuomas Eerola’s proposal (Tuuri and Eerola, 2012) 
is dedicated to find a characterization of listening that adheres to the dynamic 
articulation  of  emotional  responses  to  sound,  as  caught  in  a  process  of 
interpretative meaning-creation. 
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The proposal is built upon an older one (Tuuri, Mustonen and Pirhonen 2005) 
by  bringing  it  from  the  domain  of  emotional  states  to  one  of  embodied 
cognition  (Lakoff and  Johnson,  1980.).  The  original  account  of  Tuuri  and  
Eerola’s  proposal  is  based on David Huron’s scheme of  activating systems 
(Huron, 2002a) as mechanisms that evoke emotional states from sound, which 
is at the root of his ITPRA model of expectation (Huron, 2006). These consist of 
a set of six sources that are connected with the rise of emotions as well as with 
the emergence of other meaningful experiences. They are:
1) the  reflexive system,  which is related to fast and automatic physiological 
responses;
2)  the denotative  system,  which  is  related  to  the  identification  of  sound 
sources;
3)  the connotative  system,  which  is  related  to  the  identification  of  physical 
properties and passively learned associations connected with the sound;
4) the associative system, which is related to arbitrary learned or conditioned 
associations;
5)  the  empathetic  system,  which  is  related  to  the  identification  of  cues 
regarding some state of mind connected with the sound;
6) the critical system, which is related to the self-awareness of the perceptive 
process  and  to  the  verification  of  the  appropriateness  of  the  listener’s 
response.
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In  Tuuri’s  2005  article,  a  set  of  eight  listening  modes  is  presented,  which 
integrates  Chion’s  three  modes  with  the  instances  of  Huron’s  activating 
systems. 
While  the scope is  well  defined in  the article  as  instrumental  to  the sound 
design  of  user  interfaces,  in  the  2012  paper  the  authors  feel  the  need  to 
express the listening modes as strategies within the context of action-based 
cognition directed by meaning-forming.
In order to set the stage of the experience by listening, Tuuri and Eerola start 
from the idea of an embodied cognition as resulting in an experiential domain 
of meanings that is essentially sensorimotoric and imaginative. With their use of 
the term “imaginative”, they refer to Lakoff’s idea of the ability to 
project  from certain  well-structured aspects  of  bodily  and interactional 
experience to abstract conceptual structures. (1988, p.121) 
This  projection  can be otherwise described as  a  resonance among  action-
relevant mental images, which are the abstract structures, and two elements of 
experience,  namely patterns  of  sensation  and well-structured  patterns  of  
recurrent experiences.
Another important referent of the Tuuri and Eeroal proposal is the concept of 
enactive perception, as the idea that perception emerges first of all from our 
sensorimotoric, actions: 
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[it’s]  an  activity  of  exploring  the  environment  drawing  on  one’s 
understanding  of  the  ways  in  which  one’s  movements  affect  one’s 
sensory states. (Nöe, 2008, p.663)
This means that listening at its most basic constitution is experienced in terms 
of recurrent schemes that are action-dependent in a motor-specific way and 
work  as  enactive  efforts  in  imitative  enactions (in  which  the  ideomotoric 
processes follow the sound event itself) and responsive enactions (in which the 
ideomotoric processes counteract to the sound event). These enactive efforts 
may be seen as
synonymous  to  [the]  imaginative  effort  of  the  embodied  resonator, 
resulting  in  ecologically  relevant  mental  images  of  doing.  (Tuuri  and 
Eerola, 2012, p.28)
In the end, Tuuri and Eerola’s revision of listening modes organizes them in 
three classes as a progressive abstraction from the experiential modes to the 
denotative modes and finally to the highly abstracted reflective modes.
The three experiential  modes follow three main levels of structured   action-
sound couplings, which are 
structured experiences able to project meaningful action-relevant mental 
images relating both to our body […] and the environment. (Tuuri  and 
Eerola, 2012, p.28)
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They  consist  in  reflexive  couplings, kinaesthetic  couplings  and  connotative 
couplings. Three sub-types of couplings distinguish the last one: action-sound-
object, action-sound-intersubjectivity and action-sound-habit.
The four  denotative modes are ordered from more source-oriented modes to 
more context-oriented ones:  causal listening,  empathetic listening,  functional  
listening and semantic listening.
Finally,  there  are  only  two  reflective  modes:  reduced listening and  critical  
listening.
I will now present a very short description of all the resulting eleven listening 
modes, with the words of Tuuri and Eerola (2012, p.29 and following).
Reflexive listening  is  based on automated schemas as innate action-sound-
reaction affordances. 
Kinaesthetic listening is related to the perception of movement and in general 
to the sensitivity of “coping with the physical word”. It is based on primitive 
structures  of  “kinaesthetic  schemata  concerning  bodily  movements, 
coordination and postures”.
Connotative  listening class  deals  with  schemata  based on interactions with 
both natural and cultural constraints, which are therefore acquired by learning.
The  first connotative  listening,  action-sound-object,  refers  to  “sonic 
experiences that are about actions of encountering and manipulating objects in 
the  environment”.  The  second  one,  action-sound-intersubjectivity,  refers  to 
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“sonic  experiences  of  interpersonal  encounters”.  Finally,  action-sound-habit 
refers to “various habituated aspects of cultural ecology that are involved in 
actions”.
Denotative modes of listening deal are used to conceptualize their perceptual 
content and therefore are oriented towards sound sources or to the context of 
sound. The first listening mode is the causal one, which we have already met in 
Schaeffer and Chion and is directed to the source of sound; emphatic listening 
follows as the detection of someone’s state of mind or intentions;  functional  
listening is to detect the function related to the context and finally  semantic  
listening, another term derived from Chion, is related to the use of sound as an 
abstract symbol.
Reflective  modes are  related  to  the  highest  abstraction  of  considering  the 
perceptive process in itself.  Reduced listening aims to capture the listening 
experience  in  itself  and  results  in  describing  sound  qualities,  while critical  
listening puts the sonic event within a social context so that it is possible to 
evaluate its appropriateness.
There is much more in Tuuri  and Eerola’s article that cannot be mentioned 
here, such as the illuminating description of the eleven modes as reactions to a 
cell phone ringing. The article in itself is quite relevant for this text, as it touches 
upon several paramount tenets of this research. The idea of enactive cognition 
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and the connected paradigm of embodiment, the importance of repetition and 
context  in  shaping perception and the pursuit  of the significant  diversity  of 
listening, together with the importance of putting listening in the wider context 
of the “praxis of living”, are all fundamental issues in letting experiences break 
into the loops of semiosis.
Nevertheless,  it  seems  that  from  the  2007  article  to  the  2012  article,  the 
proposal’s character has shifted from presenting a hermeneutic ontology for 
sound design to expressing a  phenomenology of  some degree.  So,  in  this 
respect, what the theory seems to miss is the constitution of listening, so that 
again  the  discrete  character  of  listenings  matches  the  discreteness  of  the 
words we use to describe the ontology of our world.
It is therefore quite surprising that the problem of ontology forming in language 
is not fully addressed, especially as it directly involves listening.
In summation, it is indeed interesting to explore the different ways we listen to 
a sound and it is definitely didactically important to deal with a structure when 
building a degree of meaning that, upon further study, will possibly be broken 
in  order  to  build  a  deeper  meaning.  Yet,  in  case  we might  be tempted to 
express some objectivity with our theory, we should at least have to deal with 
the very likely possibility that the way we enact listening differs significantly 
from the way we describe it in our daily life. Moreover, in spite of the great  
number of modes and related schemes, in spite of the complexity we build, 
which are all  elements that seem to emerge whenever we want establish a 
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foundation for our linguistic descriptions, we always end up referring to some 
sort of subsumed ontology that will leave out an unexplained phenomenon.
Schaeffer’s description of “listenings” was ultimately an achievement that was 
necessary to handle the temporary ontology emerging from the technological 
possibility of repetitions, in the same way Chion’s modes were necessary to 
deal with the “audiovision” of sound film or Smalley’s  technological listening 
dealt with the public availability of software applications for sound analysis. We 
cannot escape our subsumed ontologies, creating a taxonomy that aims to 
describe an ontology, but we can use that taxonomy to explore our subsumed 
ontology  so  that  we  can  reveal  what  is  left  out,  by  looking  for  neglected 
experiences, without presuming that someday, we will arrive at a finis terrae of 
listening.
3.3 The Ontology of Listening.
The symmetry break that characterizes the human body since its banishment 
from the hyperuranic world of sphere-shaped Platonic beings (I am referring 
here to Plato’s myth of the progenitor of modern humans in shape of a double-
bodied creature, which is presented by the character of Aristophanes in the 
Symposium) has provided us with a preferred direction for bodily actions. As 
far as listening is concerned, the shape and position of pinnae already orient us 
in such a way that we can turn most of our sensing accesses towards the 
optimal area for distinction by listening. We can then integrate our distinctions 
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in the sound flow with the distinctions in the other sensory modes, so that we 
can best take action against the possible source of sound.
No wonder then, that the opposition between a  subject and an  object via a 
verb has  been  used  as  one  of  the  most  important  bases  for  classifying 
languages.  In  the  attempt  to  determine  the  variables  capable  of  capturing 
cross-linguistic similarities and differences, the typological branch of linguistics 
(Bickel, 2007) makes a basic distinction between verbs and nouns. According 
to a widely recognized connection between the syntactic and semantic roles of 
these clause constituents,  nouns are generally defined as “a class of words 
referring to entities” (Laudanna and Voghera, 2002), while  verbs constitute “a 
class of words referring to processes”. The distinction between subject and 
object is therefore conducted according to a same “informal semantic sense” 
(The  World  Atlas  of  Language  Structures  Online,  2014)  as  the  opposition 
respectively between a “more agent-like and a more patient-like elements”. All 
the world languages are therefore grouped according to the order of the three 
clause constituents so that a majority of languages, 565 according to the World 
Atlas, uses a subject-object-verb order (SOV), a similar amount of languages, 
488, exhibit a SVO order, then we have 95 VSO languages, 25 VOS languages, 
11 OVS languages and only 4 OSV languages. 189 languages do not show any 
order preference. English is a SVO language.
In  the  relationship  between  subject and  object  by  means  of  verbs  of 
perception, it is not really clear which is the agent and which is the patient.  
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However, I will adopt, for the moment, an “informal semantic sense”, as is used 
in linguistic typology, in order to address discourses about listening. 
We can usually describe the object of our aural perceptions, which relates, as 
we have seen,  to modes of  listening and can be expressed semiotically  in 
terms of the relationship between an  object  and a  representamen. However, 
what  I  am  interested  in  here  is  how  relevant  the  object  of  listening  is  to 
developing discourses about listening.
In fact, as a side effect of the idea that there are different ways of listening 
connected to those aspects of the sonic flow that are selected by the act of 
listening,  it  is  quite  consequent  to  link  a  single  way  of  listening  to  the 
connected aspects that have been selected and that we could call the object. 
A class of objects seems therefore a feasible way to express a listening mode. 
While  this  is  doubtful,  the possibility  of  transferring  the discourse from the 
impalpable domain of mental acts to the material domain of presences in the 
world  is  certainly  convenient.  But  these  presences  are  constituted  by 
perception in the first place, so they are unable to account for it: at most they 
can be taken as the interference pattern between our ineffable experiences on 
one hand, and our narrative of how experiences arise, our medical science on 
the other hand, so that they can be used to reveal what is missing from our 
description of perception. And the impossibility of relying on an object, with its 
well-known structure, that is well-expressed in our words, in order to found a 
description about sensorially relating with that object, in the end constrains us 
in a hall of mirrors that we mistake as knowledge.
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Jean-Luc Nancy  effectively  describes  this  sort  of  cul-de-sac  of  knowledge 
when he comments on Gérard Granel’s critique of Husserlian analysis of time 
conducted on the widely known example of a melody:
Husserl,  according  to  Granel,  perpetuates  the  “forgetting  of  being”  in  the 
Heideggerian  sense,  and  this  occurs  to  the  very  extent  that  he  does  not 
concentrate his ear on musical resonance but rather converts it ahead of time 
into the object of an intention that configures it (Nancy, 2007, p.20)
and consequently:  “Husserl  persists  in  ‘seeing’  the  melody  instead  of 
listening to it” (Nancy, 2007, p.21).
But  what  I  am doing by writing this text  is  expressing relationships among 
lexemes by instantiating sentences in English that are intended to represent, or 
at  least  to be consistently  connected,  with  non-linguistic  practices,  which I 
cannot avoid accounting for in linguistic terms. Here, we need to again appeal  
to  the  epistemology  of  Maturana,   who unequivocally  states:  “the  physical 
domain of existence arises in language as a cognitive domain” (1988, §1). This 
strong claim is essentially meant to express that within a text everything is just 
text, even when it seems to evoke something that is beyond the written page, 
that is, so to speak in the pen of the writer. In the end it is just a disposition of  
words that enacts the magician-like trick of letting appear, for a moment, the 
invisible beyond words. But reading, writing or even holding a book is already 
part of our existence, a part that seems to be too easily forgotten. And the trick 
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suddenly transforms into an opposite one: it is the text that disappears and 
disguises in a world of objects. Even though Maturana is willing to express the 
circularity of showing within the boundaries of the closed system of language 
that which is outside of the system—which is inevitably expressed in terms of 
elements that are inside the system—he still cannot abandon the idea of relying 
on  experience,  constructing  a  “biology  of  knowledge”,  in  order  to  anchor 
knowledge in its drift (Maturana and Varela, 1992). First of all, his gnoseology is 
strongly connected with the reductionism of scientific measurements, which in 
the end is  based on trusting the senses,  although caught  in  an  onto-  and 
phylo-genesis. Moreover, there is a fundamental dualistic tension in Maturana’s 
thought, which results in a certain diffidence to words and in the need to clear  
their  ambiguities  with  an  epistemology.  We are  therefore  far  from Lakoff’s 
cognitive  metaphors  in  natural  languages,  which  thanks  to  their  inherent 
ambiguity  allow  the  knowledge  to  advance.  Conversely,  while  necessarily 
dealing with language Maturana fosters a logicistic approach that, in spite of 
being connected to the existential aspect of the actions of an observer, is more 
similar  to  a  scientific  language  than  to  an  ordinary  one.  For  Maturana,  a 
scientific  explanation  therefore  consists  in  “an  ad  hoc mechanism  that 
generates the phenomenon explained as a phenomenon to be witnessed by 
the observer in his or her praxis of living” (§4.1): “witnessing” is at the root of 
cognition  as  the  optical-eidetical  operation,  which  is  in  fact  defined  as 
“distinction” and is enacted by an observer. 
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Distinguishing is here the act of separating a foreground from a background, as 
the  result  of  operations  within  the  observer’s  “praxis  of  living”.  While  the 
background is often interpreted as an environment, which is very similar  to 
Uexküll’s  Umwelt (2010),  the foreground is  typically  addressed as a  unit,  a 
whole, or better: an object. As thrown in an existence-by-language, our basic 
cognitive  operations  cannot  avoid  adhering  to  the  structure  of  our  “object 
language  because  this  is  the  only  language  that  we have  (and can  have)” 
(Maturana, 1988, §5.2). As we will see in the second part of this text, a more 
appropriate idea of distinction, which emerges in dealing with sound, mainly 
consists  of  the  disregard  of  an  expectation,  so  that  the  very  detection  of 
objects needs to be shown as constituted by, so to say, a series of expected 
distinctions instead of being a primitive concept.
However, Maturana stages the constructive narrative of cognition in a sort of 
proof  by  induction  in  terms  of  the  dialectics  between  two  constructive 
moments, the first one being the very basic distinction of a unit, which is a 
simple one, from its background and the second one being a sort of cognitive 
meiosis, which gives birth to an intermediate layer, so that the simple unit has 
now become a composite unit, resulting from the mutual interactions of other 
simple composing units. The constructive attitude of distinction is suggested 
by the definition of a simple unit in terms of a collection of properties, which 
implies that a language to describe these properties already needs to be there 
somewhere.  The act  of  distinction is  therefore caught  by an  observer  as a 
relationship between the complex unit of a subject and the complex unit he or 
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she distinguishes as a simple one by means of an interaction with his or her 
environment, which the observer interprets in its language as the setting of 
certain properties. There is indeed a difference of scope among Maturana’s 
constructivism and cognitive linguistics’ claim that “a grammar is ultimately a 
neural system” (Fauconnier, 2003). Therefore, it is not surprising if the former is 
forced  to  face  the  inherent  circularity  of  language  by  aiming  to  show  its 
emergence from interactions within a system of units and therefore needs to 
relate any such system to a meta-language that describes it (see for example 
as an attempt to formalize Maturana’s epistemology: Möller, 1991). The latter, 
by taking language for granted, does not need to face circularity and therefore 
is unable to deal with the ontologies it fosters.
3.4 Describing.
I will attempt an intuitive approach to Maturana’s epistemology here, in order 
to  deal  with  the  way  we  talk  in  our  natural  language  about  the  object  of 
listening without having to rely on a long introduction to its terminology or an 
explicit meta-language for the observer’s ontology. 
A proposition is here defined as a simple clause realized by a subject, a verb, 
an object and a series of adjuncts/complements that specify the verb and/or 
the object. In order to simplify the argumentation, I will need to follow some 
serious constraints, the first one being the restriction of the subject to the first 
singular “I”, so that the active role of the speaking subject is explicit. A second 
restriction  relates  to  the  logicistic  characterization  of  adjuncts/complements 
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within a taxonomy of objects and relations among them that we must take for 
granted.  This  restriction  is  due  to  the  ambiguity  of  natural  languages  in 
connecting  a  complement  or  an  adjective  to  the  related  element  and  in 
expressing the proper predicate/property in a standardized way. This means, 
for example, that when saying “I play a note on a piano” I need to be explicit  
about the meaning of “on” as related to the position of the “note”, we have 
already excluded that it could be related to the subject, or as the specification 
of “play” in terms of the instrument played.
A description related to a noun is therefore a proposition, which includes that 
noun as an object and is considered as appropriate by a community of natural 
speakers in the language in which the description is formulated. 
A  description  identifies  a  group  of  people  who  accept  that  description  as 
meaningful  for  some reason,  which might  be its  docility  to intersubjectively 
connect to the promised experiences of the community members that have 
been occasionally verified without excessive inconsistencies; in short, because 
they share the same semantics. 
Consequently, there are as many different kinds of descriptions “as there are 
different criteria of acceptability of reformulation of the happening of living of 
the observers that the observers specify” (§4.0).
Let’s define a  domain of description related to a noun as the class of all the 
meaningful propositions that are identified by all the possible verbs that can 
share the same adjuncts and all  the possible adjuncts that can share same 
verbs compatible with that noun and the subject “I”. For example: “I write a 
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note on a  music sheet”  and “I  erase a note on the sand” share the same 
domain  of  description  regardless  of  whether  “note”  references  a  musical 
element  or  a  textual  one,  because  if  we exchange  the  two adjuncts  while 
keeping one of the two verbs or exchange the verbs while keeping one of the 
two adjuncts, the resulting clauses are still correct. On the other hand, the two 
propositions “I hear a note at a concert” or “I play a note on my piano” do not 
express the same domain, neither with one another nor with the previous two 
sentences, unless certain unusual requirements are satisfied. For example in “I 
hear a note on a music sheet” the requirement is that a note on a music sheet 
is able to directly produce something that I can hear; or in “I erase a note on 
my piano” I need that a note is drawn (or in case of a textual note is laying) on  
the surface of my piano and I can erase it.
In Maturana’s terms, the operation of distinction is made by the observer, “I”, 
as a practice, the verb plus the verb’s adjuncts, so that a unit is distinguished 
from  my  environment  by  all  the  possible  adjuncts,  which  are  the  unit’s 
properties, to which it can be connected. 
On the other hand, if different verbs can be connected to the same noun as 
their object and to the same set of object’s adjuncts, then it means that they 
are expressing different interactions with different properties of the same unit 
and therefore belong to a same domain of possible descriptions of that noun, 
as a unit distinguished by the “operational coherences” of the subject “I”.
A simple unit is therefore the object, which is expressed by a noun, of a simple 
proposition that connects an operation of the subject to properties expressed 
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by  the  object’s  adjuncts.  A  noun  can  belong  to  different  domains  of 
description, which can be totally different or may overlap to some extent. As 
we have seen,  a note,  as a simple unit,  can be connected to the different 
domains of description according to its connection to verbs such as “write” or 
“play”.  A  noun  expresses  different  units  when  it  is  connected  to  different 
domains of description: the “note” that is written is not the same “note” that is 
heard, in spite of the use of the same label “note”.
Let’s  turn  to  composite  units.  These  are  expressed  by  one  or  more 
propositions that connect a verb and its adjuncts with different nouns and their  
adjuncts. 
For example: “I’ve heard the noise of a car immediately followed by  thunder” 
instantiate in language two units as components of a composite unit, realized 
by their succession in time. “I play the second note of the melody” instantiate 
two units, the first one, the “note”, is simple and is a composing unit by means 
of the order relation of the second one, the “melody”, which is a composite 
one. I would like to stop here and leave the development of this “conceptual 
translation” between the two “conceptual domains” of Maturana’s gnoseology 
and of the domains of description, to another occasion. What is important here 
is that a simple unit is realized in a different domain of description than the one 
that  involves  the  same  unit,  as  a  composite  one.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
composing units of a composite one realize it in a domain of description that is 
not the same as the domain of description of the composite unit. 
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In other words, the complete set of properties that define a written melody as a 
whole differs from the set of properties that define it in terms of the relations 
among  its  possible  components,  which  is  also  different,  although  partially 
coincident,  from the  set  of  properties  that  define  the  written  notes  as  the 
simple units realizing a melody.
This  complex  interplay  of  conceptual  domains  of  description  necessarily 
comes up against the redundancy of language. A metaphor, for example, while 
being considered as the main source of knowledge by  cognitive linguistics,  
might be nevertheless considered as a possible source of fallacies in Maturana. 
In fact, only if a second composite unit mirrors the organization of a composite 
unit, which is the set of the relationships among the components’ properties of 
the unit defining it,  will  we have an analogical relationship between the two 
units. Of course this is not a metaphor, but rather a correspondence between 
sets. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  is  the  cognitive  friction  between  the  domains  of 
description of the two units that are connected with each other in a more or 
less  analogical  relation.  This  is  at  the  root  of  the  process  of  knowledge 
formation, both in proposing more or less legitimate explanatory models and in 
engaging new practices that are more or less serendipitous.  I  have already 
presented  another  important  effect  of  analogical  thinking  in  shaping  the 
redundancy  of  language,  that  is,  the  possibility  for  an  object/noun  to  be 
determined  by  different  domains  of  description.  This  issue  is  particularly 
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relevant in dealing with the object of listening because it is at the core of the 
misattribution  of  domains  that  is  provoked  by  indexicality  (Hofstadter  and 
Sander, 2010, p.33 and following). 
Indeed, a written musical note is connected to a performed musical note and a 
listened musical note. I write a note on paper, then I can immediately play the 
corresponding key on a piano, which has the same name attribute, and when I 
am playing it I can also hear it, although only experienced musicians will be 
able to engage a practice, such as in using a tuning fork, in order to recognize 
the  note  without  having  seen  that  note  on  a  paper  or  having  seen  the 
performers gesture. 
Nevertheless, the range of operations that are expressed in descriptions by 
adjuncts defining the respective domains of description are totally different: we 
can use notes to compose a melody, but we cannot do the same by listening; 
we can be moved to dance by listening to a song, but we cannot do it  by 
simply writing it or even reading it; we can vibrate a note on a cello, but we 
cannot do the same on paper or by listening. 
Each  experiential-enactive  region  is  connected  to  a  domain  of  description 
realizing  a  completely  different  set  of  practices,  which  are  open  to  mutual 
translation and interaction, but are fundamentally different from each other.
As John Cage has pointed out:
composing’s one thing, performing’s another, listening’s a third. What can 
they have to do with one another? (Cage, 1961, p.15)
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Yet, the word “note” is successfully used as an index of the different enactive 
experiences of writing, listening and performing because it is seized in a net of 
metonymic (in the general sense) relationships among words. 
On one hand, these relationships form equivalence classes (determined by the 
different  use  of  the  same noun)  that  overlap  with  the  different  domains  of 
description related to that word and semantically modulate them (like between 
a musical note and a textual note). 
On the other hand, they serve the purpose of building an ontology (a note is an 
object that can be written,  listened and performed),  which nevertheless still 
cannot avoid being blurred by temporary (emerging from collective practices) 
linguistic games.
In the end, when we listen to “a music piece”, a “sequence of sine tones”, 
“what other people have to say” or “the Word of God”, which are typically 
referenced objects in the publications about  listening, we enact  a cognitive 
process  that  consists  in  distinguishing  from  the  cognitive  background  a 
constellation of units that is (linguistically) defined by a domain of description. 
But this is different from the domains of description that are possibly related to 
non listening practices, such as measuring, writing or playing, although a meta-
domain  can  be  set  which  includes  properties  of  the  involved  domains  of 
description as units.
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When  we  build  a  discourse  about  listening  we  should  therefore  avoid  the 
adjuncts that are part of domains of description related to different uses of the 
same object-name. 
This  is  not  a  simple task,  first  of  all  because it  is  not  easy to  disentangle 
ourselves from the connected regional ontologies that we are used to consider 
as different aspects of the objects that populate our world. Secondly, and as a 
consequence of this, it is not immediately clear which objects and adjuncts can 
be  considered  as  the  proper  ones  that  can  be  used  in  characterizing 
descriptions based on the “verbs of listening”, when our linguistic practices are 
formed by embodied metaphors and are therefore embedded in a flow of onto- 
and phylo-genetic cultural transformations.
Therefore,  it  comes as no surprise that discourses about listening are often 
hidden  in  texts  that  are  explicitly  devoted  to  other  topics,  which  may  be 
connected to more tangible and therefore more accountable ontologies.
In fact, if we take the titles related to the most relevant theories about listening,  
we rarely find an explicit reference to “listening” or related terms. Starting from 
Leonard Meyer’s  Emotion and Meaning in Music (1956) to Schaeffer’s  Traité 
des Objets Musicaux (1966), Abraham Moles’ Information Theory and Esthetic  
Perception (1966), Mary  Louise  Seraphine’s  Music  as  Cognition (1988), 
Delalande’s  Le condotte musicali (1993),  Huron’s  Sweet Anticipation: Music  
and  the  Psychology  of  Expectation (2006)  and  Aniruddh  Patel’s  Music,  
Language, and the Brain (2008), it seems that there is some modesty in dealing 
directly with the topic of listening. And “listening” suddenly becomes an elusive 
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topic, when it is not possible to connect it to a materiality, to a neutral level (I 
will define better this concept when I address Molino’s semiotics and the idea 
of esthesic analysis in Section 10.1) in order to rely on some positive basis.
Harold Fiske refers to this attitude as typical of the  copy paradigm, which is 
engaged from the assumption that “music, its structure, content, and maybe 
even its meaning […] [is] located ‘out there’ as an objective acoustical object” 
(1996, p.2) and consequently becomes a direction of research according to 
which “anything heard, experienced, understood, or felt is directly attributable 
to a real physical object, even one that is passing through time” (1996, pp.1-2). 
This is indeed is connected with the misattribution effect,13 which states that 
whenever we experience a strong emotion, that brain has a tendency to 
associate the emotional  state with whatever  salient stimuli  exist  in the 
environment (Huron, 2006, p.136)
or better: whenever we get used to a stimulus, this becomes a quality of a 
related element of the environment.
As a consequence, in this process of ontification, listening is studied as if we 
were “standing back and objectively observing a musical object much in the 
same  way  as  we  would  observe  a  piece  of  sculpture”  (Fiske,  1996,  p.1). 
Theories  that  follow  the copy  paradigm are  usually  based  on  an  idea  of 
listening as a decoding process, where cognition by listening 
13For a more detailed discussion see the Section 8.7 in Part II.
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serves only as a translator or an information receptor, as a system for 
information storage and retrieval, This leads to the conclusion that, give a 
performance of  a Chopin etude,  all  listeners ‘hear’  the same phrasing, 
same pattern structure and pattern interrelationship, same compositional 
scheme, and so on (Fiske, 1996, p.41) 
and potential differences between the listeners’ reception would be related to 
different translations/representations of the same source. But how do we deal 
when we face such differences among listeners?
Fiske presents two typical reactions to such a problem. 
According to the first one, it is assumed that “the ‘experienced’ listener has the 
correct  internal  representation  while  the  ‘naive’  listener’s  version  is  faulty, 
incomplete, misperceived and so on” (Fiske, 1996, p.42). 
This  is,  for  example,  the  solution  to  diverse  listening  proposed  by  Hugo 
Riemann (2010). Fiske claims that relying on the sole internal representation of 
a  music  source  necessarily  comes  against  the  continuity  of  such  a 
representation so that it is always possible to find a difference between the 
representations of two listeners. 
But in case one of the listeners is an experienced one and the other is the 
composer himself, the possible difference in the internal representation could 
be  attributed  to  a  misperception  of  the  former  as  well  as  to  the  latter’s 
misjudgement of the way a listener should listen. Therefore, such a position 
would lead to a music tradition of works that are always misperceived because 
it is impossible to verify the occurrence of a proper representation, especially if 
the composer is dead.
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An alternative solution is “to point to an objective measure of the performance 
such as […] analytical reductions and hierarchical schemes, computer sound-
generated graphs, or whatever” (Fiske, 1996, p.42).
But, as we have seen in the first chapter of this part, it is not possible to found 
the validity of the objective representation on the possible isomorphic internal 
representation of it, while at the same time founding the validity of the internal 
representation on the objectivity of the “external” representation. 
A  representation  bases  its  objectivity  on  the  “operational  coherences”  (in 
Maturana’s terms) that are theory-laden and therefore depend on some internal 
representation, whose objectivity cannot be proven (and that is why Maturana 
pursues the strategy of putting “objectivity in parentheses” (1988, §5).
Secondarily,  objective  representations  are  subject  to  technological  and 
interpretative limitations and constraints: there is no way to demonstrate that 
these limitations and constraints are not leaving out what is necessary to build 
a proper representation of music.
Fiske ultimately concludes that we must accept the validity of all the different 
internal  representations  of  a  same  musical  source.  Therefore,  the  copy 
paradigm 
is an inadequate description of the relationship between sound objects 
and  perceiver  [because]  it  cannot  support  the  idea  that  musical 
organization  is  contained  in  sound  objects  while  also  supporting 
conflicting  internal  representations  of  a  musical  performance.  (Fiske, 
1996, p.43)
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Nevertheless,  Fiske’s  criticism  addresses  two  key  assumptions  in  current 
theories of listening: the unreliability of objective references and the uncritical 
adoption of ontological paradigms that are not directly related to listening. The 
first assumption will be discussed in Section 3.5, while the second one will be 
dealt with in Section 3.7.
3.5 References. 
Regarding the first point, there are basically three kinds of references, which 
are used with the roles of  Maturana’s  “operational  coherences”  in  order  to 
anchor the discourses about listening to a certain objectivity. The first one is 
related to the elements of western music grammar we use when talking about 
listening. Mary Louise Serafine offers a historically important presentation of 
this  criticism,  claiming that  when using the concepts  taken from traditional 
music grammar to deal with music listening, 
the  very  derivation  of  tones,  intervals,  and  chords  depends  on  the 
conscious usually intellectually motivated analysis of compositions  [and 
in the end] although the analysis is useful and necessary for intellectual 
purposes, there is no reason to believe that the units of analysis are also 
the units of perception.
(Serafine, 1988, p.25) 
This is a consequence of a mismatch between domains of  description and 
holds when talking about subjects related to cognition through listening, both 
when  referring  to  music  score  and  to  analytical  schemes  derived  from 
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abstraction of  notational  items such as,  among many others,  the analytical 
schemes  of  Heinrich  Schenker  (Schenker  and  Salzer,  1969)  or  Allen  Forte 
(1964).
The second kind of reference comes from the data obtained by measurements 
of phenomena related to the listening experience. This is the case of acoustical 
data, such as the sound wave or the spectrogram/sonogram (Smalley, 1997), 
but also the case of data taken from neural activity.
Here we meet the two problems mentioned by Fiske. The first one is related to 
the  technological  status  of  the  data  retrieval  techniques,  such  as  Positron 
Emission  Tomography  (PET)  or  “functional  Magnetic  Resonance  Imaging 
(fMRI)”  (Noë,  2009)  both  in  terms of  their  resolution  in  time or  in  the data 
domain and for relating data to their pertinence in relation with the referenced 
experience. As concerns the latter, the comparative method is questioned in its 
ability to deal with a neural activity that is not working in just one direction but 
“is rather characterized by loops and two-directionalities (Noë, 2009, p.22 and 
following) and context-depending.14 
The second problem is  related  to  the degree of  translatability  between the 
domain of description of the composite units in the data set and the domain of 
description  of  the  composite  units  in  the  referenced  experiences  that  are 
connected to the data set. 
14See the analysis of place cells-remapping in: Datteri, 2012, p.109 and following
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In order to have a scientific explanation, in Maturana’s terms, the organization 
of the units in the data set, which corresponds to “operational coherences” of 
the observer, must in fact be isomorphic to the organization of the units within 
the explanandum composite system of units in such a way that some units in 
the domain of description of the data set, which constitute the explanans, are 
causally connected to the isomorphic composite system of units, which is also 
in  the  data  set.  In  sum,  the  explanans must  be  in  the  same  domain  of 
description  as  the  collected  data.  Otherwise  we  fall  into  the  paradox  of 
categories  that I mentioned in chapter 1.1. In fact, the translating connection 
between the referenced  experience,  which is  presented in  terms related to 
musical  grammar  and  the  internal  symbolic  representation  that  should  be 
isomorphic to it, is hardly realized, as “the generalizations expressed by the 
symbolic  hypothesis  are  extremely  difficult  to  ‘translate’  into  neural  terms” 
(translated from: Datteri, 2012, p.116). This happens because
the risk,  which  is  related  to  many procedures  of  direct  investigations, 
consists in allowing the experimental data to surpass any interpretative 
hypothesis, by abstracting them from the very methodological condition 
of their detection: if a theoretical frame that is able to host and interpret 
data is lacking, the final result of research reduces itself to a collection of 
more  or  less  homogeneous  data.  (translated  from:  Di  Stefano,  2016, 
p.142)
In the end, research should not start from a description of the experience in 
terms of a culturally evolved system of labels such as a music grammar, but it  
should  rather  aim to  show how this  culturally  evolved  system of  labels  is 
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possible in the first place. In particular, a discourse about listening to music or 
sound in general cannot be independent from a discourse about listening to 
words, especially if the research is based on an existing vocabulary.
Finally,  the  third  kind  of  reference  comprises  human  reports  of  listening 
experiences.  We can roughly distinguish two different subcategories:  verbal 
reports in a natural language and non-linguistic reports, such as drawings or 
movements. The problems that are possibly encountered in the first subkind 
are again connected to the use of the “enriched” vocabulary that comes from a 
conventional  taxonomical  description,  resulting  in  an  ontology,  such  as  the 
music grammar. An investigation of listening should show how listening is able 
to  account  for  a  specific  music  grammar,  so  that  it  can  also  account  for 
grammars that are different from our own, and therefore it should not be based 
on an analysis that starts from a specific music grammar if it wants to avoid the 
circular  paradox of categories.  This of course does not mean that language 
should be totally  avoided,  but  rather  that  an apparatus of  listening, be it  a 
narrative or a scientific explanation, should face the circularity of language and 
therefore account for language, which cannot be done by starting from music 
grammars.
The second subkind has the advantage of avoiding language, at least in the 
constitution of reports, although any theory that has to be communicated to a 
community cannot really get rid of language. Delalande, for example, directs 
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the analysis of listening by driving it with the apparatus of listening conducts. 
These are strategies 
of focusing on particular elements, which not only contribute to shape a 
perceptive image of a music piece, with its symbolizations, its sense, but 
also provoke sensations,  possibly  emotions,  which in turn reinforce or 
redirect  attention.  [They  are  therefore]  acts  in  which  finality,  strategy, 
perceptive construction, symbolizations, emotions are in relationship of 
dependence with each other  and progressive adaptation to an object. 
(translated from: Delalande, 2013, p.42)
These  perceptive  acts  may  therefore  result  in  references  that  witness  this 
complex, holistic, sensorial approach related to listening with verbal and non-
verbal  reports.  These  reports  are  a  consequence  of  the  functional  role  of 
listening  within  the  “praxis  of  living”  and  are  therefore  the  symptom  of  a 
possible basic root of cognition that is working before the distinction among 
senses  and  possibly  constituting  them  before  we  account  them  in  our 
descriptions.  In  this  context,  I  can  only  refer  to  the  experiments  of  sense 
substitution as a possible clue regarding the emergence of senses as patterns 
of embodied behaviour (O’Regan, 2011).
3.6 The Object
The  second  point  of  Fiske’s  criticism  gestures  towards  the  wide  spread 
adoption of the paradigm of object in dealing with listening. I am referring here 
mainly to my “Sounds and Objects” (2012) when addressing a paradigm that, 
while  having  been  introduced  for  the  first  time  in  relation  to  listening  by 
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Schaeffer  in  his  treatise  (1966),  it  is  only  from  about  1990  that  the  word 
“object” has reached such a status of common use in dealing with listening 
that it is taken for granted.
We find therefore
an increasing use of the word ‘object’ defined as ‘sound object’, ‘sonic 
object’, ‘music object’ or ‘auditory object’ in research mainly related to 
acoustics,  neurophysiology,  psychoacoustics,  philosophy,  semiology, 
sound design, musicology, music composition and music informatics. […] 
[All these disciplines] try to define the boundaries of phenomenic contexts 
that are ultimately related to the experience of sound, be they subjective 
sound  sensations,  verbal  descriptions  of  sound  sensations,  visual 
representations of physical or physiological data, visual signs related to 
musical intentions or others. Each one of those disciplines uses language 
to gather a set of descriptions of the phenomenic context they refer to 
and at  the same time establishes the connections with another  set  of 
descriptions. (Viel, 2012, p.234)
In the adoption of the paradigm of the object, I distinguish three main aspects 
that  ultimately  connect  the  different  descriptions of  listening to  domains  of 
description  that  include  object as  the  label  for  composing  and  possible 
composite units.
First of all,  objects are distinguished from a background in the same way a 
visual figure detaches itself from a plane that loses the focus. In this way, the 
object  inherits  the  perceptive  patterns,  such  as  Gestaltic  laws,  that  were 
connected to vision in the first place. This aspect is also connected to the use 
of referring to the graphic objects of notation, as we have already dealt with, 
which in the end is related to indexical or causal associations of the listening 
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experience to a  sounding object (Rocchesso and Fontana, 2003) in terms of 
“naturalized labels”.
The second aspect is related to the container image schema (Lakoff, 1987) in 
order  to  build  a  taxonomy  in  which  bigger  objects include,  as  a  lower 
hierarchical level of the taxonomy, smaller objects.
Sometimes the schema involves levels that are not described as  objects, so 
that only a specific layer of the taxonomy entails the paradigm of the object, as 
it  happens  in  Schaeffer’s  opposition  between  object  and  structure (1966, 
pp.277-278).
Finally, it is the logic-linguistic use of words as categorical labels that permits a 
use of this paradigm in order to adhere to the standard of Object Oriented 
Paradigm. The object therefore becomes a class that needs to be instantiated 
in order to connect with experience and, in the perfectly reversible process, 
listening is  directed to identify  instances of  a  class in  the sound flow. This 
aspect does not simply point us to a domain of description, which entails units 
and  relationships  among  them  as  a  “theoryladenness”  for  our  analysis  of 
listening,  but  rather,  and  more  dramatically,  ascribes  our  search  for  such 
domains of  description to the very  structure of  our  language,  as  based on 
noun, verbs and objects.
This is not a new topic, as David Bohm (1981) has already addressed it in his 
attempt to build a proper domain of description for quantum mechanics. The 
paradigm according to which linguistic typology classifies world languages by 
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determining their  word order  takes for  granted that  the structure of  nouns, 
verbs and objects is universal.
On the other hand, 
this is a pervasive structure, leading in the whole of life to a function of 
thought tending to divide things into separate entities, such entities being 
conceived of as essentially fixed and static in their nature. When this view 
is carried to its limit, one arrives at the prevailing scientific world view, in 
which every-thing is regarded as ultimately constituted out of  a set of 
basic particles of fixed nature. (Bohm, 1981, p.37)
Therefore, the interdependence between our set of labels and our experiences 
seems  to  set  us  in  a  pervasive  system of  meaning  which  does  not  allow 
addressing what is outside of this system, or at least makes it a rather difficult 
task. Language has become an apparatus, something that has “the capacity to 
capture, orient, determine, intercept,  model, control, or secure the gestures, 
behaviours, opinions, or discourses of living beings” (Agamben, 2009, p.14) 
and is inscribed in relationships drives by games of power (Foucault, 1995).
As a consequence, it is not easy to deal with languages that do not adhere to 
the noun-based structure of our language, because we might not even realize 
what  that  means.  In  fact,  even  in  dealing  with  possible  different  language 
structures, not only the Indo-European language speakers, but also linguistics 
itself as a discipline born in a culture based on Indo-European language, tend 
to reduce languages that are different from ours, such as Iroquoian Cayuga or 
Polynesian  Tongan,  within  the schemes of  the noun-verb-object  structures. 
The appeal “to look at the distinction languages really make, rather than to look 
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for distinctions only because we have inherited them from the study of Indo-
European” (Broschart, 1997, p.160) can indeed be extended to the study of 
listening.  Maturana’s  epistemology  of  simple  and  composite  classes  is 
ultimately  not  so  different  from  the  taxonomy  of  objects with  its  spatial 
metaphor,  which  comes  from the  sensorimotoric’s  and visual’s  domains  of 
description.
Again, in dealing with listening we cannot take the paradigm of the object as a 
primitive  model  for  describing  our  experiences,  which  has  to  be  taken  for 
granted,  but  we  should  instead  try  to  show how using  this  paradigm can 
describe listening without resorting to “naturalized labels”.
Perhaps, adopting an idea of distinction that does not imply a differentiation 
between a foreground and a background as an elementary cognitive act can 
help  to  construct  a  narrative  that  ultimately  might  make  available  to  our 
descriptions Schaeffer’s  objects  as well  as notational  ones as  the result  of 
more basic cognitive processes.
3.7 The Subject
When  dealing  with  descriptions,  I  have  set  the  constraint  to  only  use  the 
subject “I”. A description related to a given object has been accepted only if 
the  association  among the subject  “I”  with  a  verb,  and the  adjuncts,  both 
related to the verb and the object, have been considered as meaningful from a 
community  of  native  speakers  in  the  natural  language  of  the  description. 
“Meaningful”  here  means  that  the  description  has  been  judged  as 
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grammatically correct and can be connected to a semantics, which is related 
to the “operational coherences” of the community of speakers in such a way 
that, when expressed by the subject itself and under certain conditions, the 
description can be considered appropriate. 
Conditions are related to the range of domains of description that are entailed 
by the subject “I” and the object. On the other hand, domains of description 
are defined by ranges of compatible verbs and adjuncts, which are mutually 
implied and are connected to domains of “operational coherences”. We can 
therefore overturn the point of view, which was initially based on the object, in 
such a way that, once we have rendered explicit the possible homonimic uses 
of  verbs  by  having  distinguished  homonimies  as  occurrences  of  different 
domains of description, we can identify the set of possible verbs together with 
their adjuncts, as the spaces of actions of the subject “I” that are distinguished 
by the different domains of the discourse they belong to.
In sum, a subject selects, within all the possible descriptions related to it, the 
actions it realizes together with the range of possible target-objects, on which 
the actions are directed, as is implied by their domain of description. We can 
call the set of selected actions a domain of action. 
A subject is therefore connected with a domain of action, that, when we move 
from  the  subject  “I”  to  a  different  “third  person”  subject-unit,  mirrors 
Maturana’s  idea  of  a  “domain  of  interactions”  (Maturana,  1988,  §6.13). 
Moreover, with the possibility to change the subject, a specific object can also 
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be connected to a variety of subjects, so that it is possible to relate an object  
to a domain of subjects.
We can develop our discourse on the subject in several different directions if 
we start from the idea of a domain of action and a domain of subjects.
First  of  all,  Maturana’s  epistemology  can  been  connected  to  Foucault’s 
analyses of  discursive practices  (Foucault,  1972)  so  that  we can insert  the 
practice  of  listening  in  a  process  of  subject-formation  by  means  of  the 
interaction  between the  experience of  listening and the ways of  describing 
them.
In this regards, a discourse on listening is always related to a subject, even 
when it is, as it happens in most cases, tacit.
Secondly,  it  is  possible  to  imply  the  subject  by  dealing  with  an  object  of 
listening, whose domain of subjects defines a more or less precise type of 
listener or opens to a broader generalization.
The idea of the subject developed by Foucault, is, as is well known, born from 
the Nietzschian questioning of the self as expressed by an uncritical use of the 
pronoun “I” (Nietzsche, 1996). This places the discussion of the subject within 
the realm of a search for identity, “become who you are!” (Nietzsche, 2006, 
p.192),  which is painfully stretched between practices of  subjectivation and 
apparatuses  of  subjection  and  is  therefore  necessarily  driven  by  ethics 
(Beard,2009). 
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Foucault (2006),  in his investigation on the idea of subject in ancient Greek 
philosophy as an alternative vision from the modern one, interprets the process 
of building the self, which we could translate as the cleaning process of one’s 
domain of action, in terms of discursive practices, as the process of occupying 
the  subject’s  position  in  descriptions  that  are  true.  This  process  therefore 
enables us to 
become the subject of […] true discourses, to become the subject who 
tells the truth and who is transfigured by its enunciation of the truth, by 
this enunciation itself, precisely by the fact of telling the truth. (Foucault, 
2006, p.332)
In  opposition,  Christian  tradition  fosters  self-renunciation,  a  discipline  that 
leads to confession, which Foucault describes as the transformation of the self 
in an object of discourses, as the “objectification of the self in true discourses” 
(Foucault, 2006, p.333). In both pagan and Christian perspectives, truth plays 
an  important  role  in  the  process  of  inner  transformation.  However,  if  the 
Christian truth lies in the Word of God as is expressed by the Holy Scriptures,  
the  pagan  truth  lies,  in  this  context,  in  the  adherence  to  the  “operational 
coherences”,  in  the  recognition  of  experience  as  the  guide  to  disentangle 
oneself from the linguistic intricacies that come from using a finite vocabulary 
to defer infinite experiences. And a disciplined subjectivation is therefore the 
process of cleaning up the lies of an involuted lexicon by counterposing to it 
the truth of practices.
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In his analysis of source texts and especially of Seneca and Epictetus, Foucault 
analyses  the  discipline  of  listening,  which  is  essentially  and  necessarily 
addressed to the expressions of  logos, as a three-part process that involves 
the  practice  of  silence,  the  set  of  a  correct  posture  and  commitment. 
Nevertheless,  the  question  of  counterposing  the  practices  of  subjectivation 
against  the  apparatuses  of  subjection  can  and  must  also  be  posed  for  a 
listening practice directed to other aural phenomena than verbal discourses 
and ultimately should be treated as a general issue, which is related to the 
formation of the personal identity within a multi-cultural, media-directed, mass 
society.
But  this  cannot  be  done without  narrating  the  construction  of  the  subject,  
because  any  discourse  about  a  third-person  subject  cannot  avoid  being 
shaped by a first-person subject that might be trapped in the net of subjected 
knowledge. As we have seen, a subject’s domain of action is bounded by the 
domains of description it can use to describe its actions, but even if “the limits 
of  my  language mean  the limits  of  my world”  (Wittgenstein,  1961,  §5.6),  a 
subjected experience has the power to limit the possibility of instantiating my 
linguistic world by transferring the active potential of verbs into the passivity of 
objects. In the second part of this text I will propose an interpretation of the 
process  of  self-building,  which  by  starting  from  the  very  basic  act  of 
distinguishing  through  listening  is  able  to  show  an  openness  to  both  a 
discipline of subjectivation and to practices of subjection.
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3.8 Erasing the subject
Subjection is realized by changing a domain of action, as a consequence of 
erasing the identity of the actor, namely the subject, from the truth conditions 
of a discourse. A domain of action is changed by erasing or substituting its 
domains of discourse and, as a consequence, by modifying within the domains 
of the discourse the verbs and the related proper objects that compose them, 
together with their adjuncts. There are several ways to put a subject actor in 
the background; for example it is possible to use generalized subjects such as 
“a person”, a “man”, or impersonal subjects. Other ways that are particularly 
important in dealing with listening are the substitution of the subject actor with 
other  parts  of  the  descriptive  clause  that  have  been  “actorized”,  like 
substantivized verbs, such as gerunds, or anthropomorphized objects, which 
are now capable of  an action of their  own. As the result of these linguistic 
practices,  the  identity  of  the  acting  subject  is  no  longer  involved  in  the 
“operational  coherences”,  which  confer  a  truth-value  to  descriptions  and 
therefore its identity is implicitly inferred from descriptions, when it does not 
disappear from the discourse entirely.
The use of  “listening” is  an example  of  an “actorized”  verb,  which is  used 
throughout this text. Indeed, the simple “listening” subject seems to suggest 
that there can be a “listening” that is independent from a listener and therefore 
it can be shared, or better it has to be shared, by all listeners. Being unable to 
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refuse an idea and ultimately a practice of “listening” is therefore, for a listening 
subject, the highest possible attempt of subjection. 
As I mentioned before, the experiments of sense substitution seem to suggest 
that senses are more connected with each other than we are used to. If we 
experience some evocation of vision when hearing for some time, while being 
blind, the sounding translation of the image that comes from a camera, which 
is attached to our body (O’Regan, 2011), then what we call vision is not simply 
what reaches our eyes from an external word, but rather the result of some 
regularities in the interplay between an activity, which we call “our body”, and a 
passivity, which we call “the world”. Our distinction among senses is already 
part of an apparatus of subjection.
Therefore,  if  a  narrative,  which  starts  before  the  process  of  subjectivation, 
cannot avoid moving from the highly subjecting condition of a non-subject, in 
its  constructive path,  it  nevertheless needs to propose a way according to 
which the subject as an individual self emerges from the starting condition and 
in the end is able to propose a perceptive mechanism which is subject forming.
The “actorized” object is another device for letting the subject actor disappear 
from  discourses.  We  have  seen  how  the  actor-subject  is  a  sort  of 
uncomfortable  presence  in  discourses  because  on  one  hand  it  limits  the 
discourses to a context, which has to be explicitly defined in order to be able 
to verify the truth-value of descriptions, on the other hand a subject is involved 
in subjective experiences, which, as we have seen, are very difficult to deal 
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with. That is why most research on listening is instead explicitly devoted to 
music or to perception as caught in actions that are engaged by them. Even 
“sound studies” (see for example:  Sterne,  2012),  the newest academic field 
which  emerged  in  the  last  decades  as  a  consequence  of  the  increasing 
attention directed towards listening practices, is named after a possible object, 
in the grammatical sense, of listening. 
But dealing with music or perception without putting the identity of the subject-
actor  into  play  means  that  music  and  perception  are  independent  from  a 
specific  subject  so  that  in  the  end,  as  we  have  seen  with  “listening”,  the 
subject is implied from the domain of subjects connected to the domain of 
actions.
When  dealing  with  perception,  the  subject  is  embedded  in  the  ontology 
expressed by a reference, so that in case of reductionist measurements, the 
subject  is  implied  by  the  topology  of  parameters  that  are  involved  in  the 
scientist’s operations. But the data emerging from experimentation are related 
to  specific  forms  of  acoustic  presentations  that,  by  wearing  the  mask  of 
objectivity, do not account for their esthetic/esthesic specificity and therefore 
are not able to detect those perceptive abilities that are entailed by the identity 
of  the  subject.  Even  if  the  experimental  results  are  constrained  within  the 
proper  conditions  for  an  epistemology,  so  that  the  domains  of  description 
involved are properly distinguished from each other, the absence of the subject 
among  the  conditions  for  truth  evaluation  might  simply  let  them  miss  the 
perceptive specificity of the subject. 
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Consequently,  an  average  abstract  subject  is  created,  as  defined  by  the 
measurements averages, a simulacrum, which is endlessly instantiable and by 
its replicas expresses a rhetoric of objectivity and necessity, while in the end it 
is the mere expression of a (stylistically) situated apparatus of subjection.
Turning to music in substituting the subject-actor, the observations to be made 
cannot be so different with respect to perception. The claim of objectivity is not 
at work here, as it is replaced by the claim of universality. This is a sensitive 
topic, which articulates between the academic debate—according to which the 
universality of music as a common cognitive approach to sounding practices is 
mostly recognized, while the existence of universals in music is mostly doubted
—and the general acceptance of the mass culture apparatus, that is essentially 
related  to  pop  music  repertory,  according  to  which  music  is  a  universal 
language (Wilson, C., 2007). It is not within the scope of this text to discuss the 
reasons  for  accepting  or  refusing  to  consider  music  as  a  universal 
phenomenon that is present in all the human cultures. 
What is important here is to at least point out that some considerations should 
be made about this topic, before taking for granted that dealing with music can 
be safely done without accounting for the subjects involved. Nattiez, in an age 
that still  was not entangled with the construction of the neurocentric golem 
(Lilienfeld  and  others,  2015),  discusses  in  his  Music  and  Discourse (1990) 
whether we have a stable definition of music in our culture. Moreover, he asks 
whether  using  the  term “music”  to  describe  sounding phenomena in  other 
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cultures that do not have such a notion, or do not distinguish between what we 
call music and non-music, is a colonialist way to project our categories onto 
other cultures. This last issue is clearly quite similar to the problem we have 
already  encountered  in  attributing  word  categories  that  come  from  our 
language to understand languages that are very different from our own. First, 
Nattiez concludes that even inside our tradition, the notion of music is far from 
homogeneous. Secondly, he presents several examples, which are intended to 
show that our notion of music can be very far from the categories of other 
cultures. 
An important example is the one of zoomusicology (Ullrich, 2014), an academic 
discipline that was born from pushing the “music” paradigm to deal with the 
sounding practices of non-human animals. As a consequence of the idea that 
non-human animals may also develop cultures  that  emerge from reciprocal 
repeated interactions within a community, the notion of animal culture seems 
to foster a humanized version of non-human animals instead of a post-human 
recognition of human musics (plural intended) as specific sounding practices 
that inside some cultures are labelled as “music”.
Concerning the erasure of the subject in discourses about listening, relying on 
music as the unique source for a theory of listening, or a theory of cognition 
(Serafine, 1988), could be misleading if a theory is not driven by the realization 
that music is not merely sonic content that somebody listens to, but it is a 
practice of  listening,  performing,  composing,  organizing,  dancing and many 
other activities, that emerge in specific symbolizations from the cultural, in the 
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general sense, drift of a community. Therefore, its aspects are always situated 
and specifically  related to a  group,  no matter  how large it  is.  Ultimately,  a 
discourse about listening always and necessarily expresses a point of view, as 
we have seen, but it  also needs to leave an open door for diversity,  as an 
essential part of the discourse, so that it can show how listening can deal with 
sounding practices that are fundamentally different from what we are used to. 
Only  in  this  way  can  we  possibly  be  protected  from  the  temptation  of 
subjection and, for that matter, also able to deal with the sounding practices of 
non-human  animals  without  projecting  assumptions  that  come  from  the 
subjections that entail us,  so that we can finally engage a true post-human 
perspective—regarding humans as well.
3.9 Intransitive listening.
Dealing with listening means dealing with verbs, like any verb on Schaeffer’s 
list or any related verb in English (such as how the label of the experience of 
listening is seen as an action connecting a subject with a possible object). We 
have  also  seen that  in  relating  a  verb  with  a  truth-value  by  the  “operative 
coherences” of an observer a subject is needed in terms of an identity that 
puts the subject-actor in a specific context. If a subject is needed, we should 
also wonder whether an object is needed.
We have seen that the presence of an object can be problematic in two ways: 
first by entailing a sensorimotor metaphor which might drive our considerations 
away  from  properly  outlining  the  character  of  listening  and  secondly,  by 
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conceding a specific object the supervenience on the subject. On the other 
hand,  erasing  the  object  from  a  description  would  indeed  impoverish  the 
domain of actions of the details expressed by the objects and their adjuncts, 
but  at  the  same  time  it  would  result  in  expressing  the  most  general  and 
possibly deeper character of the verb, as independent from objects. It would 
express the intransitive aspect of action. How could we therefore possibly rule 
out the object of listening from the truth constraints operated by practices? 
Peter Szendy proposes the idea of a  sur-écoute  (2017) as a condition of the 
subject between overhearing, which is the literal translation of the French term, 
and eavesdropping. In this case, the listener is always striving towards objects, 
which  s/he  expects  to  occasionally  show  himself  or  herself  in  a  sort  of 
proliferating polyphony. The listener appears to be in a never-ending cocktail 
party-like situation in which he is always directed to the detection of  some 
hidden conversation, while some other unexpected conversation is leading its 
way to him. The object is nevertheless always there, caught in a process of 
being decoded by the subject. Therefore, it is no wonder that Szendy shapes 
his analysis of listening in terms of  the activity of spying.  
Nancy, on the other hand, in posing a fundamental philosophical distinction 
between the Schaefferian’s verbs of  entendre  and écoute,  cannot reduce the 
idea of listening to sensorimotor and visual paradigms-metaphors, which he 
connects to the tension towards meaning: 
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perhaps we never  listen to anything but the non-coded, what is not yet 
framed in a system of signifying references, and we never  hear [entend] 
anything but the already coded, which we decode. (Nancy, 2007, p.39)
If  vision  is  entangled in  an  ontology of  shapes and contours,  in  a  material 
discontinuity that constitutes itself in surfaces and objects that can occupy a 
place and can be surrounded, listening on the other hand, when detached from 
vision, becomes a sense that is open to the modulation of space-time and that 
reacts to this modulation by means of a resonance. 
The  sonorous  present  is  the  result  of  space-time:  it  spreads  through 
space, or rather it opens a space that is its own, the very spreading out of 
its resonance, its expansion and its reverberation. (Nancy, 2007, p.13)
Nancy’s idea of an object of listening gives back its blurred and metamorphic 
character. Listening is the way to deal with a specific sensorial flow and its 
constitution in terms of space and time, so that being immersed in an ocean of 
sonic waves,  which move in space and reflects in  time,  is  resolved by our 
language of objects. But these linguistic objects are secondary with respect to 
structure of our sensing, a structure that cannot be thought in terms of objects, 
in the first place.
This is why listening (écouter) before, or independently from, hearing (entendre) 
is  an  encounter  that  is  realized  by the tuning between the  capacity  of  the 
subject to engage a wave-like sensing action and the waves of the sounding 
flow: it is an act of resonance.
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Sense is first of all the rebound of sound, a rebound that is coextensive 
with  the  whole  folding/unfolding  of  presence  and  of  the  present  that 
makes  or  opens  the  perceptible  as  such,  and  that  opens  in  it  the 
sonorous exponent: the vibrant spacing-out of a sense in whatever sense 
one understands or hears it. (Nancy, 2007, p.30).
In conclusion, this grammatical path has led us to the idea of listening as an 
intransitive verb.
But “listening” is here intended, so to say, as an act of perception that is before 
musical grammars, before the “naturalized” use of labels with their ontology of 
objects  and therefore  before  language;  but  it  is  also  before  the  modes  of 
listening. Only the subject is present, in a sort of cognitive isolation tank, an 
ideal starting point for a constructivist path of narrative. And the subject, which 
is not yet a human subject, with an identity that is related to its place in the 
world, enacts and reacts to the goad of resonances. I will not use the word 
“resonance” any more in this text, but it well expresses the sounding friction 
that will  give rise, in consciousness, to the separation of the self, which will 
develop in a subject, from the world, by sensing.
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4.  NARRATIVES
In  this  final  chapter  of  the  first  part,  I  would  like  to  summarize  some 
requirements, which have been mostly met already in the previous sections 
that should be followed in discourses about listening.
Here, I will follow and comment upon several of the 21 principles for a theory of 
music listening that are listed at the end of Harold Fiske’s Selected Theories of  
Music Perception  (1996),  as one of  the very rare examples of  a discussion 
about the requirements for a theory of listening. However, I neither propose a 
theory of music perception, nor a theory of perception here. I  am not even 
proposing a theory.
My intention is rather to tell a story, to build a narrative. In fact, taking seriously 
the inevitability of expressing a point of view means that it is not possible to 
talk about a reality, or better it means abandoning the idea of words, such as 
“substance” or “matter”, with which we can express an absolute independent 
from our discourses. We can therefore only implement a fiction, possibly able 
to give a direction to our actions, so that we can happily expand that fiction in 
the  world  we  inhabit,  by  creating  something  that  we  are  used  to  calling 
“reality”.
A narrative cannot  avoid the character  of  authoriality  because an individual 
narrates it. Consequently, a narrative is contingent in that it is connected to the 
contingency of the author as opposed to the necessity of an impersonal and 
absolute  truth.   Therefore,  a  narrative  cannot  claim  a  foundational  (and 
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therefore objective) status, as it is necessarily incomplete and temporary.
Finally, a narrative is entangled in a process of negotiation, an open dialogue 
with the reader, who must be able to link the narrative to his own experiential 
references and possibly might want to embrace it, or part of it, in his practices. 
The  concept  of  negotiability  is  connected  with  “viability”,  a  term that  was 
introduced by Ernst von Glasersfeld (1981) as an epistemological translation of 
the biological idea of evolutionary adaptation, in order to deal with the idea of 
truth in a radical constructivism. 
In fact, 
we construct ideas, hypotheses, theories, and models, and as long they 
survive, which is to say, as long as our experience can be successfully 
fitted into them, they are viable. (In Piagetian terms we might say that our 
constructs are viable as long as our experience can be assimilated to 
them). (Glasersfeld, 1981)
In this context, viability is related to the possibility of a narrative to survive the 
“environment” made of  its readers,  without appealing to values of truth. As 
long as readers are capable of interacting with a narrative, by using it in their  
life as a tool to positively foster new reality, in its very general meaning, that  
narrative has to be conceded the right to be narrated. 
In Part 2, I will therefore propose a narrative that will possibly show, in the third 
part, its viability, as a method for music analysis, and music composition, and 
in dealing with more general ideas, that are related to discourses about our 
relationship with the aural  phenomena that surrounds us.  In developing the 
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narrative, I will focus on concepts, such as perceptive dimension, distinction, 
pattern and region of distinctions, in order to let them interact with each other 
and  to  show  the  potentiality  of  their  system of  interactions  in  building  an 
explanatory, and possibly implementable, mechanism; a task that I leave for 
further research.
But first, it is necessary to discuss what we should expect from a narrative that, 
by starting before the objects of listening and even before a properly formed 
subject,  promises to include in its development the language we use in the 
narrative and the cornucopia of listening experiences, the experience of music 
included.
Fiske lists 21 principles that conclude his analysis of some well-known theories 
of music perception: “talk about music and you are talking about the musical 
mind:  descriptors  of  music  are  descriptors  of  cognitive  processing”  (Fiske, 
1996,  p.138).  As  being  the  proposer  of  the  “copy  paradigm”,  he  quite 
surprisingly  adopts  it  in  a  chain  of  objects,  “music”  as  “musical  mind”  as 
“cognitive processing”,  that  apparently never  touch the subject  of  listening, 
which is, in cognitive terms, the mind as a whole system—no wonder then if in 
the first principle, the subject is already substituted with the brain. 
I  will  try  now to list  Fiske’s  principles  (1996,  p.153-154)  from number  1 to 
number  15  of  the  total  21,  because  the  last  six  are  too  involved  as 
consequences of  Fiske’s theory to be reported here as basic assumptions. 
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Each  quote  from Fiske  is  followed  by  a  brief  comment  contextualizes  the 
principles within my research. 
1)  “the  brain  seeks  perceptual  economy”  –  It  is  the  narrative  that  should 
minimize its resources in order to optimize its viability;
2) “perception in a search for element interrelationship” – it is actually a domain 
of discourses that relies on the description of a unit in terms of its components;
3) “music perception is a search for […] any type of sonic patterns” –   the 
distinction of patterns is indeed an important part of my narrative, not only in 
relation to music, but mainly in relation to any aural experience and, in the end, 
in relation with any sensorial experience overall;
4) “perception requires time and effort” – an embodied enacted listening needs 
to deal with the finite aspect of biological organisms: sensing is directed to 
survival, as is narrative;
5) “perception is a construction process, not a copy process” – the explanatory 
mechanism is indeed made in terms of a causal description;
6) “music cognition is unique to human brains” – “music” is a word that is used 
within  a  community  to  label  a  set  of  practices  that  are  born  within  that 
community.  Sounding  practices  on  the  other  hand,  which  include  spoken 
language are diffused among human as well as non-human animals;
7) “the function of music cognition is the realization of tonal-rhythmic (pitch 
durational) patterns” – the listening process directed to sounding practices are 
focused on the elements that emerge as peculiar (and therefore are referenced 
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by other  practices  of  the same community,  such as  talking or  teaching)  of 
those practices;
8) “music cognition is limited exclusively to the realization of the tonal-rhythmic 
(pitch durational) pattern structure and interrelationship” –  that is simply not 
true  as  it  is  witnessed  even  in  our  tradition  by  certain  compositional  (and 
listening)  practices  of  contemporary  music  or  contemporary  society  music 
styles, such as drone ambient or noise;
9) “music cognition requires time and effort” – it is the consequence of §4 and 
of the embodied enactive character of sensing;
10) “music pattern comparison procedures represent  a semantically closed, 
self-referenced,  modular  system”  –  this  principle  is  too  conclusive  to  be 
commented upon without having yet presented the narrative of listening and 
therefore shall not be;
11) “music communication is the result of a shared social-cultural contract” – 
while  the  association  between  the  words  “music”,  “communication”,  and 
“language” is somewhat problematic, it is relatively uncontentious to claim that 
music  has  emerged  within  a  community  as  the  encounter  of  some  of  its 
practices;
12) “music listening requires active, rather than passive, participation on the 
part  of  the listener”  –  or  in  other  words:  listening,  as  a  way of  sensing,  is 
enaction;
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13) “music listening is a hypothesis-testing process” – this is acceptable only if 
we remember that “hypothesis-testing” is here an anthropomorphic metaphor. 
“Hypothesis-testing” is what mirrors a basic mechanism of sensing;
14) “perception is dependent upon a cognitive context created by the listener” 
- in the narrative I adopt, listening is context-related as the result of its intrinsic 
process of abstraction;
15) “a musical language is defined by the set of syntactic rules describing the 
permissible tonal and durational relationships which represent that language” – 
this is, in my opinion, a highly simplistic way to represent music even in the 
western tradition. Moreover, it is completely incorrect if it intends to address 
the broader sounding practices of the world.
These 15 principles seem to run into the fallacy of the subject substitution at all  
levels, so that “listening” appears explicitly only in numbers 12 and 13, and as 
a gerund, while the listening subject is involved only in numbers 12 and 14. The 
actant seems therefore to vary according to need, sometimes referring to the 
brain,  sometimes  music  cognition,  perception  and  so  on.  And  as  a 
consequence,  it  is  rarely  recognized,  at  least  in  the  formulation  of  these 
principles, that listening exists before music, before the idea of perception and, 
in my narrative, before the language itself.
Conversely,  the narrative that  this  text  focuses on,  starts  as an experience 
“always already” in our daily experiences (see the first chapter of the second 
part), while its starting point of narration originates from the very constitution of 
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the enacted life,  in  the Maturanian “praxis  of  living”,  of  the organism as is 
described by an observer. 
Therefore music, not even the word “music” as applied to the world sounding 
practices, cannot be the possible incipit of a discourse on listening, because 
music cannot but work as a part of an apparatus of subjection that removes 
the  listening subjects.  A  discourse on listening cannot  even  be founded in 
language, because language too is a result of listening practices. We therefore 
need to find a generative experience that, while being necessarily expressed by 
language, is “always already” actualized by our experiences and entangled in 
the “praxis of living” so that it involves time before the idea of time and effort 
before the idea of effort.
Contemporarily it should be possible to also include the basic skills of listening 
that we are used to attributing to our ontologies with their references, such as 
Gestalt laws or habituation effects, as far as we are able to describe them with 
our language. It should be possible to account, for example, the experience of 
perceiving  a  sine  wave  whose  frequency  is  randomly  modulated  with  an 
increasing range as a cross fade between a sine wave and a white noise.
This brings us to the last and most important point: a discourse about listening 
that seeks to capture the experience of listening should involve, as a practice 
of truth, the ways we talk about listening as an activity of the subject, with 
narratives that do not erase the subject. It is therefore essential for a discourse 
about listening to be able to account for, at some point along the path of its 
construction,  how  the  diversities  of  listening  (and  consequently  sounding) 
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practices emerge from the basic mechanism-without-subject. A goal that is not 
possible to reach if the starting point, the music or a universal music, the brain, 
music cognition and so on, is already a subjected one.
Let us now move to the first informal narrative about listening as expressed by 
the simplest experience of it: the distinction of a change.
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5.  IN THE ISOLATION TANK 
5.1 Through our headphones
I would like to begin this second part with a narration of what we could call  
“the discoveries of listening”, which intends to intuitively introduce some of the 
elements  that  are  at  the  core  of  my  research  in  the  form  of  a  mental 
experiment.  I  shall  lead this narrative through the experience of  listening to 
music, but only as a sort of tribute to the tradition of dealing implicitly with 
listening through music. Nevertheless, the same path of “discoveries” could 
also be explored through everyday aural experiences.
Let’s imagine that we are comfortably sitting in the dark, listening to the noise 
and sounds that come from our headphones. It is something akin to floating 
inside an isolation tank, an environment that was invented by John Lilly in his 
research on the isolated brain (Lilly, 1988), whose purpose is to suppress all 
the sensory inputs as much as possible, in order to simulate the condition of a 
“brain in a bowl”. Let’s imagine we cannot see, smell or taste, we cannot even 
have the sensation of touch or the other sensations that constitute our most 
updated inventory of  senses:  we can only hear.  This is likely an impossible 
condition, but I will nonetheless try to set the starting point of my narrative on 
this fantasy, so that I can experimentally pretend to talk about listening without 
involving the other senses, at least for now: we are sitting in the dark and we 
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are listening through our headphones to the noises and sounds that reach us 
from a (far? near?) music-hall, just before the concert begins. 
We are immersed in a continuous stream made of noise and sounds that we 
mostly recognize: the voices of people talking, coughing, moving and shuffling 
their clothes on the seats. After some time, we can also distinguish a chaotic 
mixture of melodic fragments, inside of which we can recognize the sound of 
musical instruments, which are more or less familiar to us. Suddenly, the noise 
gets very soft, almost silent. We can only hear a single sustained sound that is 
soon followed by an intense mixture of slow and fast melodic fragments. Then 
silence again. After a while,  a thunderous noisy texture bursts in: applause. 
Apparently the conductor has entered the stage. And again silence. All at once, 
a completely new sound experience bursts in and dominates our experience of 
listening with a strong intensity and highly predictable sound changes, to the 
point  that  we  can  also  tap  our  foot  in  synchrony  with  the  sound  of  the 
orchestra and, presumably, with the gestures of the conductor. The concert 
has definitely begun.
We have been able to understand and follow what was happening in the hall, 
probably because we have already been in similar situations. We are therefore 
generally  able  to  associate  the  changes  in  the  sound  quality  of  the  sonic 
stream  with  specific  events,  which  follow  a  quite  precise  order  that 
corresponds to what usually happens before a concert begins.
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This capability is not banal at all. In fact, if we were asked to listen, within the 
same  sensory  isolation,  to  the  sonic  stream  coming  from  a  less  “formal” 
situation, let us say some experimental music performed at a vernissage in an 
art gallery (for example “It’s Gonna Rain” by Steve Reich, a composer whose 
music has been intensively performed in art galleries, during the late 60s), we 
most probably would not be able to detect the beginning of the performance 
without some serious effort.
In  sum,  I  have  characterized  the  experience  of  listening  in  terms  of  the 
distinction of relevant sounding moments, marking the succession of sound 
events, or, in other words, in terms of the auditory segmentation of a sounding 
stream, which, as we know from Cage’s experience in the anechoic chamber, 
is a never-ceasing continuum.
And actually, any discourse on listening cannot but start from the existence of 
a  sounding  continuum,  which  constitutes  the  horizon  of  listening.  But 
immediately, we need to turn our attention to the unfolding of the segmenting 
process, which articulates the sounding continuum in time.
5.2 - The music of noise
Even in the case of an absence of “signals”, such as the audience’s applause 
and the tuning of the orchestra, the cognitive act of separating the beginning of 
a music piece from the environmental noise that precedes it in the sounding 
continuum, is usually an easy operation. The distinction between the “before” 
133
and  the  “after”  of  a  musical  beginning  is  commonly  addressed  as  the 
distinction between “noise” (or “environment”, “background noise” or simply 
“background”) and “music” (or “sound”). I have to postpone the discussion on 
the different uses of the word “noise”. For now, it is enough to say that “noise” 
is here intended as in the sentence “this is not music, it is noise!”, which we 
could call  a “semantic” acceptation, according to which noise is something 
that “doesn’t speak to me”, as is often said about some music we don’t like.15 
Therefore, the distinction between “noise” and “music” is here a distinction of 
meaning,  between  two  attitudes  of  the  listener,  which  emerge  within  the 
complex articulation of social practices. In the mode of listening related to the 
word “noise”, our attention is directed to the source of the sonic phenomenon 
and any quality  that  we detect  in  the sound/noise  we hear  is  related  to  a 
property of the physical phenomenon that originated it. This is what we have 
called  the  “extrinsic  meaning”  of  a  sound  phenomenon,  which  we  have 
connected to “naturalized” labels. On the other hand, when we use the word 
“music”, as opposed to “noise”, listening is directed to the inner qualities of the 
sonic phenomenon, or better  to a structured selection of  them, in  order  to 
follow how these sounds change in time. This is what we can call “intrinsic 
meaning” and it is usually referred to as the typical music listening attitude.
I will use the terms “music” and “noise”, in opposition with each other, with this 
meaning throughout Chapter 5 and I will distinguish them from other possible 
uses by putting them between quotation marks. 
15A use of the word that most contemporary music composers have met at least once in their 
lifetime when dealing with people annoyed by their compositions!
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It is nonetheless obvious that the process of segmentation is here connected 
with a distinction, the one between “noise” and “music”, that goes beyond the 
simple  discrimination  of  the  sonic  event  (although  all  the  perceptive 
mechanisms that are investigated by psychoacoustics are inevitably at work) 
and moves towards a more general articulation of the subject and the world of 
social and cultural practices it is immersed in.
The problem of the threshold between “music” and “noise”, that is the problem 
of detecting the conditions according to which what we usually consider as 
“noise”  starts  to  be  considered  as  a  part  of  “music”  and  vice  versa,  has 
especially intrigued composers over the course of the last century.
I need to mention at least:
- the birth of  musique concrète in the 40s and the application of the idea of 
objet trouvé in music composition, as a consequence of the diffusion of tape 
recorders in radio stations, with the related techniques for manipulating sound 
events  that  were  not  previously  considered  as  proper  elements  for  music 
(Schaeffer, 1966);
- John Cage’s idea that “everything we do is music” (Konstelanetz, 2003, p.69) 
as it was first expressed in 1952 through his seminal work for any instrument 
combination “4’33””, in which the performers do not actually even play their 
instruments, but rather sit or stand quiet letting the world sound;
- the idea of “soundscape”,  which Murray Schafer first introduced (Schafer, 
1969) in order to grant the acoustic environment we live in, an attention that is 
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usually devoted to music, up to the point that it stimulated the development of 
a specific musical practice/genre with the name “soundscape music”.16
Managing the threshold between “noise” and “music” in the previous examples 
is mostly a matter of letting the categories of our subjected ontology calibrate 
the psychoacoustic process of segregation, which is the ability to distinguish 
simultaneous layers in the continuum. Some composers  on the other  hand 
want to soften the passage between “noise” and “music”, with the result of 
blurring, at least for a while, the boundaries between background (the “noise”) 
and foreground (the “music”, which emerges from the environment).
For example, Gerard Grisey’s “Dérives” for orchestra, the masterpiece of the 
spectralist movement, begins with almost no perceptible difference with the 
preceding  moment  in  which  the  musicians  of  the  orchestra  tune  up  their 
instruments.  The  i(m)  “clapping  moment”  from  Karlheinz  Stockhausen’s 
“Momente”  for  solo  soprano,  choir  and  orchestra,  which  in  all  the  actual 
versions  of  this  open  work  immediately  follows  the  audience’s  applause, 
consists  of  the  choir  clapping  back  to  the  audience  in  a  rather  humorous 
mirroring, which slowly transforms into a musically articulated texture. During 
this more than two hour long work, the choir inserts several ”signals” which are 
derived from the typical noisy reactions that the audience of that time used to 
express for its disapproval of avant-garde music, such as hisses, shouts or 
16I  will  come back to the topic of  “soundscape”  in Chapter 12 of the Third Part,  where I’ll 
discuss the idea of soundscape more in detail.
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clapping noises. In this way the boundaries between the foreground “music” 
and the background “noise” were so blurred that the audience was no longer 
sure whether its protests were going to become part of the “music” or not.
An  historical  and  therefore  less  literal  example  of  fading  from  “music”  to 
“noise”  is  the  ending  of  Franz  Joseph  Haydn’s  Symphony  No.  45,  the 
“Farewell” Symphony, dated 1772, in which the musicians of the orchestra are 
supposed to leave their place gradually one after the other, so in the end only 
two violins are left to conclude the piece. In this way the musicians, under the 
composer’s guide, could express to the orchestra’s patron the Prince Nikolaus 
Esterházy, as politely and cautiously as possible but in an unequivocal fashion, 
their desire for a vacation from work. Not unlike Haydn’s work, in the theatrical 
version of  Stockhausen’s  “Luzifers  Tanz” (“Lucifer’s  dance”  from the opera 
“Saturday from Light”, which premiered in Milano in 1984), the performance is 
interrupted by a sudden, this time violent, strike of the orchestra which protests 
against  overwork  and  therefore  leaves  the  last  nineteen  bars  of  the  work 
unperformed.  In  this  case  it  seems  that  the  reason  has  to  be  found as  a 
“satanic”  mockery  of  the  orchestra’s  strike  that,  during  the  staging  of  the 
previous composer’s opera “Donnerstag aus Licht” (“Thursday from Light”) at 
Teatro Alla Scala in Milan in 1981, truly impeded the realization of the third act 
for  several  days.  Nevertheless,  the examples  of  fading in  and out  between 
“music” and “noise” are rather infrequent in works that are not involved with 
theatrical narratives. On the contrary, as soon as the theatrical part of a work 
starts to play a more important role, the interaction between music and the 
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world in which that music is played, which usually fades in the background 
during the performance, starts to intervene and a complex mirroring of  mise-
en-scènes may  take  place,  often  with  an  entangled  articulation  between 
narrative expedients and reality. The concept of diegetic music exemplifies the 
relationship  between  “noise”  and  “music”  well,  which  is  a  functional 
relationship, not unlike the relationship between sound and silence that was 
rendered explicit by Cage’s experience in the anechoic chamber (Cage, 1961). 
We call  music that takes place as an event within a narration diegetic.  It  is 
therefore opposed to the music that accompanies the narration or is part of the 
way the story is  narrated (the so called  non-diegetic  music)  and especially 
emerges as a narrative resource in cinema (Chion, Gorbman & Murch, 1994), 
even if we can already find it in operas such as Mozart’s “Don Giovanni” (in the 
scene of Don Giovanni’s ballroom during the first act).
The  relationship  between  “noise”  and  “music”,  when  translated  in  the 
relationship  with  a  narrative  plan,  is  caught  in  the  mise  en  abîme of 
representation, in which the “music” of one level of narration may become the 
“noise”  of  a  deeper  level.  For  example  at  the  end  of  the  third  act  of 
Stockhausen’s “Donnerstag aus Licht”, a section called “Vision”, the triplicated 
role of Michael assists to a shadow play in which seven excerpts of the very 
same opera are presented as memories. Nevertheless the non-diegetic music 
is still  present so that the excerpts, which previously were part of the  non-
diegetic music are now overlapped with the actual  non-diegetic music as a 
different layer. But like the interplay between the possible plans of narration, 
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which is driven by apparatuses that, so to speak, lock the range of our shared 
narratives (Foucault, 1971) which are now open to iterated or combinatorial  
articulations (I will just mention Raymond Roussel’s “Locus Solus”, which is a 
progressive  accumulation  of  nested  narrative  layers  and  ends  with  seven 
different  nested stories),  music too is  forced to follow the complications of 
narrative paths in possible meta-diegetic or cross-diegetic roles, that still need 
to deal with the mechanisms of perceptive segmentation. This is why music is 
most of the time only partially involved in the multiplication of layers and, whilst  
we can easily find the presence of diegetic music, often involved in a transition 
from a  diegetic and a  non-diegetic role, it is very difficult to find music that 
reaches us from a second level of  diegesis. It is worth mentioning as a rare 
example of second-level diegetic music, Richard Strauss’ “Ariadne auf Naxos”, 
an opera that suffered, not without reason, some difficulties in being premiered 
due to the excessive length of its realization and the demands in number and 
versatility of the cast: problems that are almost inevitable when producing a 
work based on a  meta-narrative.  In  the  second part  of  the work (which  is 
entitled “Opera”) Zerbinetta and his group of burlesque actors play a little show 
for Ariadne to cheer her up for having being abandoned by Theseus. This little 
show has a diegetic role in Ariadne’s plan of narrative, which in turn is the plot 
of an opera that is premiered, and therefore has a diegetic role, in front of the 
richest man in Vienna, who commissioned it, and his guests. And of course the 
whole  work  is  performed  in  front  of  the  audience,  such  as  the  one  who 
attended the premiere in 1912, at the Hoftheather in Stuttgart.
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As I have said, no matter how many the nested levels of narration there are, our 
perception  has  still  to  cope  with  the  distinction  between  the  “composed” 
overlapping events in the arbitrary complex narration and the “non composed” 
events, in which we are immersed.
What is interesting for my purposes is that even if the passage from “noise” to 
“music”,  for  example in  Grisey’s  work,  is  gradual  or  imperceptible,  there is 
always a precise point, perhaps different for each listener, in which what was 
previously considered as “noise” is now considered as “music”. In any case, 
we face a discontinuity in the listeners’ attitude and it is this very moment that 
distinguishes the sounding continuum in a “before” and an “after”. Of course, 
at the beginning of a music work a discontinuity for some experienced qualities 
in the sound is often present, which are certainly useful in helping to establish 
the beginning (or the end) of the work. For example a sudden chord in the 
brass section might be an unequivocal signal that marks the beginning of a 
work, as it happens for “Dérives”. 
In any case, it is the change of the listener’s perspective in considering the 
sound events (we could call  it  the intentionality that drives listening),  which 
establishes what is “music” and what is “noise”: the discontinuity in sound has 
only the role of reinforcing the change of perspective. 
Therefore, if a possible reinforced discontinuity is not recognized by a listener 
as the proper signal to mark his change of perspective, it will be useless for 
him.
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5.3 Segments
Of course, even if we do not want to consider the concert event as a “music 
form” in itself, many music works are composed by a series of shorter pieces, 
which are separated from each other by “noise” inserts. 
For example, an opera is usually segmented in acts, a sonata and all the forms 
that have been derived from it are subdivided in movements, the suites or the 
collections of similar works such as the preludes, studies, variations on a same 
theme and so on, when performed, are mostly separated by brief moments, 
which are not written and are not considered part of the music.
Even  if  the  effect  of  these  breaks  into  “noise”  results  in  loosening  the 
“perceptive tension” of the audience, so that people might cough or even get 
up and move from their seats, in case of a longer break, their direct purpose is 
not easy to decipher because is lost in the details of the historicized practices 
that they singularly emerged from. Therefore, a more detailed discussion of the 
typical  relationship  between  “music”  sections  and “noise”  in  a  larger  work 
cannot be unrelated to a more general consideration on the cultural practices 
that generated it.
In any case, along with the development of western tradition, we can find both 
the tendency for bigger segments of “music” to be more and more separated 
by moments of “noise” until they can hardly be perceived as unified under a 
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same larger segment of “music” and the tendency of segments of “music” that 
are  originally  separated  by  “noise”  to  be  connected  with  each  other  in  a 
uninterrupted segment of “music”.
Let’s  take  the  case  of  the  Christian  mass  as  an  institutionalized  sounding 
practice.  At  the  origin  of  the  rite,  the  mostly  uninterrupted  reading  of  the 
liturgical  text  primarily  depended  upon  an  unordinary  “musical”  use  of  the 
voice, which served as a contrast with the mundane world (Corbin, 1987, 47) 
by transfiguring the spoken voice in cantillation up to the ecstatic part of the 
Alleluia chant,  the melismatic  jubilus.  Along one millennium of development, 
the segments of  the Christian mass have become increasingly independent 
from their original context within the liturgy, so that at the beginning of the 18 th 
century, for example, Antonio Vivaldi was able to write a Gloria (catalogued as 
RV 589) for orchestra, solos and choir that did not need to be performed during 
the  Mass  already  according  to  the  composer’s  intentions.  This  path  of 
“mundanization” seems to have moved away from the purpose to exceptionally 
set  a  bridge between  our  daily  experience and the  Heavenly  Jerusalem of 
“music”, to being restituted back to the “noise” of the semantic context, of the 
spoken parts that are nowadays prevalent in the contemporary liturgy: that is, 
in the end, the experience of sound as the vessel of the extrinsic. At the same 
time,  it  seems that,  by mostly relegating the words to the mundane net of 
linguistic  meanings,  the increased divide between “music”  and “noise”  has 
prepared  the  path  to  the  emancipation  of  instrumental  sound,  firstly  by 
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inheriting the rhetorical structures of speech and afterwards by subjugating the 
text itself to the structures of music.17
In the end, the mundane practice of “music” emerges from putting “noise” into 
a background, so that it can never be neglected and it is always there as a 
reference,  even during the music performance,  because music is  no longer 
functional to a relation with the extra-mundane, but to the mundane structure 
of  the  power  it  serves,  such  as  the  aristocracy,  whose  members  possibly 
attend the performance themselves.
There is no wonder then, if in the romantic-era the recovered relationship with 
the extra-mundane, which is often emptied from the institutionalized religious 
content,  there is a tendency to unify the “music” segments in a continuous 
stream,  in  an  extended  durchkomponieren,  which  is  intended  to  drive  the 
listener towards an “other side” with respect to the “noise” that surrounds him. 
In this way the process goes so far, with the idea of  Gesamtkunstwerk, as to 
include  in  “music”  those  aspects  of  “noise”  that,  while  being  experiential,  
which is not only acoustical, used to be considered the background of “music”, 
such as lights, shapes and even perfumes (Alexander Scriabin’s “Prometheus: 
the Poem of Fire” and Stockhausen’s “Düfte-Zeichen”, “Scents-Signs”, are two 
well known examples of the introduction of multi-sensoriality in music).
17See for example the discussion about the interaction between music and text in the last 
century in Zeller, 1964.
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If “noise” has the role of leading “music” segments within a frame of meaning 
(the  theatre,  the  concert),  we  should  nevertheless  ask  ourselves  what  the 
segments included in the same work have in common.
Obviously, it is the context that establishes a connection in the first place. It is 
the coincidence of performance time and listening that sets the connection, 
even when the unity of space is somehow fragmented (see for example, the 
works realized by simultaneous performances in different locations, that while 
being far  from each other,  are  sonically present  in both or  in  a third place 
where the listeners are attending the event, as it happens with Bill Fontana’s 
“Satellite Ear Bridge Cologne-San Francisco”). Firstly, electronic technologies 
and subsequently digital ones have been able to fragment the time unity that 
connected the performer to the listener as the medium (be it the vinyl, the CD 
or the album distributed on the Web) that is now in charge of providing a frame 
for the experience of segments. With the arrival of distribution services that are 
based  on  the  extemporaneity  of  music  fruition  and  ultimately  on  the 
unpredictability  of  the  succession  of  the  single  segments/tracks,  such  as 
Spotify and YouTube, the cohesion between performer/producer and listener is 
finally disarticulated and the meaning of frame is led back to everyday “noise”. 
Nowadays, music is often experienced as a part of “noise”, it is somehow more 
similar to something you wear, a clothing, than something to be listened to 
carefully  in  order  to  distinguish  its  elements.  As  a  result,  the daily  routine, 
which is related to “noise”, is transfigured and modulated by “music”, which is 
in turn assimilated to the listener’s identity.
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The occasion of listening is often enough to realize the common frame that 
encompasses  the  different  “music”  segments  listened  to  in  succession, 
because it  is  the “noise” from which listening emerges,  that connects, in a 
social/cultural net, the different practices with each other that produced those 
segments. After all, the music we can listen to on Spotify, in spite of its global 
shared character, gathers around well-specified statistics, which expresses the 
intersection between what  the connected people,  which  is  a  subset  of  the 
entire population, are able to find within Spotify’s catalogue and what Spotify 
was  able  to  find,  and  get,  from  all  the  sound  expressions  of  the  world. 
Nevertheless, we need still ask to ourselves what are the common sounding 
elements that are shared by the different segments of a collection, which are 
the sounding identities on which the sounding differences that articulate the 
collection are built.
For this purpose, I  restrict  myself  to mentioning two planes.  The first plane 
refers to the possible attributes that might be shared by the segments included 
in a collection, therefore constituting the identity of the collection. For example, 
timbre (such as works for a common instrumentation), qualities related to some 
emotional/sensorimotor character (such as a collection of waltzes), but also, on 
a more explicitly linguistic-semantic side, the attributes that are related to text 
(such as a collection of songs based on the poems by a same author) or use 
(such as a collection of “Etudes”).
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The second plane is  related to the differences between the segments of  a 
collection, which we recognize as being articulated in a succession that follows 
a well-learned path. This might be related to the attributes such as the ones 
included in the first plane, which instead of being more or less constant along 
the segments, vary in a predictable way—for example,  the character of the 
different  movements  in  a  classical  symphony  or  sonata,  or  of  the  dance 
movements  in  a  baroque  suite  and  so  on.  In  other  cases,  the  path  of 
differences might be, so to speak, a parasite of an extramusical scheme, such 
as a story, for example in Eric Satie’s “Sports and Divertissements” (1914). In 
the end, any articulation of the differences in some attribute, even if along the 
predicable and well-known path, is usually integrated by some other attributes 
that are constant throughout the segments. For example, it is uncommon for 
the movements of a Classical-era symphony, which is usually scored for full  
orchestra,  to  be  scored  for  very  different  setups,  for  example  with  one 
movement for solo flute, another one for the full orchestra and a third for kettle 
drums and the clarinet section alone. 
However, it is not difficult to imagine a collection of music segments, a macro-
form,  that  shares  the  least  possible  elements  besides  the  time  frame  of 
performing/listening:  for  example,  a  collection  of  works  with  very  different 
instrumentation, duration, style and also performance location. I think of a sort 
of an online—that means shared by performers scattered all over the world—
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contest of remixes of one song, which can be realized without constraints of 
duration and instrumentation.
Why then is the presence of constant elements so common within collections 
of musical works? We might argue that the homogeneities, for example in the 
instrumentation,  must  be  related  to  the  institutional  needs  in  allocating 
resources, which are therefore to be related to the socio-(political)-economics 
of music.
But it might also be for the simple fact that we do not perceive the common 
elements  as  something  changeable,  but  rather  as  necessary  parts  of  the 
(cultural)  objects  that  surround  us  in  our  world.  And  as  soon  it  has  been 
realized by somebody that something can be changed in what we were taking 
for granted, then, after a while, it becomes part of the difference that can be 
composed and is no more part of the identity.
5.4 How to end a sonata
In this path of distinctions from the “top” of separating music from to “noise” to 
the “down” of dealing with the identities and differences within a collection of 
music works, we need to proceed further to the distinctions we make within 
single music works.
For this purpose, let’s imagine now that we are listening to a recording of a 
music piece, let us say for solo piano, that we have never heard before and 
without knowing whether we are listening to the whole piece or just a fragment 
of it.
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How would we be able to determine by just listening whether the piece has 
been cut or presented in its integrity? Of course, our ability also depends on 
our knowledge of the piece’s style. For example, in case of a pointllistic music 
style, such as in Pierre Boulez’s “Structures I” for two pianos, we would hardly 
realize the possible cuts. On the other hand, in the case of a tonal work, let us 
say in a galant music style, it is definitely easier, at least for a trained listener, to 
realize whether the work has been cut or not.
In fact, we might need some clues, to which nevertheless we still need to be 
accustomed,  in order  to detect  the proper  beginning or  ending of  a music 
piece and these depend, more or less precisely, on the style and in general the 
music system we are dealing with. Clues can be found in different layers of 
abstraction and usually refer to the concept and rules of composition, such as 
the  accent  structure,  the  harmony,  the  organization  of  phrases  and  the 
arrangement. 
Here are some elements that can be helpful in recognizing the final part of a 
recording as the proper ending of a typical Classical-era work:
- the recording ends with a chord on a time-moment that we have recognized 
as the most accented beat of the meter; 
- alternatively the recording ends on a long, at least double, appoggiatura with 
a tonic note bass on the most accented beat resolving by single degrees on 
the proper final chord;
- the final chord is the tonic one in root-position;
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- the final chord might be repeated several times, with different voicing, before 
stopping on the accented beat:
- the final chord/appoggiatura is preceded in the immediately previous weak 
beat, by the harmony of the dominant;
- last chords are presented with a slowed down pulse speed;
- if I have correctly determined the proper beginning of the work, the recording 
must  have  a  duration  that  follows  the  requirements  related  to  the  proper 
duration for a work, such as being at least longer than ten seconds.
It is not important here to address the cultural specificity of the cues as the 
product  of  a  complex  socio-cultural  system  of  practices  that  involve 
composition,  but  as  discourses  as  well  and  therefore  also  theory.  The 
Classical-era sonata is here just an example, which is necessarily situated in a 
historical context, of a sounding continuity in which we aim for cues to base 
our judgments that might be, for example, directed to understand whether the 
musical piece had come to an end.
Nevertheless, these clues are related to conventional endings of Classical-era 
piano music and are expressed according to the appropriate musical grammar 
that is used today to teach common practice18 composition. Obviously, it not 
possible to take for granted that a possible listener knows what a “tonic chord 
in  root  position”  is  or  that  he  or  she  is  able  to  recognize  it  properly. 
Nevertheless, a listener can definitely be trained to detect it, which is proven 
18The idea of common practice labels the compositive practice between 1600 and the 
beginning of 1900, under the explicative apparatus of tonality. The first proposal of the concept 
is dated back to Walter Piston’s Harmony, 1941.
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when these clues are absent, as it happens in most works of contemporary 
music in which the general audience often has trouble detecting the ending of 
a music piece and ends up relying on the lone applause of some brave expert, 
who takes charge in leading the rest of the audience, as a clue that the piece 
has actually come to an end.
It  would nevertheless  be incorrect  to  claim that  tonal  music  and non tonal 
music do not share any compositional schemes or rhetorical devices that can 
serve as cues for listeners who want to detect, for example, the end of a piece.
I just want to mention here two typical ending schemes: the “pompous” ending 
and the “vanishing” one. The first one is obtained by giving the last moment of 
the music  piece  a  surplus  of  energy,  so to speak,  so that  the attention of 
listeners is driven to what is happening as a special moment, that is the ending 
of a piece, especially if it is the ending of the last movement or, as we called it 
earlier, the last “music” segment of a larger work.
At the very ending of Ludwig van Beethoven’s 3rd Symphony, for example, the 
final chord is repeated up to about one minute in some performances, a very 
long time even for  a  traditional  finale,  so that  not  only  the ordinary flux of 
harmony is interrupted, but the piece itself ends up developing a sort of an 
overgrown limb. And something very similar also happens in the ending of the 
8th Symphony. Such a bombastic character for a piece’s ending is so typical 
that it  earned the mockery of Erik Satie,  who made a parody of it with the 
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“never-ending” ending of “De podophtalma”, the last piece of the composition 
“Embryons Desséchés” for piano. 
Other examples of this “pompous” character include the ending of Johannes 
Brahms' 2nd Symphony and Dmitri  Shostakovich’s 5th Symphony, but also 
Stockhausen’s “Punkte” or Iannis Xenakis’ “Akea”. 
Regarding the second example of an ending pattern, the “vanishing” one, we 
encounter  the  progressive  diminishing  of  the  sounding  energy,  which  is 
typically  realized  by  a  general  diminuendo  and  by  slowing  down  the  tone 
movements as a sensory-motor metaphor of a “dying” or “fading into memory/
dream”  character.  See  for  example  the  ending  of  Gustav  Mahler’s  4th 
Symphony or Brahms’ 3rd Symphony, but also Claude Debussy’s “Fêtes” and 
even, a very unusual ending for a Baroque music work, the fading out shout of 
the  “dying”  soprano  “I  Come  to  You  Lord  Jesus”  (“Ja,  komm,  Herr  Jesu, 
komm!”) in J.S.Bach’s  cantata BVW 106 “Actus Tragicus”. 
Examples  of  the  “vanishing”  ending  in  the  20th  century  include  György 
Ligetis’s  “Lontano” and  Brian  Ferneyhough’s  “Carceri  d’Invenzione”  for 
orchestra,  but  the very  long list  of  fading out  endings in  pop music songs 
should also be considered as valid examples of this ending pattern.
What is important here is that what we consider as the appropriate elements to 
signal  the beginning or the ending of  a music piece are part  of a complex 
structure, in which they work at different levels and on different categories of 
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auditory  discrimination.  Single  notes  in  their  duration  and  pitch,  groups  of 
notes such as chords, groups of groups of notes such as the succession of 
ornament  patterns  forming  the  melodic  line,  harmony  as  the  choice  of  the 
proper  pitches and durations within  a  range of  well-formed successions of 
interpretants,  together  with  consistency  rules  that  drive  the  organization  of 
successions in time, such as metrics, forms and the constrained liberties of 
linear development, which are related to styles, genres and ultimately cultural 
sounding  practices  in  general,  their  social  (and  economical)  environment 
included: these are but some of the elements that are involved in the detection 
of the ending of a music work such as the first movement of a Classic-era 
sonata  for  piano.  It  does  not  matter  whether  words  taken  from  common 
speech,  musical  grammar  or  even  semiotics  are  mixed  together  without 
discrimination of the level of skill of the listener. 
Whatever degree of objectivity of the labels we use possess, the simple fact 
that we use terms to point to distinctions is proof—according to the way we 
are able to describe our experience of listening with language—that we are 
caught in a complex net of possible distinctions, even if we are just trying to 
understand that a piano sonata movement is finished.  
Of course, whether we are able to detect a proper and consistent system in the 
relationships among the elements listed above is uncertain to say the least. 
First  of  all,  because  the  ideas  that  are  behind  terms,  such  as  “note”, 
“appoggiatura”, “chord”, “harmony” and so on, are related to a specific music 
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grammar that has neither been universally present throughout the world, nor 
even in the culture that generated it, it has been stable in time. 
In  this  respect,  the  epistemological  condition  of  terms  taken  from musical 
grammar is not so different from the terms taken from common speech, as is 
demonstrated by the commonality of using the words “tonality” of “harmony” 
for works written in an age that didn’t know those words, such as 1600 or 
1700, at least as we use them today (Hyer, 2008). The contingency of music 
practices, those related to the didactics of music composition included, forces 
us to dismantle the illusion of being able to use the notions taken from of our 
musical  grammar  as  a  passepartout  for  dealing  with  the  world’s  sounding 
practices, even if it is the music of our past, besides projecting our contingency 
onto them. Not only because this is what actually happens, for example in all 
the treatises that are devoted to the common practice, but also because all the 
available documents can only express the surface of the musical practice that 
necessarily omits what is left out by the purpose of the document.  
Secondly, even if we will someday be able to establish neural markers for these 
elements, as we have seen, we will still be dealing with the attempt to make a 
connection between the labels of our music grammars and the raw data of our 
objective measurements without being able to find a reference between the 
discontinuity  we  perceive  and  express  with  labels  and  the  continuity  of 
physical/physiological measurements without  ladening them with our theories 
on the world.
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Regardless,  it  is  important  to  realize  that  we can  detect  different  types  of 
ending or beginning music pieces simply because we are able to distinguish 
them as sections in the first place, due to the fact that we have found some 
qualities or characteristic successions of qualities that, being consistent within 
those sections, allow us to separate them as (simple or composite) units from 
comes before or after them in the “music”.
5.5 Changes
At  this  point  we  are  dealing  with  an  entire  musical  piece,  a  perceptive 
“parenthesis”, which is separated, or better said it is framed, by the “noise” of 
the sonic stream we are constantly immersed in and is well  identified as a 
whole,  which can be even labelled and,  so to speak,  thrown into linguistic 
presence by a title.
The possibility for that musical piece to be identified as a whole relies on some 
constant quality, both on the sonic side and on the causal side. But it has to be 
noted that this “causal side” of music is the same side we are used to relating 
to as “noise”. The sound of a clarinet is in fact bounded both by the experience 
of  seeing  or  at  least  conceding  that  a  clarinet,  somewhere,  somehow,  is 
playing and by the sonic event that shows a constant quality that we have 
learned to recognize as the sound of the clarinet. This is why on one hand we 
consider the sonic event as proceeding from a cause and, on the other hand, 
we recognize the sonic event as the sound of a clarinet, which is consistent  
with the cause. We can easily imagine some situations in which one of the two 
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conditions are not held and therefore our identification might fail. In fact, we 
might be unable to identify the source of a sound because we don’t see it or 
we are not expecting it (as in the case of hidden loudspeakers, for example) or 
because there is no constancy in the quality of the sound stream. Let’s take for 
example the case of Stockhausen’s “Klavierstuck XV” for electronic keyboard 
and  electronic  sounds.  As  the  electronic  keyboard  part  presents  a  lot  of 
changes in the sound colours, which also happens in the electronic part, there 
is no easy way to distinguish only by listening what the synthesizer plays and 
what is played by the background track. Nevertheless, we are still able to put 
music in the foreground against the background “noise”.
But  what  if  we imagine  a  paradoxical  music  work in  which the performers 
appear to us as people from the audience, sitting amongst the audience and 
making the customary noises that people make while waiting for a concert to 
begin? We need to imagine, of course, that these performers are following very 
precise instructions about the sounds they are asked to produce, which are 
written in a score and are performed by heart.
In this extreme case we would not be able to identify either the source of the 
“musical”  sounds,  because  we  would  probably  mistake  the  performers  for 
people  from  the  audience,  or  the  “music”  as  a  foreground  against  the 
background “noise”, because we would not be able to find any constant sonic 
qualities that we can rely on in order to distinguish “music” from “noise”. We 
would not even be able to realize when the “music” begins and when it ends. 
Of course, the topic of distinguishing “music” from “noise” has been widely 
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explored  by  artists  and  musicians  especially  in  the  artistic/musical  paths 
following John Cage’s ideas, such as the Fluxus movement.
In order to examine this situation more clearly, we will consider each element 
on  its  own.  First,  let  us  consider  only  changes  within  the  sonic  stream, 
hypothetically removing any experience of the causal source. In doing this, we 
can establish that if we are able to identify a change in some qualities of the 
sonic stream that let us separate the background “noise” from a foreground, 
we have, so to speak, something to deal with: a target for our attention which 
is somehow bounded both in time, by its beginning and its end, and in the 
sonic texture. Whether we identify this foreground as “music” and not as a 
layer of “noise”,  as it  would happen if,  when waiting for an electroacoustic 
concert to begin, all of a sudden an electric-like buzz would resound in the hall, 
it  is  up  to  our  expectations.  In  this  case,  we would probably  attribute the 
sudden electric-like buzz to an electric system malfunction, especially if we are 
not directed by some non-sonic change in the surrounding environment, such 
as the fading out of the lights in the hall, that let us identify any new foreground 
sound as “music”. We would therefore assume the presence of a source, the 
system malfunction, even if we cannot see it or do not know anything about it. 
What  is  important  here  is  that  if  we  are  appropriately  oriented  by  our 
expectations to identify that foreground as “music”, a simple distinction within 
the sonic experience between foreground and background is enough for us to 
separate “music” from “noise”.
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Concerning the “music” piece, as a “musical” segment of the sonic continuum, 
I have ultimately related our ability to identify portions of that continuum, on 
one hand, to a change in the sonic qualities we rely on to distinguish “music” 
from “noise” and, on the other hand, to a change in some sonic qualities that 
were constant within the “musical” continuum. 
Even if I have not shown in detail precisely what those constant sonic qualities 
are that allow us to easily identify a beginning or an ending segment, it is the 
very possibility of distinguishing parts in “music” segments without having to 
rely on causal sources that grants us the possibility to look for some changes 
in aural experiences that we could call, in the most abstract and general way, 
qualities, be they the experience qualities that we can easily relate to terms of 
our musical grammar or not. 
For example, the distinction of the humorous long lasting ending of Satie’s “De 
podophtalma” from what precedes it, is provided by a sudden change in some 
complex elements of the piano part, such as the sudden interruption of the 
previous melodic textures, the juxtaposition of short segments that are related 
to a single chord, the tonic chord, together with the presentation of rhythmic 
and pitch schemes that are typical of classical music endings. 
While we do not have a proper word for naming such changing qualities as a 
whole yet, a more or less skilled listener is able to detect those changes. It is 
not important whether an inexperienced listener might be able detect changes 
in some qualities or not, but the simple possibility for of other listeners that 
157
have been trained to a certain level being able to do it provides us with the 
opportunity to relate distinctions within a “music” continuum to the change in 
some, perhaps complex, quality, as the requirement of these distinctions.
Yet, there must be some cases in which the lack of this requirement leads to a 
failure in segmenting. Let’s take the case of the “infamous” La Monte Young 
“Composition 1960 #7”. The score simply shows a stave with a fifth interval (B3 
- F#4) “to be held for a long time”, which, in some cases, might be extended to 
one  hour  and  even  more  (Alburger,  2003),  to  be  performed  by  an  open 
instrumentation.  If  some  distinctions  can  be  made  within  the  fifth  interval 
continuum, it is not the score requires some related actions by the performer. 
We can imagine a performance of this work for a sine wave generator, as it  
happens for some of Young’s later sound installations, so that the performance 
extemporaneities are minimized. What will happen to a motionless and quiet 
listener  during  a  two-hour  performance  of  that  work  cannot  be  precisely 
predicted. We can only predict that, if the electronic gear does not malfunction, 
it  will  not  be possible to relate any listening distinction to any change in a 
certain quality within the sound stream provided by the performance, because 
there is no way to detect any change in it. 
In other words: if  the “music” continuum does not change in any way,  we 
cannot attach to it a distinction in time, a segmentation. But what do we mean, 
when  we  say  that  the  “music”  continuum does  not  change?  Is  that  even 
possible? From acoustics we know that sound is the result of vibrations, so 
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there  must be something changing in order to have sounds and ultimately a 
“music”  continuum.  Moreover,  even  if  we  accept  the  idea  of  a  constant 
pressure wave,  like  an ideal  sine wave,  this  wave is  realized by constantly 
moving air (or any other elastic medium) molecules, which are even formed by 
particles the are a never stable: there is no possibility of the sonic continuum 
not changing at all, not even a microscopic one. But the sonic continuum is not 
the “music” continuum, as the first one is connected with our measurements 
while the second one is a mental construction that is realized by our perceptive 
system. 
So, nothing changes in the “music” continuum when we cannot detect any 
change in it by listening: when we have not had any listening experience of 
change within it. In spite of the appearances, this is not a tautology, however. 
In  fact,  as  we  cannot  make  any  objective  statement  about  experiences,  if 
somebody claimed to have had the listening experience of a certain change in 
“music” that we haven’t  had, it  is  not possible for us to verify whether the 
person lied, had an hallucination or is simply more sensitive than us. 
When  we want  to  share  our  distinctions,  we necessarily  have to deal  with 
setting the conditions for our discourse to be a public one.
Of course, not everybody has the same sensitivity for changing qualities within 
the “music” continuum. Indian traditional musicians, for example, are trained to 
detect  intervals  of  20  cents  (Boep,  1999),  instead  of  the  western  music’s 
semitones’  100 cents.  It  is  therefore  possible  that  an  Indian  listener  might 
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perceive as different what, in certain contexts, is analysed as two instances of 
the same interval by a western listener. Yet there is no need to bring up the 
diversities  of  western  and  non-western  music  traditions:  the  difference 
between minimal techno and tech-house genres in electronic dance music, for 
example, can be very hard to detect for a listener who has only been trained, 
even if highly trained, in the classical music repertoire. 
When we want to create a public discourse about how to detect when qualities 
change, we are therefore inevitably forced to deal with the diversity of people’s 
sensitivities in detecting changes. This means that we always need to refer to a 
context, to a community of people who agree on what sets the threshold for 
deciding whether a quality in a “music” continuum is stable or not. 
5.6 - Extreme music
We can therefore find a community who agrees that a two hour version of 
Young’s “Composition 1960 #7” for sine waves presents no changes that can 
be related to distinctions within the “music” continuum. This is definitely such 
an extreme case of a non-segmentable music work that we can hardly find 
other compositions that present such a changeless continuity. It is not that it  
would be a difficult task to create them: any held tone played by an electronic 
instrument  with  the most stable sound would have the same result.  But  of 
course  extreme  cases  are  for  extremist  composers,  who  are  extremely 
infrequent. 
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Let’s take another one: Phill Niblock. In his album YPGPN (1970), he presents a 
series of works based on the highest continuity of sound. “A Trombone Piece” 
for tape, for example is a work that is based on the superimposition of tape 
recordings of a trombone that mostly plays the same note in different octaves 
and with  different  micro-tuning  variations.  Even  if  all  the tracks  are  mostly 
realized by a continuum that is based on variations of a static tone, it is very 
difficult  not  to  hear  changes  here  and  there,  such  as  the  attacks  of  the 
instruments,  due  to  their  dependence  on  breathing,  or  some  transitions 
highlighting different sound qualities, a tone-beat for example. Nevertheless, it 
is difficult to place these changes within a hierarchy that allows the listeners to 
distinguish the “music” segment in, let us say, a before and an after, as a first 
and a second part  of  the work.  Another  example,  even if  somehow at  the 
opposite side of the spectrum, is Olivier Messiaen’s “Épôde” for 18 strings, a 
section of “Chronochromie” which is technically written as a sort of a 18-part 
fugue  in  the  so-called  style-oiseaux.  Even  if  in  this  highly  contrapuntal 
composition everything moves and transforms all the time, it is apparently very 
hard to detect an overall  change in quality during its four minutes of, so to 
speak,  sonic  chaos.  It  sounds  like  18  birds  singing  all  together  in  such  a 
complex dialogue that it  seems to overcharge human listening, which is no 
longer able to distinguish anything but the rapid articulation of bird songs. We 
are  dealing  here  with  a  “music”  continuum  that,  in  spite  of  having  the 
possibility of detecting several changes and events in it, we are not able, at 
least not without serious effort  and a sort  of a re-education of  listening, to 
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divide it in parts, by simply detecting global changes. We cannot rely on the 
changing of qualities to segment the “music” continuum and yet we might not 
give up and turn to solely relying on causal sources: we can still engage a sort  
of attentive fight directed to “elevate”, so to speak, the perceptive foreground 
to the “music” domain against its stowing to the background “noise”.
Sheet  music for piano that  was found in Erik  Satie’s  house after  his death 
provides us with a final example of extreme music. The textual notes of this 
work, entitled “Vexations”, state that: “in order to play the theme 840 times in 
succession, it would be advisable to prepare oneself beforehand, and in the 
deepest silence, by serious immobilities” (Satie, 1893). Even if it is not clear 
whether the composition was really intended to include 840 repetitions of the 
same sheet, which by the way already consists of a double repetition, this work 
has  slowly  become  a  classic  of  experimental  and,  so  to  say,  adventurous 
music, starting from its first performance by 12 interchanging pianists, in 1963.
Even  if  the  double  structure  of  the  single  repetitions  already  confuses  the 
listener during the performance of this work, which lasts about 20 hours, by 
listening  it  is  indeed  easy  to  detect  the  single  repetitions,  so  that  we  can 
actually  distinguish  a  number  of  sections  corresponding  to  the  single 
repetitions in the whole performance. On the other hand, it is not possible to 
group the repetitions in larger sections by detecting more global changes in the 
perceived sound without putting into play the succession of  the performing 
pianists and therefore relying on the single pianists interpretation as a changing 
quality.
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5.7 - Qualities
But by connecting distinctions in time with repetitions we are already forced to 
question the idea of quality itself. In Section 5.1, I first described the ability of 
detecting the beginning of a specific event such as a concert by only listening 
in terms of the detection of changes in the sound quality of the sonic stream. 
In the course of this text I have connected qualities to the instantiation of a  
sound  property  with  a  sonic  character  that  is  constant  within  a  certain 
threshold:  for  example,  a  constantly  loud  dynamics,  but  also  the  constant 
sound colour of an instrument, such as the piano, or the constant presence of 
a causal source, such as the crowd attending a concert. 
Also, a constant diminuendo or the constant rise of a note scale seems to be 
able  to  give  rise  to  distinctions  as  soon  as  they  change  movements  or 
direction. 
I  have therefore shown how qualities have a complex constitution and can 
result in qualities that seem to show a more abstract character. For example, 
the  ability  to  consider  the  presence  of  a  chord  as  a  constant  quality  in  a 
succession of  notes with irregular  attacks,  different  durations and changing 
note  registers  implies  the  cognitive  possibility  to  gestaltically  attribute  that 
quality  to  elements  like  the  possible  pauses  between  notes,  which  do  not 
directly express the chord. 
The same is true for the possibility that even a music style might give rise to 
distinctions whenever  it  changes in an explicit  and striking manner.  In fact, 
there are works that use differences in style to articulate form, such as Bach’s 
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“Mass in B Minor” or a long list of Frank Zappa’s songs (like “Beauty Knows no 
Pain” from the album You are What You Is).
Finally,  I  have  shown  that  even  the  recognition  of  a  “music”  segment,  a 
repetition, is able to provoke a distinction within the “music” continuum, to the 
point that repetition is present in western and non-western music tradition in an 
overwhelming way,19 which seems to point us to repetition as a fundamental 
aspect of music. 
But  what  could  possibly  be  the  sound property,  the  aural  quality,  that  we 
detect as a change in the moment we recognize a repetition?
The idea of quality seems to be too vague to be usable outside a very general 
approach  to  the  distinctive  aspects  of  perception  and  cognition.  But  I 
introduced the word “quality” as a marker for distinctions in the aural stream, 
so  that  it  could  play  an  ambiguous  role  of  directing  the  process  of 
distinguishing to the changing properties of the sound flow in causal terms, as 
a naturalistic approach to the aural world made of (sound) objects that exhibit 
properties. At the same time, the use of the word “quality” as an explicative 
term supported a naive ontology of sound expressed by talking about listening 
experiences with the vocabulary of  music grammars,  such as dynamics,  or 
general music related terms, such as style.
Nevertheless,  if  we  must  take  literally  the  claim  according  to  which  we 
distinguish in time as a consequence of detecting sudden changes in certain 
19For general survey of the “ubiquity of repetition” see Ockelford, 2005, pp. 1-6.
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qualities, we also need to account for the ability of experiencing all the different 
qualities that might be simultaneously present in a same sound flow. But as 
qualities might consist  at  least in indefinitely complex abstractions of  those 
sound elements that are usually considered at the base of sound perception, 
such as tone height, intensity and timbre, they are in an infinite number. 
There is therefore no way to understand how cognition might be able to identify 
each one of them at the same time in order to be open to all possible changes 
in the sound flow.
This problem is apparently a consequence of an idea of cognition that is not 
constituted in time from the materiality of the body, but is rather defined by the 
reversible and infinitely articulated space of linguistic and logical syntax.
But  “quality”  is  just  a  linguistic invention,  an apparatus that  is  instrumental 
within a narrative, with a role that is neither ontological nor foundational. It is  
there because if we distinguish in time, there must be something before and 
something after  both  the actual  moment  we make that  distinction  and the 
moment we address as the point in the sound flow that we relate to as that 
distinction. As these two moments cannot be coincident and the moment we 
realize a change always follows the moment of the change, we need to relate 
distinctions  not  to  a  syntactical  complication  of  parametric  values  that  we 
relate to qualities, but rather to the articulation of time in perception, which may 
ultimately give rise to the ideas of syntax and parametric values. “Qualities” are 
there to work as placeholders that are projected as properties of an object and 
are  asked  to  assume  a  causal  role  in  driving  our  perception  by  the 
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sensorimotor  narrative  of  a  sound flow that  is  projected  around us  and is 
populated by objects that, somehow, oppose us.
We rather need to start from distinction in itself as a starting point of a narrative 
that is possibly able to provide a backdrop against which emerges not only the 
idea of an external word, but the very syntagm “external word” as a segment in 
the sound .
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6. INTERLUDE: INSTANT AND DURATION
The  French  philosopher  Gaston  Bachelard,  in  his  short  but  dense  book 
L’intuition de l’instant develops a metaphysics of the instant in opposition to 
Bergson’s idea of durée réelle.
The exposition  of  the arguments  are  conducted by following  Siloë,  a  book 
written by the historian Gaston Roupnel, in which the author presents an idea 
of time according to which: “time has but a reality:  the one of  the Instant” 
(translated from: Bachelard, 1932, p.12).
For Bergson, the true reality of time is its duration and the instant is just an 
abstraction that comes from projecting time into space. It is the connection 
between two durations that we perceive spatially as the point that separates a 
“before” from an “after”.
On the other hand, for Roupnel and therefore for Bachelard 
the true reality of time is the Instant; duration is nothing but a construction 
that  doesn’t  have  an  absolute  reality.  It  is  created  from  outside,  by 
memory, the power of imagination par excellence, that just aims to dream 
and  live  again,  but  doesn’t  want  to  understand.  (translated  from: 
Bachelard, 1932, p.21)
Both Bergson and Bachelard claim that time is created by an act of the subject  
that  involves  attention,  but  while  for  Bergson  they  are  actions  that  extend 
between the subject’s  decision  and a goal,  for  Bachelard,  instants  are  the 
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consequence of acts that are unique sudden decisions, which carry the burden 
of originality.
It is not a matter of proposing theories that are complementary with each other 
so that the instant is just the negative of duration. Relativity forces us to give 
up on the presumption of being able to address the simultaneity of events that 
happen  in  two different  locations  in  space,  without  the  need to  adapt  the 
notion of simultaneity to a measure of the relationship between the instants of  
time that are connected to the occurring events.
Not only are instants the psychological markers of moments in time, as they 
are  unique,  each  of  them  singularly  constitute  time,  which  is  therefore 
discontinuous:  “life  is  the discontinuity of  acts” (translated from: Bachelard, 
1932,  p.19).  On  the  other  hand,  the  experience  of  instants,  with  their 
dimensionless indifference, is exposed to the mercy of the world because “time 
is  nothing  if  nothing  happens”  (translated  from:  Bachelard,  1932,  p.19). 
Therefore consciousness awaits for an “attack from the world” as an “abrupt 
change”  in  which  a  creative  act  is  in  operation,  in  order  to  be  capable  of 
articulating itself in memories that can only be connected to instants, and in an 
attention that is the continuous renewal of expectations.
In the interplay of memory and attention as grounded in the Instant, we find 
Bachelard’s idea of habit as a quality of the instant that is able to link within 
each instant, memory and tension towards the future as the time-forming act, 
whose symptom is identity:
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being is the place of resonance for the rhythms of instants and, as such, 
we can say that it has a past in the same way, so to say, a voice has an 
echo. But this past is nothing but a present habit and this being present 
of past is just a metaphor. (translated from: Bachelard, 1932, p.43)
By being rooted in the present instant, habits are unique acts that are on one 
hand connected in memory with secondary habits in routines, but, on the other 
hand, are always renewed as expectations, so that a habit can be defined as a 
“repetitive integration of novelties” (translated from: Bachelard, 1932, p.43).
We will later see how habit can degenerate, so to say, into habituation, so that 
“novelties” are no more expected as such, but disappear from consciousness 
and become the qualities of  the objects in  the world we live  in.  Bachelard 
addresses  this  by saying that  in  order  to maintain  its  engagement,  a  habit 
constantly  needs  to  be  disregarded  to  some  extent,  so  that  the  sense  of 
novelty is renewed. An effective habit is therefore the sign of progress. But we 
are the variable sum of conscious habits:
we recognize ourselves in our  character  because we imitate ourselves 
and  because  our  personality  is  therefore  the  habit  of  our  own  name. 
(translated from: Bachelard, 1932, p.64)
Therefore,  the  idea  of  progress  becomes  a  moral  tension  that  asks  us  to 
ceaselessly transform the copies of ourselves that we instantiate in order to 
maintain the possibility to act in the world because “what endures is always 
what is able to regenerate itself” (translated from: Bachelard, 1932, p.65).
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Along this path of ideas, we can find the essence of most of the ideas that will 
be presented in the following sections.
Bachelard has proposed a metaphysics of the Instant as distinguished, but not 
unrelated,  from the  psychological  sensation  connected  to  a  sudden  act  of 
consciousness. We have seen in the very beginning of this text, that distinction 
is  always  a  narrative  that  can  be  decomposed  by  other  narratives  in  an 
articulation  of  instants:  the  instant  in  which  the  discontinuity  happens,  the 
instant we perceive, for example, a wince,20 the instant we become conscious 
of it and relate that wince to the instant in the measured time in which we still 
were not experiencing that wince, and so on.
On the other hand we can develop sensorimotor metaphors in analysing the 
idea of instants as edges,  so that we can distinguish Bergson’s instants in 
terms of  borders from Bachelard’s  instants in  terms of  boundaries.  In  fact, 
according to Edward Casey, borderlines, with their precision and arbitrariness 
resemble  Bergson’s  “rigidly  delimited  nows”  (Casey,  2008,  p.6),  which  are 
invisible and yet are able to separate extended surfaces. Boundaries, on the 
other  hand,  are  permeable  and  allow  trespassing;  they  are  not  abstract 
stipulated lines on a map, but are undetachable from their organic substrate. 
Specifically, Casey discusses three aspects of Bachelard’s instant that he also 
finds  in  his  vision  of  boundaries.  Novelty,  the  first  one,  is  related  to  the 
uniqueness of each instant in the similar way an organic boundary-like edge is 
never static but always altering, always unique;  commencement  is related to 
20The experience of a wince, here and for the rest of text, is used as an exemplary reference to 
the phyisiological (couscious or unconscious) relatus of the cognitive act of distinguishing, as it 
will be explicitely stated in Section 7.1. 
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the idea that an instant is always giving rise to an event as the crossing the 
boundary  is  always  an  invitation  to  something  new,  in  opposition  with  the 
border that discourages trespassing. Finally,  verticality, as the surprise of the 
suddenness of the instant, what I  called the “wince”,  reminds Casey of the 
vertical position of boundaries with respect to the flow that crosses them.
The author admits that the “parallel is not perfect” (2008, p.11), but for us it is  
enough to recognize the potential of a sensorimotor metaphor, that will prove 
useful in intuitively visualizing structures of distinctions and, in a special way, in 
the didactics of the pattern composition.21
As we have seen, it is not possible to address listening without dealing with the 
way we talk about it.  The same is true for dealing with time as well  as for 
dealing  with  all  the  topics  that  are,  willing  or  not,  necessarily  involved  in 
discourses that are entangled with the structure of the language they use.
Maybe  the  distinction  between  duration  and  instant  is  also  related  to  the 
different positions regarding the subjecting consequences of using a language 
of  nouns.  Maybe  a  discourse  about  listening  should  be  made  through  a 
language that, in the attempt to avoid the paradigm of the object that we met in 
Section  3.6,  is  able  to  bring  back  naturalized  labels  to  their  process  of 
constitution.
As far as concerns this text, I will necessarily have to use the language I have 
at  my  disposal,  with  all  the  ambiguities  of  noun-based  clauses  and  the 
21See Section 11.2.
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unavoidable hypostatizations, in expressing, similarly to  Bachelard, an idea of 
the instant directly in terms of an act of distinction that therefore does not have 
to  carry  the  ontological  burden  of  a  metaphysical  object,  but  is  rather  a 
generative  element  of  a  narrative  that  involves,  as  a  consequence,  the 
constitution of time. 
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7. OUR LOST DIMENSIONS
7.1  Distinction
When we talk about listening, as well as when we talk about human cognition, 
we  put  ourselves  in  the  position  of  impersonating,  so  to  speak,  both  the 
researcher and the object of research, in a way that the language we that we 
use to talk about ourselves is involved as an effect of our object of research. 
This is why, according to Humberto Maturana, we cannot avoid relying on an 
epistemology of the observer in our investigation, as we have seen in the first 
part of this text. Observing, according to Maturana (1988), is an operation that 
takes place in language and therefore already relates to a community. And here 
language is the fundamental requirement of knowledge, hence all the concepts 
we use and in the end all we can talk about is based on language, as a social 
extension of the body. The body itself,  as well  as cognition, is the result of 
language rather than its condition. In fact, we need not forget that “cognition” 
is a word in the first place, and it is inserted in a pragmatics, which includes all 
the operations,  the experiments  and data collections as  a  reference of  our 
“praxis of living” when we talk or write about cognition. As a consequence, 
observation cannot but be founded on those emerging oppositions, as we have 
seen, when using language as a simulacrum of presence, so that the world 
ends  up  with  being  populated  by  objectified  différances. Observation  acts 
therefore as a process for propagating and articulating differences in the hall of 
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mirrors  of  naturalized  semantics:  “the  basic  operation  that  an  observer 
performs in the praxis of living is the operation of distinction” (Maturana, 1988, 
§6.2).
 
“Distinction” in Maturana is the process of separating a foreground (a unity) 
from a background (a medium) including those operations carried out by the 
observer  while  implementing  that  separation,  which  are  not  therefore 
independent from the acts of the observer.  While this is already a complex 
activity, especially if mediated by language, when we turn to listening we can 
relate it to an even more basic activity, without risking, when it is brought to 
more  complex  frames,  losing  its  constructive  potentiality.  In  the  previous 
chapter,  I  characterized  distinction  as  the  moment  when  we  realize  that 
something  happened,  a  moment  which  is  often  accompanied  by  an 
instantaneous “wince”, the behavioural mark of the very moment of distinction.
We can relate this wince to physiological evidence that seems to be connected 
to it, such as the orienting response, the basic reflex of the head turning in the 
direction  of  the  sound  when  something  new  happens,  as  shown  by  all 
vertebrates, including young infants.
Other  direct  physiological  relata  include  the  bradycardiac  changes  in  the 
heartbeat, the reduction of heart rate, whenever a stimulus change is detected, 
and the so-called mismatch negativity, a peak in a particular electrical activity 
of brain cells, namely the N2 evoked response potential  (Huron, 2007, pp.49-
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52). When an explicit reaction to surprise is brought into play, other possible 
relata  show  up,  such  as  piloerection,  increased  arousal  or  breath  holding 
(Huron, 2007, p.362). There is nevertheless a problem in linking the wince of 
distinction to physiological  data,  because after  some repetitions of the new 
stimulus the listener will habituate to it and it will not be possible again to find a 
change in the previously listed physiological relata. Consequently, it is possible 
to relate the physiological data to the perception of some degree of novelty. It  
seems we can therefore interpret  the detected change as a violation of  an 
expectation and that the sudden wince becomes the sign of surprise. 
Let’s go back to addressing what we are used to dealing with as a property of 
the world, in the shape of the sound flow, that is the external correlate of that  
wince. So far, I have used for it the most general word “quality” and I have said 
that  the  wince  is  related  to  the  experience  of  change  in  the  quality  of 
experience. As I explained at the end of last chapter, we do not have a way to 
identify if the old quality was substituted by a new quality, because up to now 
we have not involved any ability to distinguish a single quality in the sound flow 
among the infinite numbers of qualities: the continuum of qualities, as we could 
call it, is related to any single moment of our experience of the sound flow. Yet,  
if what we really perceive, as far as we can say up to now, is just a change in a 
quality, without being able to detect a possible direction of that change, that 
change is experienced as a lack, affecting the experience of the sound flow 
after the change. In fact, even if this “contrasting phenomenon” seems to be 
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observed only in extremely simple conditions, it might be taken as the sign of 
what  we  experience  changes  in  terms  of  differences,  instead  of  absolute 
qualities:
Listening  to  a  stimulus  with  a  particular  spectral  structure  and  then 
switching rapidly to a stimulus with a flat spectrum, such as white noise, 
may obtain a powerful demonstration of this effect. A white noise heard in 
isolation  may be  described as  ‘colourless’;  it  has  no pitch  and has  a 
neutral sort of timbre. However, when a white noise follows immediately 
after a stimulus with spectral structure, the noise sounds ‘coloured’. The 
coloration corresponds to the inverse of the spectrum of the preceding 
sound. (Moore, 1997, p.255)
In  the  previous  quote,  the  terms  of  “coloured”  and  “colourless”  express 
different qualities of “noise” and its “colour”, which are characterized in terms 
of physical measurements, as sound spectra. A consequence of characterizing 
qualities with a dimensional metric of measurements, the sound spectrum, a 
quality  ends  up  being  identified  within  the  continuum  of  possible 
measurements/qualities as a set of parameters, which is given the role of a 
hermeneutic probe within the sound flow. On the other hand, the description of 
the experience is made in evocative terms, which are related to the experience 
of qualities in other sensorial modes, such as with “colour”, but it could also be 
made with an extended description or even with a label invented on purpose. 
So, the experience of a change can be associated with any kind of description 
that we are able to assemble, or better: if we can describe a change perceived 
in whatever way we do it, then that description has the right to be listed as a 
perceptive quality. 
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How many ways do we know in which we can describe a change within a 
music work,  within  a sound flow in the most general  sense,  which we can 
detect by simply listening to it with the full burden of our past experiences? Of 
course, even if it is not an infinite quantity, they are still in a very large number,  
because it is always possible to invent new ways to describe them. I mention 
here a few examples, starting from a very common one, at least for a skilled 
musician,  and  ending  with  one  of  the  most  abstract  and  blurred:  pitch, 
harshness of timbre, position (in a stereo panning, for example), consonance, 
rhythmicity,  tonality,  pleasantness, deepness (a quality that is often used in 
some  sub-genres  of  electronic  dance  music),  presence  of  a  voice,  of  an 
instrument, of a chord, the entrance of a theme, the genre. If we can say that a 
music has suddenly changed, let us say, in its genre, we can consider that it 
has a quality that, under certain conditions related to that quality, allows us to 
distinguish  the  moment  of  change  within  the  sound  flow.  Nevertheless, 
qualities show different relationships with each other not only because their 
boundaries are always blurred and there might be some overlapping amongst 
them, but also because the way we talk about certain qualities occasionally 
connects  them  to  other  qualities,  to  which  they  relate  by  combination, 
inclusively or in other kinds of relations. For example, sound colour overlaps 
with pitch because the former influences the way we detect the latter and the 
lower the pitch, the higher the possibility for sound colour to be rich of partials.  
On the other hand, the case of harmony, as a way to deal with pitches, and 
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genre, as a possible combination of pitch, harmony, sound colour and so on, 
shows the high degree of complexity of possible relations among qualities.
7.2 - Dimensions
In her seminal article “Time, Our Lost Dimension”, the cognitive psychologist 
Mari-Riess Jones proposes a way to deal with qualities from a parametrical 
point of view. Even if it is not the first or the last time that such a proposal has 
been made, especially in cognitive psychology and musical analysis, Jones’ 
approach  is  particularly  important  for  my  research  and  therefore  I  will 
especially follow her article in the next sections. In fact, even if her text was 
intended to account for cognitive problems in the serial ordering of events and 
in particular to the psychological phenomenon of  streaming, I have found her 
terminology so extremely useful in dealing with the distinctions of listening, that 
I  have  not  only  been  able  to  apply  them  outside  of  the  field  of  music 
psychology, in music composition and analysis, as I will show in Part Three,  
but it also seems to be promising in dealing with more general topics related to 
cognition in the context of society.
Jones’  primary  concern  is  to  establish  a  shareable  representation  of  the 
experiences  of  articulated  changes  in  qualities,  which  she  projects  as 
properties of the world in terms of “world patterns” instantiating a physicalist 
“world structure”:
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this approach rests on the assumptions that world structure is built within 
the constraints of three dimensions of space and one of time and that 
humans  lawfully  reflect  world  structure.  In  particular  our  auditory 
environment  is  assumed  to  be  subjectively  represented  by  pattern 
relations  along  dimensions  of  pitch,  loudness  and time.  (Jones,  1976, 
p.327)
Jones does not explicitly define the term “dimension”, but it seems obvious 
from  the  context  that  she  refers  to  its  physicalist  definition  in  terms  of  a 
coordinate within a mathematical space.22 In this text the idea of “dimension” is 
simplified from its  mathematical  abstractions to  simply  intuitively  refer  to  a 
parameter,  as  in  the  “height”  or  “duration”  or  even  “pitch”  and  “mel”  (or 
perceived ton “height”)  dimensions.  A  further  development of  the notion  of 
dimension extends beyond the scope of the present text, but it is enough to 
say that a parameter is related to an “ordering structure” (Ito, 1993, p.1168) so 
that, for example, any set of values in the dimension of “height” can be ordered 
from the lowest to the highest one. 
After having stated her assumptions, Jones immediately proceeds in defining a 
first set of assumptions that are the consequences of her physicalist approach. 
First  of  all,  she  defines  “world  patterns”  as  the  “invariant  relations  along 
changing physical dimensions” (Jones, 1976, p.328), then she connects “world 
patterns” to the “relations of a finite number of subjective dimensions”, so that 
it is possible to realize an isomorphism between the multidimensional physical 
space and a multidimensional subjective space. This is not too different from 
22For a complete mathematical discussion on the concept of “dimension” see (Ito, 1993, 
p.448).
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Oackelford’s definition of perspects, the contraction of “perceived aspects”, as 
“qualities  of  the  musical  fabric  as  we  apprehend  them” (Oackelford,  2005, 
p.10). After all, both Jones and Oackelford are talking about parameters that 
are in a, not necessarily one-to-one, correspondence with the basic acoustic 
parameters, such as frequency and amplitude, which in turn are theoretically 
laden by our sounding-aural social practices. The simplicity of these acoustic 
dimensions is only apparent though, as they have to be expressed as statistical 
abstractions  ruled  by  thresholds  in  order  to  be  applied  to  real  world 
phenomena,  and  we  perceive  their  subjective  correlate  only  because  our 
listening process is trained to detect them by simply ignoring the unfitting parts 
of experience. Frequency, for example, can be defined in absolute terms only if 
there is a perfect replication of a pressure oscillation, which is impossible by 
definition in real life (although it can be reached with digital instruments with a 
good but nevertheless approximation). In the same way, phase can be defined 
as an absolute value only in presence of a perfect and impossible replication of  
the oscillation period. It is true that phase, in spite of its basic character, is a 
sort of neglected parameter so that neither Jones nor Oackelford seem to be 
interested  in  it,  because  phase cannot  easily  be  connected  to  any  related 
subjective dimension (see Oackelford, 2005, pp.10-11). Yet the difference in 
phase has an important role, for example, in detecting the position in space of 
a sound source, which on the other hand is a subjective dimension. Sound 
spectrum as well, which was used as a acoustic evidence for detecting the 
“contrasting  phenomenon”,  is  just  one  of  the  many  possible  analytical 
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representations  of  the  pressure-wave  flow  and,  as  being  based  on  the 
unrealistic  assumption  that  a  pressure  wave  repeats  itself  in  an  precisely 
identical way, it needs some conceptual adjustments in order to be useful.23
Jones and Oackelford ultimately direct their analysis essentially to pitch, as the 
basic  subjective  dimension  we  have  developed  a  strong  sensitivity  for,  in 
western music practice, as opposed, for example to the strong sensitivity for 
timbre that bases our comprehension of natural languages. To be precise, in 
psychoacoustic terms, the subjective scale of tone height is usually expressed 
in mel, while the subjective experience of amplitude is usually expressed in the 
phon  scale,  nevertheless the dimension of pitch as investigated by the two 
researchers  is  quite  surprisingly  arranged according to the western musical 
grammar. In Jones’ text, this is motivated by following Shephard’s claim that 
his  model  (Shepard,  1982),  which  distinguishes  between  tone  height  from 
chroma,  is  more  appropriate  for  analysing  patterns  structures.  Twenty-nine 
years later, Oackelford relates the choice of using the pitch-scale instead of 
mels to Gilles Fauconnier’s idea of “mental space” (Fauconniers, 1985), in the 
definition by George Lakoff as “a ‘medium for conceptualization and thought’,  
capable of representing ‘any fixed or ongoing state of affairs’” (Lakoff, 1987; 
cited in Oackelford, 2005, p.12). The idea is that any descriptive structure of a 
conventional system of parameters/notations, such as the traditional western 
music grammar is suitable to work as a system of coordinates, on which it is 
23See Huron, 2007, p.102 and Roads, 1996, pp.1073 and following.
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possible to build an algebra, for the simple fact that it is accepted and used by 
a community.
I am now turning back to Jones, she has completed the passage from quality 
to quantity, from experience to the abstraction of numbers, while on the other, 
she has prepared the ground for detecting patterns, in the algebraic context of 
symmetry: 
relations that define subjective pattern structure can be represented by 
the  mathematics  of  group  of  symmetry  applied  to  the  subjective 
dimensional representations. (Jones, 1976, p.328)
The path from the indescribable experience of qualities to the multidimensional 
set of parameters is a long one, from which there is no easy turning back: 
everything we listen to can be referred to the instantiations of  a subjective 
dimension  which  is  the  result  of  some  combination  of  more  basic,  still  
subjective, dimensions and is therefore the, again subjective, representation of 
their correlates in the multidimensional set of physical, objective, parameters. It 
is a long path because we have given up the constructive power of perception 
to the properties of the world as we find them as ready-made in our training 
process of listening. There is no easy turning back because in the meanwhile 
we have forgotten how we would listen before training, for example how we 
would listen to our mother tongue before we learned it, so that the effort to 
“listen differently and creatively” is harder and harder the older we get.
Nevertheless  we  can  now  characterize  our  distinctions  as  experiences  of 
discontinuities along some perceptive scale, which can be articulated at will. 
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For example, Stephen McAdams’s now classical proposal of a “timbre space”, 
a  multidimensional  representation  of  the experience  of  timbre,  includes the 
three  dimensional  components  of  “attack  time”,  “spectral  centroid”  and 
“spectral flux”. These components are already complex, so to speak, arbitrary 
hermeneutic  dimensions  and  are  related  to  the  physical  correlates  in  the 
complex  multi-dimensional  analysis  of  sound  spectra  (McAdams,  1999). 
“Timbre space”  is  therefore the example of  a  dimension that  is  analytically 
presented as a multi-dimensional space. But this is only one of the possibilities 
of articulating complex dimensions.
Mari-Riess Jones is interested in setting a proper numerical representation that 
is  adequate  to  the  complex  relations  among  notes  in  the  western  music 
tradition, consequently her dimensions are totally ordered. This means that any 
couple of subsequent pitches can be ordered and consequently their interval 
can be described as ascending, descending or as a unison. In other words: if 
we consider two instances of that subjective dimension that we perceive as 
different from each other, we can always say if one instance is in a lower place 
than the other in the scale defining that dimension. However, if we take the list  
of subjective qualities I presented earlier, we can see that this is not always the 
case. For example, we can always say if the degree of rhythmicity, which is a 
quality that can indeed be defined and experienced in very different subjective 
ways, is different between two music excerpts, but it is not always easy to 
distinguish which one is more rhythmical than the other one. Nevertheless, the 
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locution “more rhythmical” is far from meaningless, because most of us can 
easily imagine two different music pieces or two different sounding events, the 
second of which is evidently more rhythmical than the first one. 
The dimensions of style and genre, I am using these terms in their most general 
sense here, are even more puzzling as there are so many ways that a music 
piece can be perceived apart from the style, let us say, of XVIII Century galant 
music and therefore setting a degree of distance from galant music might seem 
pointless. On the other hand, if we are properly experienced, we are definitely 
capable of putting in a scale, according to the dimension of galant music style, 
a  work  belonging  to  the  galant  music  style,  a  work  which  shares  some 
similarities with that style let as say a piece of Beethoven’s first period, and, for  
example, a contemporary music work such as Iannis Xenakis’ “Achorripsis”. It 
seems therefore that there might be conditions to be met in order to compare 
any  two  instances  of  some perceptive  dimensions,  which  in  this  case  are 
therefore only partially ordered ones.
I have to add that even if I did not define “style”, nor I have presented a way to 
connect  this  dimension  to  the  articulation  of  more  basic  subjective  and 
physical dimensions, I can anyway say that style, however it is defined, must 
be at least phenomenally connected to sets of instances in dimensions such as 
pitch, harmony and timbre, and therefore seems to be a sort of dimension of 
dimensions. This is indeed the example of a maximally complex dimension that 
is  different  from  the  case  of  “timbre  space”,  as  it  is  not  an  explicit 
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multidimensional space, but is rather based on the presence of instances of 
some  kind:  chords  successions,  instruments,  melodic  or  accompaniment 
types, that we could describe, in our terms, as domains of similarities collecting 
articulated instances in different dimensions. Let’s keep this concept at a level 
of  intuition  for  the  moment  and  see  what  happens  if  we  take  away  the 
reference to a particular style from the dimension of “style”.
In this case, we can still discern if a style has drastically changed over time, but 
without a reference to a particular style we cannot set any scale. Nevertheless, 
we can still compare, under certain conditions, the “style distance” between 
two successions of music segments. In other words: in the example just above 
we can still say that the similarity in style between the galant music piece and 
Beethoven’s piece,  is greater than the similarity between Beethoven’s piece 
and Xenakis’ piece. 
As  the  differences  between  the  “style  distances”,  the  intervals  of  that 
dimension,  are  here  macroscopic,  we  could  quite  easily  think  the  “style” 
dimension to be an ordered one, but instead it is the differential dimension of 
“style distances” that  can be organized in a scale  ranging from couples of 
works that are most similar in style to couples of works that are completely 
different  in  style  from each  other.  This  dimension,  which we could call  the 
“style interval” dimension, is partially ordered and can therefore be used in 
building configurations or,  in  other  words,  successive discontinuities in that 
dimension, as it happens for example in several of Frank Zappa’s songs, such 
as the already mentioned “Beauty Knows No Pain”.
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Let’s take now another example, Luciano Berio’s 3rd movement of “Sinfonia”, 
which is based on a long succession of music quotations  from very different 
moments of the history of the classical western tradition. In spite of the variety 
of styles and the speed change, it is often possible to detect the moments that 
the music changes along the “style intervals” dimension. But, we can more 
easily distinguish the repeated instances of the same work (for example the 
leading sections related to Gustav Mahler’s 2nd Symphony), as far as our skills 
in the classical repertoire and our memory allow it, from the presence of music 
quotations  that  are  related  to  different  styles.  Instead  of  the  articulated 
dimension of “style interval” we might prefer to focus on particular works that 
we recognized,  as  they seem to  vanish  and appear  again,  lost  in  a  music 
continuum. In dealing with the recurring appearance of an instance of a very 
complex dimension such as “style”, we seem to turn to relying on a scale that  
is ultimately based only on two values: identical and different. This means that 
a reference style is posed every time we recognize an instance of it, as long as 
we are able to keep it in our memory. On the other hand, identity is dynamically 
defined according to the “style intervals” which, if they are wide enough, let us 
distinguish in the music flow the status of identical and different. Let us say, for 
example, that a music piece is made by quotes of Mozart, Beethoven, Xenakis, 
Haydn and the  pointillistic  Stockhausen.  Most  listeners  will  probably  group 
Mozart,  Beethoven  and  Haydn  together  as  “identical”  styles  against  the 
“different” Xenakis and Stockhausen, which will be nevertheless considered as 
expressing an identical style of their own.
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Another example of this kind is the detection of a change, provided by the 
entrance of, let us say, an oboe. Let’s imagine a music piece for electronic 
sounds  and  oboe.  Let  us  say  the  electronic  part  is  simply  based  on  a 
constantly  rumbling  low  frequency  noise  and  after  one  minute  of  solo 
electronic sounds, the oboe starts playing a one minute part, of any kind, but in 
a way that  it  is  clearly possible to distinguish the oboe from the electronic 
sounds by listening. The oboe part is then followed by another minute of solo 
electronic rumble and again this is followed by another entrance of the oboe 
that lasts one minute. Then the piece, which is four minutes long, ends. Of 
course,  we  are  definitely  able  to  detect  changes  in  the  music  flow,  which 
corresponds to the oboe’s first entrance, the solo electronic part in the middle 
and the second entrance of the oboe. The particular organization of the work 
has also made clear to us that it has been possible to set a binary dimension 
expressed by the presence of the oboe, together with the binary dimension 
expressed  by  the  presence  of  solo  electronic  music,  which  are  perfectly 
complementary with each other so that we can also detect a repetition of the 
configuration  realized  by  a  section  with  solo  electronics  followed  by  the 
entrance of the oboe.
 
In the end, the idea that every distinction we make in listening to the sound 
flow, that we are also able to label somehow, has the right to enter the “realm” 
of perceptive dimensions has put us in contact with a variety of dimensional 
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structures, from the simple mono-dimensional to the multidimensional ones, 
from the complex to the binary ones.
Nevertheless, there might be a legitimate suspicion that this sort of explosion 
of dimensions of very different types, that can be dynamically changing and 
have  the  potentiality  to  be  complicated  at  will,  might  be  emerging  from a 
description that is missing some more basic cognitive activity,  that involves 
time. 
Moreover, difference has assumed roles that vary according to the dimensions. 
In  the  totally  ordered  dimension  of  pitch,  for  example,  differences  express 
themselves in the symmetries of the repetitions of pitch configurations, that we 
recognize even if they are transposed and therefore presented with different 
values of the dimensional scale. Other dimensions, such as the one involved by 
the distinctions within a succession of rhythmic patterns, put differences in a 
simple binary opposition with some recognition. The  style dimension seems 
therefore to be on one hand the result of complex components that are, more 
or less, constant in time, such as the presence of piano in a typical romantic 
Lied,  but  on  the  other  hand,  it  also  seems  to  be  connected  with  abstract 
properties of configurations, as it happens with melodic and chordal schemes, 
for example, that need to be properly detected within the music flow because 
they  are  part  of  a  style,  such  as  an  accompanying  pattern,  or  a  specific 
harmonic cadence. And this complex articulation of conditions, the range of 
possibilities that define a style, together with the virtually infinite possibilities of 
styles instances, is what impedes us to set a proper scale that can be put in 
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relation with numbers. In the end, we could consider a scale as a well-ordered 
collection  of  differences  that  have  undergone  the  listener’s  training  in  the 
recognition  of  identities  and  in  the  ability  to  discard  what  could  not  be 
recognized by downgrading it to the role of simple variations (to be avoided or 
not) of the recognized identities. 
Jones’  physicalism binds  her  to  space-time,  so,  as  far  as  it  concerns  the 
description of the world, time is a physical dimension among the basic four that 
should  not  be  denied.  The  article  itself,  already  in  its  title  “Time,  our  lost 
dimension”, is mainly concerned with giving time its position back inside the 
parametric  description of  sounding phenomena and establishing its  primary 
role in determining the perception of sound configurations. In order to integrate 
the physical dimension of time in a descriptive system that is able to account 
for  the  symmetries  we  detect  in  the  sound  flow,  Jones  introduces  a  time 
dimension that, in analogy with the pitch dimension, is based on time intervals 
arranged  in  an  algebraic  group.  In  this  way,  she  is  able  to  describe  a 
configuration of pitches in time, in terms of their differential dimensions as a 
succession of  pitch and time intervals.  And consequently,  the configuration 
does not lose its identity when pitches and/or durations are transposed or, in 
other terms, multiplied by a constant. While in 1976 the application of group 
theory to durations was a new experimental approach, Oackelford, in 2005, is 
already taking for granted that traditional music notation of rhythm is suitable 
to represent repetitions. This is not surprising considering that Jones is dealing 
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with the construction of controlled stimulus for her experiment in perception 
while Oackelford seems to be primarily interested in the analysis of music from 
the  western  written  tradition,  and  therefore  he  approaches  listening  in  the 
typically ambiguous way described by Fiske’s copy paradigm, as we have seen 
in the first part.
Nevertheless, the status of time as dimension needs to be discussed. In fact, 
time onsets are instances of the physical time dimension, which relate to a 
reference value, the time-axis origin. On the other hand, the measurement of 
time intervals,  or  inter-onset intervals,  is  still  derived from the physical  time 
scale  as  an  immediate  consequence  of  its  group  structure.  However,  it  is 
definitely possible to follow the idea of mental spaces that Oackelford invoked 
for pitches and to choose a metric structure over the time-scale in seconds. 
Moreover, it is usually possible, under certain threshold conditions, to detect 
symmetries in time, such as recognizing a rhythmic pattern when it is played at 
different speed, so putting a configuration in relation with instances of  time 
intervals  results  in  maintaining  some symmetries.  However,  if  a  perceptive 
dimension is a scale that allows connecting to a perceived change in some 
quality  as  a  point  in  the scale,  the timeline in  seconds is  not  a  perceptive 
dimension, but rather that very quantified scale based on a spatial metaphor to 
which Bergson opposes a living experience of time as duration.
On the other hand, the differential dimension of “time intervals”, especially if it 
is expressed in units of pulse as in the traditional western music grammar, can 
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be considered a perceptive dimension, as it is possible to distinguish within the 
sound flow by detecting a change in the time interval of some sounding event.
This might be confusing because a time interval is nothing per se, if nothing is 
happening to mark the beginning and the end of the interval: an instance of 
time interval needs to be associated with a change in some other qualities to 
be perceived as such. But the same is true for pitch, as a pitch that does not  
have dynamics or sound colour simply cannot exist. The same can be said for  
all  the  possible  perceptive  dimensions.  In  fact,  we  must  remember  that 
perceptive dimensions are hermeneutic probes, so to speak, that are launched 
in  the  continuum  of  qualities  to  select  qualities  we  can  talk  about  when 
describing our experience of listening.
So, if a change in a given quality cannot be separated from the time it happens, 
then time also cannot be separated from a change in certain qualities.
Let’s  then  imagine  a  series  of  regular  slow  pulses  of  a  sonorous  click. 
Suddenly, the click stumbles. But it immediately resumes its regular pulse. This 
is an example of  what could elicit  a distinction in the sound flow, which is 
related to a change in the time interval dimension. But, as we have seen in the 
previous  chapter,  a  duration  is  detected  because  something  is  always 
happening in  the process of  our enacting cognition,  be it  addressed as an 
event  of  the  objectified  “external  world”  or  as  a  twitch  of  our  cognition  in 
operation.
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7.3 Regions
We cannot disjoint time from a world event that happens in time: this is the 
most  important  idea  fostered  by  Jones’  article.  In  fact,  she  shows  that 
configurations in some dimension, such as pitch, are experienced in different 
ways depending on their speed. 
What the psychologist is interested in is the experience of a configuration in 
some perceptive dimension in terms of the recognition of its serial structure: 
the order followed by the instances of that perceptive dimension while realizing 
that configuration in sound. The eventuality that under certain conditions we 
are unable to preserve the serial  structure of a configuration by listening, is 
exemplified by the  streaming effect,  a perceptive phenomenon according to 
which we experience, for example, a succession of sonic events, by grouping 
them not “according to their physical temporal order, but according to their 
attributes, e.g. their pitches” (Moore, 1997, p.260). We can easily find a typical 
expression of  streaming in scores that use tremolo chords, the reiterated fast 
succession of two or more notes, which are not intended to express a fast 
repeating melodic figure, but rather the chord that results from the overlapping 
notes, together with a trembling sound.
As Jones’ main purpose is to investigate the criteria underlying the recognition 
of  a  serial  structure,  she starts  by pointing out  that  there are  cases,  as  in 
streaming,  in which the serial structure does not coincide with the listener’s 
percept. 
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Her system of physical and perceptive dimensions provides her, as we have 
seen, with the possibility of describing a succession of two or more events in 
terms of pairs of values that reference instances of two differential dimensions: 
the interval between the values of a perceptive dimension that are instantiated 
by the two events and the interval of time they occur in. The pairs of intervals 
can therefore be plotted on a two-dimensional space defined by a horizontal 
axis referencing time intervals and a vertical axis for intervals of the perceptive 
dimension. At this point, Jones proposes that the space of interval pairs is able 
to  account  for  the  different  ways  that  we  deal  with  serial  structures,  and 
therefore traces two lines on the graph plan that divide it as thresholds in three 
regions,  related  to  three  subjective  modes  of  distinction,  as  three  maximal 
perceptive categories (Jones 1976, p.343). 
Figure 2: regional modes of distinction, reproduced from a graph in Jones, 1976.
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The central  region is  the  Serial  Integration  Region (SIR),  the area  including 
those intervals pairs that allow the listener to detect and compare changes in 
the perceptive dimension, in such a way that he or she is able to recognize 
their position within a succession. In other words, this region is connected to 
the possibility for the listener to detect the changes in terms of intervals—in 
terms of recognizable identities—so that he or she can memorize them in the 
order  of  their  occurrences  and  possibly  recognize  that  order  in  another 
configuration.
Above the SIR, there is the Parallel Representation Region (PRR). This region is 
bounded  downwards  by  a  threshold  plotting  a  line  that  moves  from  a 
dimensional  interval  of  zero and a very short  interval  of  time towards wide 
intervals of both time and perceptive dimension. When the point defined by the 
pair that is related to two successive events falls in this region, the listener is 
no longer able to recognize the order in which the events occur and they will be 
therefore perceived as overlapping. This is the region in charge of  streaming, 
among  other  perceptive  phenomena,  and  is  therefore  connected  to  the 
perceptual category of diversity or, in a wide sense, polyphony.  
Below the SIR and consequently below the lower threshold, which is again 
expressed by a raising line with a lower slope than the higher threshold, we 
have the third region. 
This is the Chunking Region (CR), in which the different instances are “no more 
treated as events to be serially related, but as unified ‘chunks’” (Jones 1976, 
p.343). When events fall  into this area we cannot really detect changes, but 
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rather perceive them as the articulation of a single instance. This is why Jones 
refers  this  region  to  the  subjective  mode  of  distinction,  which  addresses 
different events to the “same” category.
So far, I have related distinction to the detection of a change in some quality. 
Jones’ graph provides an analytical framework that defines “quality” in terms of 
a perceptive dimension. It relates changes to an interval of time between two 
consecutive instances of that dimension and it articulates distinction in three 
modes that depend on time and dimensional intervals. On the other hand, she 
aims  to  provide  a  framework  to  establish  the  parameters  for  a  correct 
experimentation. 
Even  if  Jones’  theoretical  proposal  seems  to  be  open  to  applications  in 
different contexts, such as in vision perception (Skelly, Jones, Goodyear and 
Roe, 2003), her purpose primarily lies within the disciplinary boundaries of the 
cognitive psychology of music. 
The present text, on the other hand aims to find a viable narrative that can 
address a variety of  topics,  as the third part  will  prove.  Therefore,  it  is  not 
important here to provide a precise parameterization of dimensions, regions 
and thresholds. What is essential here is rather the possibility of distinguishing 
thresholds within  the continuum of objective data,  a possibility that  can be 
related to the constitution of human experience. 
In this respect, it is possible to extend Jones’ modes of distinction to three 
paradigmatic directions for constituting the perceived world. 
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The CR can therefore not only be considered a sort of blindness in terms of 
detecting changes, but is also a condition of distinguishing composite units as 
“chunks”,  in  which  the  distinctions  we  cannot  make  become  the  textural 
properties of the perceived continuum. 
On the other hand, the SIR accounts for the possibility of articulating chunks in 
figures: it expresses the possibility of recognizing and therefore is fundamental 
to the process of dealing with a dynamic world. 
Our perception seeks to find changes that we can use in a meaningful way to 
act in the world, and these changes are made by events that fall in the SIR. But  
we cannot use the SIR events if we cannot distinguish the inherent differences 
among them: this is the role of the PRR. 
The parallel representation is a spatial metaphor to express the perception of 
differences, the discontinuities that break chunks into pieces. Jones’s PRR is 
at the core of the perception of simultaneity and acts by misplacing events that 
from an objective-scientific side are considered as consecutive in time, so that 
an  objective  articulated  stream  is  broken  into  two,  or  more,  simultaneous 
streams. And these, so to speak, hallucinated streams, which are the product 
of  an  illusion  of  listening,  appear  to  “behave”  as  single  streams  that  are 
independent  from each  other  up  to  the  point  that  they  can  be  related  to 
subsets of their objective measurements as a whole. They can therefore fall in 
the CR or in the SIR, which appear as nested within the PRR that stimulated 
their distinction as single streams. 
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In fact, we could even consider, for example, virtual polyphony, a composition 
technique which is directed to realize contrapuntal works for instruments that 
are  not  capable  of  substantial  polyphony,  such as  the first  Bourrée in  J.S. 
Bach’s cello Suite n. 3, as a system of streams, which are nested in a PRR and 
falling in the SIR. Of course, in Bach the single voices are too slow to undergo 
the  streaming illusion  and  therefore  cannot  be  perceived  as  simultaneous. 
Nevertheless, the use of terms such as fugue, which is typical of polyphonic 
textures, or  the  detection  of  chords,  both  in  relation  to  analysis  and 
composition, when dealing with works that are incapable of emitting more than 
one sound at a time, testify to the presence of some parallel representation in 
action.
Moreover, I am suggesting that the PRR can also be appealed to account for 
the experience of  simultaneity  not  only  between two objectively  successive 
events, but also between two events that objective measurements consider as 
simultaneous. The PRR is therefore possibly gathering the conditions for any 
group of  events  to  be  perceived  as  simultaneous.  The  cognitive  faculty  of 
distinguishing simultaneous events is what in psychoacoustic terms is called 
segregation, although some authors call it “perceptual grouping”, which in my 
opinion may give rise to a confusing overlap with the different phenomenon of 
grouping  in  time  and  segmenting,  or  “auditory  scene  analysis”  (Bregman, 
1990).
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In  order  to explain  how we can distinguish different  simultaneous layers  of 
sound  only  by  listening,  psychoacoustic  research  has  detected  several 
perceptive mechanisms, which operate by detecting conflicting fundamental 
frequencies, onset disparities, the spatial  location of sources, contrasts with 
the  previous  perceived  qualities  and  correlated  changes  in  amplitude  or 
frequency  (Moore,  1997,  pp.249-259).  All  the  above  criteria  rely  on  the 
detection of a timing contrast between two streams, which happens at different 
time  spans,  such  as  the  micro-time of  waveforms  in  the  phase  locking  of 
harmonics of fundamental frequency, the interaural time differences we use to 
determine positions in space and the conscious time span related to changes 
in sound qualities. Even if the above-mentioned mechanisms might also involve 
processes that are not explicitly related to the detection of time differences, as 
it  happens  for  the  “contrasting  effect”,  this  seems  to  me  enough  to 
experimentally  consider  segregation  as  the  effect  of  some  perceptive 
dimension that falls in the PRR.
I need to recall here that even if the inner ear works, in a huge simplification, as 
a sort of spectrum analyser, by translating the mechanical oscillations of the 
tympanic membrane into the spectral components, as the result of the organ of 
Corti in the cochlea, and therefore apparently losing in translation the original 
format of oscillations in the continuity of space, that information is still present 
in  the  neural  decoding  of  phase-locked  firing  rates  of  the  inner  hair  cells 
(Moore,  1997,  pp.38-40).  The  role  of  phase  locking  is  not  yet  completely 
understood  and  this  research  is  not  directly  interested  in  looking  at 
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physiological data for correlates of listening as a cognitive act, yet it seems 
that, even according to the analysis of the auditory system, we can expect that 
changes in very fast timespans, up to about 4-5 kHz, are used to distinguish 
simultaneous streams in the sound flow.
It  is  also  possible  to  interpret  the  relationship  among the  three  perceptive 
modes by following another important perceptive phenomenon: the dialectics 
between figure and ground. In fact, as
It seems that we are not generally capable of consciously attending to 
every aspect of the auditory input (…) the complex sound is analysed into 
streams and we attend primarily to one stream at a time. (Moore, 1997, 
p.268)
In this respect, streaming or segregation in general is the perceptive device 
that separates a figure from a ground, so that in a given instant we attend to 
one of the two or more streams, resulting from the parallel representation, as 
the foreground against the background of the remaining streams. While the 
selection of the stream that is in charge of bringing out the “figure” to attention 
might also depend on the conscious aspects of the listening context, the PRR 
is definitely a primary condition of being able to distinguish a figure from the 
ground in the sound flow. We have already seen how the SIR and the CR can 
be nested within  a PRR,  it  is  therefore quite an obvious consequence that 
relates, in a given instant, the SIR to the figure, which is defined by the ordered 
values of  some perceptive dimension,  and the CR to the ground,  which is 
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identified as a whole, a “chunk”, in opposition to the layers of the sound flow 
that fall in the SIR. In this respect, perception as a dynamic process of isolating 
a foreground from the background is the never-ceasing effort of breaking the 
sound  flow  by  looking  into  the  possible  events  falling  in  the  PRR  for  the 
perceptive dimensions that fall in the SIR, so that all the remaining changes fall 
in the CR. What I have previously said about virtual polyphony is therefore not 
totally  correct  because  in  order  to  be  compatible  with  the  “figure-ground” 
principle, the voices need moment by moment to be arranged by separating a 
focus voice, which needs to be put in the SIR, from the rest of the voices, 
which need to be put in the CR. And this is why virtual polyphony works, as the 
monophonic instruments are allowed to leave out most of the CR parts, which 
are then simply alluded, and commit themselves to the SIR parts, so that the 
score essentially provides a figure, which is always related to different voices, 
while omitting the ground.
7.4 Expectations
Let’s turn to the events that fall  in the SIR and follow their  definition to its 
consequences.  As  above  mentioned,  events  in  the  SIR  can  be  ordered 
according to the intervals in the perceptive dimension that define them, in such 
a way that their order can be recognized in other instances. Already starting 
from its title, “Toward a New Theory of Perception, Attention and Memory”, 
Jones’ article aims to frame perception within a wider context of  cognition, 
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which includes, besides memory and attention, perceptual learning and issues 
related to age and illness (Jones, 1976, pp.347-352).
In fact, any theory of perception cannot avoid framing the analysed topic within 
the context of cognition, which in turn has to be related to the context of social  
and cultural practices, in order to be able to account for the wide range of 
related phenomena. As we have seen in the first part, it is not possible to avoid, 
for example, the topic of speech perception when dealing with listening, by 
simply stating different  listening modes described in terms of  their  objects, 
instead of proposing how the process according to which the different modes 
are constituted in listening.
On the other hand, any experiment about listening cannot avoid dealing with 
human beings as living systems, with all the details of cognition as part of their 
“praxis  of  living”.  So,  from the very beginning,  Jones’  proposal  is  explicitly 
contextualized  within  “the  research  with  auditory  patterns”  (Jones,  1976, 
pp.323), but the theoretical background itself is also laden with the eminent 
role  of  patterns  in  our  linguistic  operations,  scientific  experimentation  and 
mathematics. This is not a trivial claim, as in fact Jones’ article seeks to find 
patterns in pattern finding, but, on the other hand how is it possible to deal with 
patterns without assuming their existence? Jones resolves this circularity, so to 
speak,  by  only  addressing  the  research  to  auditory  patterns  and  by 
characterizing them in terms of the possibility of recognizing the order of its 
components. In my research, which does not claim any scientific status and 
therefore  does  not  need  to  rely  on  an  epistemology  of  measurements, 
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circularity is resolved by setting a narrative, which even if it still needs to show 
its viability, cannot avoid dealing with its constructive status, which results from 
its birth in language and from its aim of addressing cognition.
I can therefore specify the idea of “configuration”, which has been defined thus 
far as a succession in time of intervals, or discontinuities, in some perceptive 
dimension,  in  terms  of  the  result  of  a  complex  cognitive  activity  involving 
memory and attention. As far as it concerns memory, the ability to determine 
the order of intervals within a configuration implies the ability to recognize their 
position on a scale. If “the concept of order embodies our discovery of pattern 
and regularity in the world” (Jenkins, 1968, p.429),  then recognition already 
happens within the horizon of cognition by constituting perceptive dimensions. 
I  will  outline  the  consequences  of  this  later  in  the  text;  however,  for  the 
moment, it is enough to say that intervals, and eventually the recognized order 
as  well,  need  to  be  part  of  the  past  experience  of  the  perceiver  and 
consequently need to be instantiated in some sort  of  time-lasting reservoir, 
which we usually  think of  as memory.  On the other  hand, attention is  also 
connected to the idea of perceptive dimension as cognitive faculty that is in 
charge  of  selecting  that  dimension  within  the  continuum  of  sound  flow 
qualities. We have therefore met, if not a cause, at least an actor of selection: a  
label  that  addresses  the  cognitive  faculty  of  distinguishing  qualities  as 
perceptive dimensions. At the same time by involving memory and attention, 
listening has been given back its place in time as a cognitive practice. In fact,  
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the act of listening is here interpreted as the attempt of selecting within the 
sound continuum the perceptive dimension that allows the listener to recognize 
an order,  which needs to be already present  in memory.  If  we accept  that 
memory and attention are faculties that work as functional blocks within the 
system of cognition, then memory is related to dealing with representations of 
the past, while attention is related to dealing with representations of the future, 
as the faculty in  charge of  selecting the dimensions in  which the expected 
change will likely occur. We do not necessarily have to project a naturalization 
of our description of the mind so that we have functional units that represent in 
some way the objects of our external world. Still,  we need to deal with our 
existence in time, at least for the sole reason of building a narrative that shows 
how time is at the base of the stories we tell. 
The first attempt of describing music listening in terms of a complex process 
that involves a cognitive projection towards both the past and the future is 
usually ascribed to Leonard Meyer’s Emotion and Meaning in Music (1956). But 
the roots of the idea according to which the present moment of the perceptual 
act is constituted in the conscience as a structure of moments that unfold in 
time and is not given to the subject’s conscience have to be referred back to 
Husserl’s  phenomenological  analysis  of  the  constitution  of  time  and  the 
constitution of the objects of perception through passive synthesis (Husserl, 
2001). 
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There is a fundamental difference in the level between the two analyses, as 
Husserl’s aim is to show how a world of objects is formed in the conscience 
starting from sensory data, while Meyer takes for granted the system of music 
elements of western tradition from the outset, so his analysis is not concerned 
with showing, for example, whether his conclusions also work for other music 
traditions. 
It  is  therefore  curious  that  Schaeffer,  who takes  some relevant  ideas  from 
Husserl’s research,  never places listening within a frame that involves what 
Husserl  calls  retension,  primal-impression and protension,  or  at  least  in  an 
explicit relationship with expectation and memory, even though his “Treatise” 
is dated ten years after Meyer’s book.
Meyer’s research moves from the discussion on how emotion is related to the 
structure of music from the western classical tradition and how it is connected 
with meaning. It is therefore a typical implementation of Fiske’s copy paradigm, 
as he assumes “that relationships between stimuli and events or objects they 
indicate  ‘are  real  connections  existing  objectively  in  culture’”  (Fiske,  1996, 
p.110 quoting Meyer 1956, p.34) and can be directly found in objectified and 
objective form in the music scores. 
Nevertheless,  all  the  systems  of  expectations  of  memorized  content  and 
reactions, together with the idea that expectations are based on probability 
generated by the statistics of experienced occurrences, is already there. 
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According to  Meyer,  the relationship between expectation  and its  following 
reaction  is  able  to  account  for  meaning as  enacted  by the  emotion  of  the 
listener. In fact
affect  or emotion-felt  is  aroused when an expectation -  a tendency to 
respond  -  activated  by  the  musical  stimulus  situation,  is  temporarily 
inhibited or permanently blocked. (Meyer, 1956, p.31)
In particular, there are three possible ways according to which the listener’s 
expectations stimulated by an antecedent in the score might not be satisfied 
by its consequent and therefore might give rise to affect arousal, the degree of 
which depends on the strength of the expectations: a delay in the presentation 
of the expected consequent, an ambiguity of the antecedent that is therefore 
not  implying  an  exact  consequent,  and  a  consequent  that  is  completely 
unexpected.
Further developments of this primary analysis of listening have moved mostly 
in two directions. The first has been primarily concerned with articulating the 
content of expectation, by typically directing the research to the expectation of 
melodic structures  and to  its  implementation  in  formal  languages.  Narmour 
(1990), for example, who was a scholar of Meyer, proposed in his implication-
realisation  model,  an  extension  of  Meyer’s  approach  by  distinguishing 
implicative  and non-implicative  music  situations  and  by  defining  rules  of 
melodic implication as implied by Gestalt principles, such as the principle of 
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proximity  or  of  good-continuation.  On  the  other  hand,  the  same  Gestalt 
principles  have  been  addressed  in  the  attempt  to  create  an  alphabet  of 
symbols that could express a generative description of expectancies in terms 
of pattern induction processes. The original model (Simon and Sumner, 1968) 
has been developed by Diana Deutsch and John Feroe (1981) by completing 
the  original  repertory  of  operators  and  structures  so  that,  in  line  with  the 
cognitive  paradigm  of  Human  Information  Processing,  it  was  possible  to 
propose an algorithmic model. This, on the other hand, is intended to produce 
an  efficient  computational  representation  of  (western)  music,  but  it  is  not 
concerned with putting music listening in the wider and complex context of 
cognition as the result of the “praxis of living”.
On the contrary, a second direction of research has been more concerned with 
proposing a deeper analysis of the structure of expectation. In particular, the 
idea of  dynamic attending has been used to extend Meyer’s and Narmour’s 
concept of expectation as not driven by metre and rhythm towards the idea of 
a  complex  process  that  is  driven  by  cues  extracted  by  an  articulated 
perceptive context. While the first proposal of the re-introduction of time in the 
analysis  of  listening can be referred  to the already widely  quoted article  of 
Mari-Riess Jones (1976), it is with the ITPRA model of David Huron (2006) that 
we meet the proposal of a structure of expectation that is most articulated. 
Instead  of  a  simple  dialectic  of  two  stages  of  attending,  that  occupy  the 
moments before and after the sonic event, as an expectation that relays on 
past experience and the reaction that forms new experience, we have now a 
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five stage model.  This  is  formed  by the succession  of  emotional  response 
systems that are  related to different  biological  functions and are evoked at 
different  times  during  the  cycle  of  expectation.  The  five  stages  of  the 
expectation cycle, whose name’s initials form the acronym ITPRA, are divided 
in pre-outcome and post-outcome responses in relation to the sonic event. 
The  pre-outcome responses  are:  the  imagination response and the  tension 
response, the former having the purpose of motivating an organism by letting 
the  organism  to  feel  “vicarious  pleasure  (or  displeasure)—as  though  that 
outcome has already happened” (Huron, 2006, p.8), while the latter has the 
purpose of charging an organism in terms of motor preparation (arousal) and 
perceptual preparation (attention)”.
The post-outcome responses are initiated by the  prediction  response, which 
causes  the  emotional  response  to  be  positively  characterized  in  case  the 
event-stimulus was expected and to be negatively characterized in case the 
event-stimulus was unexpected.  Then,  two types of  response to the actual 
sonic event occur:  a fast  one and a slower one. The fast one is called the 
reaction  response,  and consists  in  a  reflexive  unconscious  reaction  that  is 
defensive  or  protective  in  function.  The  slower  appraisal  response  follows, 
providing a positive or negative reaction that “can involve conscious thought 
that  often  draws  on  complex  social  and  contextual  factors”  (Huron,  2006, 
p.15).
On the other hand, interest has risen in the last years regarding a model of 
perception that  emerged in the context  of  connectionist  theories of  rhythm 
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detection and is usually referred to as the resonance model (Large, 1996). The 
central idea on which the proposal of this model is based is that perception is 
enacted  by the organism instead of  simply  being the (although articulated) 
response to a stimulus. In particular:
the general idea of resonance theory is that an external auditory rhythm 
can be represented by the amplitude of internal oscillatory units. These 
oscillatory units are coupled to the external rhythm and are by definition 
periodic while the external rhythm does not have to be periodic. (Bååth, 
Lagerstedt and Gärdenfors, 2014)
While expectation is still in charge, in this context it is expressed in terms of the 
entrainment  between  world  patterns  and  cognitive  patterns.  Cognition  is 
therefore  enacted  because  it  is  the  result  of  the  encounter  between  the 
motivated  actions  of  the  subject  and  an  external  world  objectified  by  our 
measurements. But, as measurements are also the result of cognition, what we 
ultimately  call  “world”  is  a  character  in  the  narrative  that  moves  from the 
sensations that are promoted by our subjectivity and is therefore an embodied 
narrative.
We can now come back to our distinctions, which are the markers of instants 
of time, to realize that the experiences of both distinction and time are far from 
being the originary (I’m borrowing here a Husserlian term) simple moment that 
can  found  a  theory  of  listening.  They  are  rather  the  start  of  a  chain  of  
descriptions caught in a circular narrative, within which our language, as an 
instrument for hypostatization, constrains us. It is therefore with great caution 
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that we connect successions of discontinuities with labels that on one hand 
may allow us to deal with them as a whole, and on the other hand will tempt us 
in considering them more than the occasional  result  of  the intrusiveness of 
linguistic metaphors, as objects that inhabit our world.
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8. STRUCTURAL LISTENING
8.1 In the name of the pattern
The  hypostatization  has  indeed  already  begun  when  I  used  the  terms 
“dimension”, or “instance”, or again “configuration”, if not even before, when I 
was using generic labels to address the unique experiences of instants. But 
this is inevitable and therefore we have to accept  it,  or  better,  we need to 
embrace  objectified  experiences  as  illusions,  so  that  we can highlight  their 
inconsistency in our attempts to deal with experiences through language. After 
all, if the objects of perception are constituted as interferences between the 
cognitive action of  a subject and a transcendence that we can never meet 
naked from our enacted cognition, we have to argue that we are entangled with 
some sort of cognitive hologram-like world that reflects our (en)actions.
We have therefore no other chance, if we want to build a tool to use in our 
world  of  ghostly  objects,  than  to  deal  with  successions  of  instants,  as 
configurations of instances, as a fundamental constructive result, that seems 
more  onto-  and  phylo-genetically  connected  to  our  existence  than  being 
related to a  conceptual  process,  such as abstraction.  The three regions of 
perceptive  modes,  which  are  at  the  root  of  the  process  of  grouping,  are 
therefore  an  elementary  system of  distinction,  maybe  the  most  elementary 
process that can be found in cognition. Nevertheless, they are not inscribed in 
our body, in the connection of neurons or in an emergent property of the brain, 
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but they are rather within our narrative as a scheme that depends on the way 
we describe our experiences of listening.
I  will  therefore  use  the  word  pattern to  address  the  result  of  recognizing 
successive distinctions that fall in the SIR. I prefer this term over inventing a 
new  one  or  adopting  different  locutions  that  have  been  used  for  similar 
contexts or purposes, such as Oackelford’s “zygonic relationship” (Oackelford, 
2005) or Fauconnier’s “connector” (Fauconniers, 1985) for several reasons. The 
first one is that the word “pattern”, as a general term of the English language, 
involves the ideas of repetition and resemblance. In fact, already in its Middle 
English  original  form,  the  term  patron,  which  comes  from  the  Old  French 
patron  from the Medieval Latin patronus, was used to designate a model of 
behaviour or something to be copied. When in the XVIII century the modern 
form  pattern,  created  from the metathesis  of  the old  term,  was completely 
established, it was essentially used, especially in dressmaking, for addressing 
a model to be copied (Patridge, 1958, p.1062). Therefore, since the first uses of 
the word, a pattern is related to practices involving a reiterated connection to a 
reference  that  is  based  on  resemblance:  there  is  no  pattern  without  a 
recognition of it and the possibility of a re-presentation. 
On the other hand, “pattern” has been used as a technical word in a variety of  
disciplines. 
In particular, I want to connect my research with Howard Margolis’ adoption of 
“pattern”  in  addressing  topics  such  as  political  and  scientific  judgments 
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(Margolis, 1987), hence a path to the cultural and social implications of using 
“pattern” as an hermeneutic key to cognition is somehow already traced. By 
choosing the term “pattern”,  I  ultimately  connect  my research  to all  of  the 
disciplines that use it as a technical term, by suggesting how all of them are 
variations  of  the  general  concept  of  pattern  that  I  use  in  this  text.  Finally, 
although “pattern” is used in music composition more as a general term than 
as a technical one, it is still  very present in different forms within the whole 
western tradition, up to the 20th century’s minimal style and popular music, as 
well  as  in  describing  the  surviving  sonorous  practices  of  other  cultures. 
Therefore,  the  use  of  the  word  “pattern”  in  writing  about  listening  already 
connects  and  interacts  with  its  various  applications  in  composition  and 
musicology, possibly providing an interesting interrelation of meaning.
In  “In  the  Name of  the Pattern”  (Viel,  2014),  I  have  detected  four  different 
technical uses of the term “pattern”, each showing a distinct application of the 
idea of the recognizing distinctions, as the process of organizing the units that 
form a composite unit.
A first use is related to pattern recognition and involves disciplines that can be 
related to formal languages, to statistical decision theory, fuzzy logic, digital  
hardware, pure math and computer programming. While the term “pattern” is 
often taken for granted in texts about “pattern recognition”, it is often assumed 
that
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a “pattern” is the result of finding some kind of regularities, that can be 
drawn from a set of models or “ideals”, within some sort of ready-made 
data. This is a phenomenon that has to be there already in the first place, 
in the reduced form of raw data, ready to be picked up by the recognition 
process. (Viel, 2014)
In the end,  pattern recognition can be defined as the “search for  structure  in 
data" (Bezdek, 1981, p.1) and consequently a pattern is a structure in terms of 
regularities.
A second use of the term “pattern” is found in the context of design, in the 
locution “design pattern”. This is the description of
a  particular  recurring  design  problem  that  arises  in  specific  design 
contexts,  and  presents  a  well-proven  generic  scheme  for  its  solution 
(Bushman, 1996, p.8),
provided that the solution is in terms of an ontology of classes that can be 
used in a computer programming environment, and is therefore connected to 
the paradigm of Object Oriented Programming.
While  pattern  recognition is  about  linking  raw  data  to  an  abstract  model 
instantiated in the data,  design patterns are the answer to a design problem, 
recognized as a singular case within a general one, for which there is already a 
solution.
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A third use is related to art, craftsmanship and music. From this perspective, a 
pattern is a configuration in a given (visual, sensorimotor, sonorous) domain 
that is instantiated several times as contiguous (in space, in motion, in time). 
This  means  that  an  observer  must  be  able  to  recognize  the  repetitions  of 
pattern in the medium they are presented, otherwise the starting model is not 
recognized as a pattern. 
As Oackelford pointed out, repetitions are paramount in music (2005). Yet, in 
spite of a wide use of the word “pattern” also in dealing with the music of the 
western tradition, it is difficult to find it as a technical term in texts concerning 
music. In my article I  argue that precisely due to the pervasive presence of 
patterns in music,
repetitions  of  different  elements  and with  different  features  have  been 
called with various names along the history of western music, following 
the evolution of styles, genres, composition practices and so forth. […] 
And the more names there,  the more difficult  it  is  to be aware of  the 
common underlying principle of repetition, which seems to be hidden in 
plain sight. (Viel, 2014)
Finally, the fourth use of “pattern” as a technical term can be found again in 
music, and especially in jazz, but with a different definition than the previous 
one. What we can call training patterns are
finger habits. [...] Something that is not necessarily pre-heard, but [...] is 
understood to work  (by cognizance of the theoretical reasons and/or by 
previous  experience),  or  [...]  that  feel  comfortable  to  the  fingers  and 
hands.  [Something]  [...]  to  be  practiced  diligently  by  serious students. 
(Coker 1970, p.1)
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Training  patterns  are  ultimately  never  used in  the  actual  practice  of  music 
performance,  yet they are repeated during the training phase, so that when 
there is an opportunity to use them during a performance, even just once, the 
musician is ready to play them almost automatically.
We have encountered four technical applications of the word “pattern”. They 
indeed share with each other, to a greater or lesser extent, the concepts of 
recognition, similarity, repetition, domain, previous knowledge, type of relation/
structure and habit. A pattern is a model that has to be instantiated repeatedly 
in the external word of objects or in the internal world of actions in such a way 
that the instances are perceived as contiguous in the dimension that realizes 
the development of its components. A pattern is therefore hardly perceived as 
a  whole,  but  it  is  rather  a  collection  of  relationships  that  carry  out  an 
organization (recognized pattern), a function (design pattern), a shape (visual  
pattern) or  a  gesture  (training  pattern)  that  constitute  the  pattern  as  a 
composite unit, which is realized by certain components.
Finally, we can define a  pattern as something we recognize in terms of (the 
order of)  its components. Within the context of our narrative, a  pattern is a 
configuration  of  instances  in  some  perceptive  dimensions  that  we  can 
recognize by their order.  As previously mentioned, the concept of “pattern” 
already holds within it the idea of repetition, which from the point of view of 
perception  becomes recognition,  and in  turn recognition brings the idea  of 
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resemblance. On the other hand, the claim that a pattern is something that is 
composed of something else connects with the idea of hierarchy. This emerges 
from  the  relation  of  inclusion  between  a  “container”  unit  and  the  units  it  
contains itself as a bigger structure that is suitable to include all the units. We 
can express inclusion by labelling all the units with a number that corresponds 
to the hierarchical level they belong to, so that if the container unit is said to 
belong to some level number, the contained units belong to the immediately 
inferior  level.  Once introduced,  hierarchy cannot  avoid replicating itself  in a 
potentially pervasive tree-like structure of units and levels.
Starting  from  the  idea  of  a  structure  of  patterns  (Section  8.3)  and  its 
interpretation  within  the  scheme  of  perceptive  regions  (Section  8.4),  the 
chapter  moves towards the progressive construction of  a  world of  objects. 
First  of all,  some sonic events that do not seem to be easily interpreted in 
terms of pattern are introduced in terms of statistical dimensions (Section 8.5), 
so  that  an  interpretation  of  the  cognitive  role  of  attention  and  an  idea  of 
learning  as  a  process  driven  by  attendance  that  mirrors  the  statistics  of 
occurrences  can  be  presented  (Section  8.6).  The  introduction  of  the 
“misattribution  effect”  (Section  8.7)  opens  the  way  to  the  naturalization  of 
patterns in terms of  objects  (Section 8.8).  The final  section (Section 8.9)  is  
dedicated  to  the  unavoidable  problem of  meaning  in  music,  which  is  first 
summarized in its most relevant issues and then is finally discussed within the 
framework of the present research.
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But before introducing the idea of a pattern structure, we still have to discuss, 
in the next section, the thorny problem of resemblance, as it emerges naturally 
from the idea of recognition, and can be interpreted within the concepts of 
intention (Husserl) and autopoiesis (Varela)
8.2 A matter of resemblance
A  pattern is the effect of recognition, but recognition does not constrain the 
simulacrum. On the contrary, it implies the discovery of identity within diversity. 
According to the notorious sentence ascribed to Heraclitus, “you cannot step 
twice into the same stream", where the impossibility of “sameness” is here just 
another aspect of the contention between the logocentric promise of eternal 
reference  and  the  semantic  solitude  of  the  uniqueness  of  experiences.  In 
between the two contenders, the notion of  resemblance seems to bear the 
philosophical  responsibility  of  bringing  cognition  towards  its  purpose  of 
building a knowledge that is able to leap over the instants of time.
According to Hume, for example, all we can know or in the end, all we are, is 
made by just one kind of experience that is modulated in “degrees of force and 
liveliness”  (2001,  §1.1.1.1)  from  the  highest  degree  of  sensations  and 
subjective  states,  to  the  lowest  degree  of  higher  order  “reflexions”.  It  is  a 
population of  impressions and ideas,  a sort  of  weaker  “internal”  version  of 
impressions, whether simple or complex, which belong to different orders, and 
come  from  the  proliferation  of  primary  sensations.  From  the  world  of 
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sensations, we have therefore moved to the relata of concepts: we are now in 
the world of abstract ideas.  These rise from a sort of skilled activity of the 
imagination. In fact whenever we find a resemblance between several objects 
we label them with a same word, creating a habit that has the possibility of 
evoking all the ideas connected to a word whenever that word is heard and 
vice versa. 
In the end, Humeʼs mind is a vast collection of just one kind of object with 
infinite variations of a sort of transparency under the care of a machine that has 
the  ability  to  create,  link  and analyse  objects  with  the  magnifying glass  of 
resemblance.  This  impersonal  machine  is  stuck  in  an  endless  routine  that 
generates objects with the rule that every time an object is created another one 
is created that is linked with the first one and is a little bit more transparent. It 
also looks for resemblance between objects so that when found, it creates a 
new object linked with all the similar found objects.           
We could say that Hume depicted a Turing machine of some sort, with all of 
the related problems on the nature of reality and identity; problems that emerge 
from Hume’s devotion to Newtonʼs mechanicism and pay back, as underlined 
in the conclusion of the first book A Treatise of Human Nature with the “forlorn 
solitude” of an irreconcilable contradiction with everyday life experience. 
In Humeʼs vision, as in his predecessors Locke and Berkeley, resemblance and 
its active counterpart, the habit, play an important role. If it seems, following 
Gamboa  (2007),  that  Hume  has  avoided  the  perils  of  a  one-dimensional 
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definition of resemblance as the possession of common attributes by showing 
an  openness  directed  to  a  polymorphous  conception,  the  Humean  idea  of 
resemblance is nonetheless not without problems. 
One  main  issue  in  judging  the  resemblance  between  objects  is  that,  as 
Goodman (1972) has shown, there are infinite ways in which two objects can 
resemble  each  other  or,  stated  otherwise,  there are  infinite  ways to  detect 
subsets of a given set of objects based on resemblance. When we rely on a 
mechanism  of  resemblance  detection,  we  need  to  face  the  problem  of 
relevance;  meaning  that  we  need  to  establish  some  criteria  to  get  the 
resemblance we need in a given moment. 
While it seems that Hume was aware of the problem,24 there is still no explicit 
answer to it. And this is not difficult to understand: apart from the activity of 
resemblance detection, whose analysis is not developed at all, according to 
Hume the path from sensation to knowledge moves only in one direction and 
there is no way for the knowing mind to turn to sensations and, in some way, 
to shape them. No wonder then, if it has been claimed, for example by Sellars, 
that for Hume, together with Locke and Berkeley, resemblance seems to be a 
“primordial, non-problematic feature of ʻimmediate experienceʼ” (1997) instead 
of being the result of the knowing mind activity. 
Another important issue in Hume is the ontological status of the objects that 
populate the world we know. It has been observed by Popper that Hume was a 
“a passionate realist that was led from his subjectivist theory of knowledge to 
24See for example, Hume 2001, §1.1.7.21.
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metaphysical  results which,  while feeling obliged to accept  on the basis  of 
logic, was constitutionally unable to believe even for one hour” (2013). Husserl 
talks about a “fictionalist theory of knowledge” (1970) according to which “all 
categories of objectivity” are seeped in immanency as fictions of mind. And 
again,  this  is  due to the knowledge arrow that,  in the attempt to found an 
objective “physicalistic” knowledge, moves to the knowing mind from what we 
know of  the transcendental  objective world,  which  are  the sensations.  “No 
inference  is  thinkable  [...]  through  which  conclusions  could  be  drawn from 
these sense-data about anything but other such data” (Husserl, 1970, §23).
Again, according to Husserl  “Hume ends up, basically,  in a solipsism”. And 
already since Kant, but with roots in the Cartesian “primal self-evidence to be 
the  self-evidence  of  ʻinner  perceptionʼ”,  it  is  the  reverse  of  the  knowledge 
arrow, that is proposed as a solution for the foundation of an objectivity of the 
world, as the legitimation of its transcendental nature. 
With the introduction of the concept of “intention” the knowing mind is no more 
a neutral  vessel  that  receives and organizes sensations,  but  it  becomes an 
active  instrument  that  moves  towards  the  mere  sensorial  content  and 
organizes it in what appears to our consciousness as “perception”. In Husserlʼs 
vision, by applying a phenomenological method of judgement suspension of a 
sceptical nature, we have the chance to become aware of our “unconscious 
inferences”,  as  Helmoltz  would  have  called  them,  which  unveil  the  hidden 
activity of the knowing mind. 
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This is a complex geometry of structures of intentions, which unifies a series of 
single sensations as adumbrations of transcendental objects in the same way 
that different visual and instantaneous sensations are perceived when a table is 
looked  at  whilst  moving  around  it.  But  a  table,  as  an  intention,  is  never 
perceived in a final way, as it is primarily a cognitive horizon of possibilities 
open to infinite specifications in time and space. That is why the intentional 
process is taken in a sort of endless interplay of predelineation and fulfilment 
between apperception (the sensory data) and apprehension (the act of unifying 
through space and time different apperceptions in a transcendental object). 
Ultimately,  the transcendental  object  itself  remains “at  an infinite distance”, 
while what the intention intercepts just “pretends to be its essence, and it is it 
too, but [...] in an incomplete approximation, [...] that constantly grasps in an 
emptiness  that  cries  out  for  fulfilling”  (Husserl,  2001,  p.59).  Caught  in  this 
endless  loop,  the  sceptical  refutation  of  the  possibility  to  meet  the 
transcendental  word is  just  a  step  away,  so  that  Husserl  needs  to  involve 
regional “ideal limits” of fulfilling that bring us back to our body and its physical 
thresholds. 
In  the  relation  to  the  body,  with  its  limits,  functional  asymmetries  and 
transformations,  Husserl  opens  his  system  to  the  investigation  of  the 
ontogenesis of intentions as a so-called “genetic constitution”. First of all, the 
body provides a “constitutive duet”, that is composed first by “the system of 
[...]  free  possibilities  of  movement”  that  “is  intentionally  constituted  as  a 
practical kinaesthetic horizon”, secondarily by the process according to which 
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every  sensation  is  “ordered  with  respect  to  consciousness,  to  the  current 
situation  of  the  consciousness  of  the  parts  of  the  lived-body,  creating  an 
horizon of further possibilities” (Husserl, 2001, p.52) and consequent possible 
“appearances” linked to the possible movements of the body. 
This  loop seems  nothing  else  but  the  predelineation-fulfillment  loop that  is 
applied to the matrix of possibilities of the body as a transcendental object 
among transcendental objects. 
When we strip that loop from the contingencies of regional intentions, we meet 
the core and most abstract mechanism of the dynamic process of knowledge 
as  an  endless  loop  of  protention  and  retention.  These,  when  applied  to 
predelineation and fulfilment, engage the loop of expectation and reaction. 
In this infinite loop, habits are created and once again resemblance is what 
allows us to expect something that already happened in the past, or rather that 
resembles what I have already experienced. Once again, resemblance is at the 
centre of an unconscious mechanism that manages repetitions, the habits, as a 
basic pattern for constituting knowledge and, in a phenomenological  vision, 
human reality itself. 
What has changed since Hume? The notion of intention seems to have the 
chance to manage the relevance issue: the relevant characters of resemblance 
are selected by intention itself.  Moreover, the issue of transcendence of the 
word is taken into account even we ultimately cannot meet it. 
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We also  find the  idea  of  cognition  as  a  circular  process,  in  Maturana and 
Varela’s  autopoietic system, according to which the organism is stuck in an 
endless  loop  of,  let  us  call  them,  stimuli  and  reactions,  where  stimuli  are 
modifications  of  internal  biological  states,  due  to  the  cognitive  closure  of 
autopoiesis, and reactions are the processes of maintaining itself as a unit, that 
in the end is “surviving” as an autopoietic system. This, exactly as the human 
being in Husserl, cannot reach the world appearing as a sort of “unrequested” 
modification of the system itself. The only context available of the autopoietic 
system is itself. As observers, we can see the living being in the context of an 
external  environment  in  a  structural  coupling  made  of  modifications  of  the 
environment  and  modification  of  the  autopoietic system.  As  the  structural 
coupling goes on, regularities emerge that we could interpret as habits or in the 
end intentions. 
As Varela says: “signification arises in the emergence of a viewpoint proper to 
the autonomous constitution of the organism at all its levels, starting with its 
basic autopoiesis” while “the constitution of an autonomous unit provides the 
means  for  regularities  to  appear  which  are  the  bases  of  [syntactical] 
compositionality” (Varela, 1992, p.13).
Resemblance too emerges from regularities in the structural coupling, in the 
encounter of the living being with the mirror of the self, what we call external 
reality. Within the structural coupling in action, however, there is no need for 
such  a  concept.  It  emerges  in  the  domain  of  descriptions  that  we  make 
through language when we evoke a transcendental world of objects. 
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Therefore,  it  ultimately  seems  that  the  quasi-esoteric  complications  of 
Husserlian terminology arise from the contradiction between the vision of a 
world of objects, which is definitely made easier by our languages of nouns, 
and the genetic perspective of a world constituted by actions.
Resemblance lives in the descriptions that we make and therefore is open to 
the uncertainty of the infinite possibilities of selecting the qualities that realize 
it. The choice can only be made within the context of our descriptions, which in 
turn depend on the context that, within our “praxis of living”, gives rise to those 
descriptions. 
Goodman is indeed correct to be suspicious about the use of resemblance to 
validate knowledge beginning from our descriptions as observers. But what we 
call  resemblance  is  rather  the  hypostatization  of  a  symptom  that  is  the 
consequence of the articulated process of constituting ourselves as subjects 
with our repetitive actions and their expected results. 
Provided that these results do not perfectly match our expectations, but rather 
challenge, up to a certain threshold, our ability to expect, we could say that our  
possibility  of  action  in  the  world,  our  refusal  of  habituation,  is  linguistically 
represented by that difference we call resemblance. We therefore do not have 
to deal with the infinite qualities in which to look for resemblances, but it is our  
repertoire of experiences that is inscribed in our world and drive our actions 
towards expectations that follow the world and can be described in terms of 
searching for resemblances.
225
8.3 Pattern structures
We can  finally  introduce one of  the  most  important  topics  of  the  chapter: 
pattern structure. In fact, if a pattern is something we recognize in terms of its 
components, then an ordered configuration of patterns is a pattern as well, 
provided that it has been recognized in a representation. Jones was well aware 
of  this,  as  it  is  a  consequence  of  the  group structure  of  dimensions.  The 
associative property, which is a requirement included in the very definition of 
the “group” structure, provides the theoretical conditions for a succession of 
recognizable  configurations  to  be  understood  together  as  a  higher  level 
recognizable configuration. Consequently (I am following here: Jones, 1981), 
two  consecutive  presentation-instances  of  the  same  pattern,  in  terms  of 
intervals, form together a composite pattern unit, the simplest one, and can be 
connected to the interval between the first values of each one of the instances, 
as a  generator that  describes the interval  of  transposition between the two 
instances. This generator interval can therefore be taken as the compositional 
value describing the dimensional relationship between the two instances of the 
same pattern. 
We therefore have a tree-like structure,  in which the lowest,  “surface”  level 
comprises  the  units  corresponding  to  the  double  two  pattern  instances, 
labelled by the intervals of the related perceptive dimension being generated 
through  repetition  and  transposition,  the  single  instances  of  the  patterns. 
Immediately above the lowest level, we have a middle level that includes one 
composite pattern unit composed by the two pattern instances. 
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If the highest possible level, the “total” level, comprises only a single composite 
pattern unit, encompassing all the composite pattern units at the immediately 
lower  level,  that  in  turn  encompass  all  the  composite  pattern  units  at  the 
immediately lower level and so on down to the single instances of the pattern, 
then in this very simple tree-structure the total level coincides with the middle 
level.
Figure 3: the simplest composite pattern unit with dimensional generators.
Of  course,  as  we  have  seen,  a  perceptive  dimension  is  not  enough  to 
characterize a configuration that, in order to be a pattern, needs to fall under 
the SIR. If we want to build a diagram of regions we also need to specify the 
time interval dimension for all the levels of the pattern structure, except for the 
highest “total” one. This can be done in a manner similar to the diagram used 
for the perceptive dimensions, so that the surface level units are connected 
with the time interval  between their  onset  and the onset  of  the successive 
instance,  while  the  units  at  the  higher  levels  are  connected  with  the  time 
interval  between the first  surface  unit  of  that  higher  level  unit  and the first 
surface unit of the successive higher level unit, which corresponds to the sum 
of the time intervals of all the surface units nested in that higher level unit.
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So, if all the instances have, let us say, the same duration of one pulse, the 
surface level units will be labelled by that pulse, while the middle level units of 
component patterns will be labelled by the time interval between the onsets of 
the two presentations.
Figure 4: a simple pattern structure with time generators.
Of course, once we have determined how to describe a multi-level pattern, we 
can invent or discover extremely complicated patterns in the sound flow. 
Figure 5: a more complicated pattern structure.
We can also apply statistics to determine the generators in  cases where it 
might be useful for us: after all, as we have seen, every steady phenomenon is 
constituted as a chunk from its undetectable variations and in our sounding 
practices  it  is  impossible  to  realize  two time intervals  that  are  exactly  and 
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perfectly the same. Every measurement related to our listening experiences are 
de facto connected with error thresholds that make them statistical data. We 
can therefore,  in  some cases,  describe each level  of  a complex composite 
pattern unit with a pair of values, the dimensional generator interval and the 
time generator interval, so that we can plot them in the space of perceptive 
modes. While, as I have said, this is not a research on psychoacoustics so it is 
not important here to determine exactly the regional ratios, that would anyway 
be different for each perceptive dimension, the possibility of relating the levels 
of a pattern structure to the regions of perceptive modes has very important 
consequences.
Figure 6: generators of a simple pattern structure as points in the space of the modes  
of distinctions. The surface level falls in the CR, the higher level falls in the SIR and the  
highest level, which is immediately under the total, level falls in the PRR.
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8.4 Regions at higher levels of pattern structure
However,  we  can  try  to  understand  what  regions  mean  when  the  idea  is 
applied not  to the single pairs  of  instances in the surface level,  but  to the 
generator pairs of the higher levels.
If we consider a dimensional generator equal to zero, we are dealing with a CR 
realized  by  the  exact  repetition  of  the  component  patterns  at  the  level 
expressed by the generator. When we deviate from the value of zero, as long 
as we stay within the CR, by definition we should not be able to detect any 
relevant differences between the repetitions of the pattern units, composing a 
unit belonging to the immediately higher level, so that they realize it as a chunk. 
The  composing  units  then  become  the  elements  of  the  texture  that 
characterizes the chunk to which it belongs. We could therefore say that CR 
deals with identity.
Figure 7: succession of instances that fall in the CR in the dimension P.
Nevertheless it is still  possible that the chunks in some level might work as 
units  falling  in  the  SIR  in  some  higher  level  in  the  very  same  perceptive 
dimension.  In  fact  while a composing unit  in a certain given level  stops its 
process, of constituting a higher level unit at the highest level so that it falls in 
the SIR, which does not  mean that its lower levels could not fall in the CR or 
even in the PRR.
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Figure 8: succession of instances that fall in the CR at the surface level, 
but fall in the SIR at a higher level.
The  SIR  is  the  region  expressing  the  pattern  as  composed  by  ordered, 
recognizable  components.  Therefore,  to  be  a  composite  unit  a  pattern 
structure  needs  at  least  to  fall  in  the  SIR  at  the  highest  level  defining  its 
components. The number of levels that fall in the SIR define the articulation of 
a composite unit so that the differences between the units in the lowest SIR 
level are the material, so to speak, from which the units in the higher SIR levels 
are built of by abstraction. This also means that the possible articulation of a 
composite unit must depend on the limits when dealing with our ability to order 
differences in memory. However, the complexity of dealing with world patterns, 
which  are  articulated  in  multiple  dimensions  with  nested  levels  related  to 
different perceptive mode regions based on time intervals, might explain why a 
determination of the perceptive thresholds involved is so difficult to reach, as 
shown by the history of the debate around this topic (see, for example: Miller, 
1956; Honig, 1988; Gobet and Clarkson, 2004). In this context, it is enough to 
say that whenever the limits of distinction are reached, we fail  to order the 
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configuration of instances on some structural level, which therefore falls back 
in the CR.
In sum, the relationship between CR and SIR in composite pattern units show 
us that the CR seems to be in charge of perceptively forming the units, which, 
by means of their ordered differences, realize patterns. 
Moreover,  CR levels  that  are higher  than the maximum level  related to the 
composite unit in dimensions that are different from the perceptive dimension 
where the pattern is constituted, are connected with the experience of what is 
constant in the sound flow during the enunciation of the pattern. For example, 
a pitch pattern played legato on a synthesizer with a sine wave timbre exhibits 
a CR for the whole duration of the pattern in the timbre dimension, which in 
other words means that the timbre dimension does not define the pattern as 
such, but its steady character helps us constitute it as a changing foreground 
against a stable background. Therefore, in opposition to CR’s identitarian role, 
we could say that the main role of SIR, even in multiple level patterns is to 
address difference.
PRR intervenes when the generator interval of some level related to a certain 
perceptive dimension is too high to fall in the SIR. In a fast surface level, we 
have  seen  how  PRR gives  rise  to  the  phenomenon  of  streaming,  so  that 
successive instances are perceived as simultaneous. In higher abstract levels, 
which are by definition slower than the surface level, this might not happen. 
Jones’  example  of  a  structure  with  a  PRR level  shows  how,  with  surface 
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instances lasting 0,25 msec, even a simple pattern of eight pitches such as C-
D-E-F-C3-D3-E3-F3  cannot  be  perceived  as  a  repeating  segment  of  eight 
notes, but it is broken into the two overlapping segments of four notes that fall 
in the SIR: C-D-E-F and C3-D3-E3-F3 (Jones, 1976, p.343).
The influence of PRR on perception does not stop when the generator time 
interval is slow enough to avoid streaming, although when two sections of the 
sound  flow  are  evidently  perceived  as  one  after  the  other,  it  might  seem 
unclear  what  a  “parallel  representation”  could mean.  But  the  perception  of 
simultaneity  before being the constitutive  occasion for  unity,  expresses the 
fragmentation  of  the  continuum  of  perception:  it  is  a  segregation.  This 
continuity  that  is  broken  into  pieces  and cannot  be  brought  back  to  unity 
without a wider  context in which such pieces reach unity while maintaining 
their diversity  is the general effect on perception that PRR accomplishes, even 
in higher levels of a pattern structure. If two successive composite units exhibit 
a generator dimensional interval between them too wide to fall into the SIR, 
then these units can hardly be merged into a single unit of a higher degree, but 
need to be perceived in a higher level as components of two different units that 
follow one after the other. Let’s take the last example and increase the pitch 
intervals between the fourth and the fifth instances so that the pattern is now 
C-D-E-F-C7-D7-E7-F7,  with  a  surface  instances  duration  of  200  msec.  We 
mostly will not be able to integrate, without effort, the whole pattern as a series 
of  eight  pitches,  but  we  will  rather  easily  fragment  it  into  two  alternating 
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patterns of four notes each. This is therefore an example of the diversity issue 
addressed by PRR in higher and slower levels of the pattern structure. 
Let’s  see  other  examples.  Bobby  McFerrin’s  arrangement,  of  The  Beatles’ 
“Blackbird”, for solo voice is a typical example of how the technique of virtual  
polyphony can be used to suggest, with just the aid of the monophonic voice, 
the simultaneous performance of the different sections of a band, for example 
the rhythmical section against the melody, by using extensively PRR among 
units  in  slower  levels  of  the  pattern  structure.  A  different  case  results  by 
“identifying” lower level units with CR units separated by PRR intervals. For 
example, let’s take the “echo effect” which is typical of the polychoral style of 
cori spezzati: when it is reduced to the sole sounding flow resulting from its 
performance, we could say that the opposition between choirs is simply based 
on PRR intervals between identitary CR levels as their position in space. The 
same is true for other kinds of musical oppositions such as the PRR in timbre 
and  dynamics  that  characterizes  the  distinction  between ripieno  and 
concertino,  in  the  Concerto  Grosso  form,  or  between  a  soloist  and  the 
orchestra, or also between two manuals of, let us say, a work for cembalo. All  
the  dimensions  that  fall  in  the  PRR  in  the  end  are  directed  to  suggest  a 
diversity in the sources of what, in terms of the pitch dimension, is falling in the 
SIR and therefore constitute the pattern levels.
There  is  another  aspect  of  PRR  that  can  be  connected  to  the  continuity  
phenomenon in  psychoacoustics.  This  happens  when  one  signal  (typically 
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called the “probe”) is followed by another signal that is potentially able to mask 
the  previous  one.  The  phenomenon  manifests  itself  in  the  difficulty  of 
interpreting in different ways a probe interrupted by the following signal and a 
probe  that  is  actually  masked  by  the  following  signal.  In  both  cases  “the 
perceptual system ‘assumes’ that the signal continues” (Moore, 1997, p.254) 
because, according to the Gestaltic principle of “good continuation”, 
as  changes  in  frequency,  intensity,  locations  or  spectrum tend  to  be 
smooth and continuous rather than abrupt […] a sudden change indicates 
that a new source has been activated”. (Moore, 1997, p.264)
This phenomenon is consistent with the distinction of diversities within a sound 
flow, deduced from the presence of necessarily abrupt changes within the PRR 
between sequences of units falling in the CR. And in the end, the dimensions 
that are related to the masking effect, such as dynamics, first of all, will be in  
charge of driving our perception, so that it can attribute the sequences with the 
roles of foreground or background.
CR, SIR and PRR are therefore the three poles of a dialectics of perception as 
an active process of  moving in  the world,  as  constitutive  of  the “praxis  of 
living”. I have chosen three words to interpret the functional roles of the three 
regions, identity, difference and diversity, which are not neutral at all. They are 
in fact deeply rooted in western thought: they have appeared as a fundamental 
topic  since  pre-Socratic  philosophy  and  cover  the  whole  path  of  western 
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history up to the contemporary era where they emerge in a variety of contexts 
such  as  the  theory  of  mind  and  the  cultural,  post-colonialist  and  gender 
studies. 
I do not dare here to deal with all of the connections that these terms might 
throw into the vast ocean of western thought and therefore I leave them as a 
constant background for possible references. 
In this context and from the perspective of perception,  identity refers to what 
cannot be distinguished, to what is invisible and yet conditions our experience; 
difference refers to the distinction of movement, of variation; diversity refers to 
the  splitting  of  movements  into  identities.  The  process  from CR to  PRR is 
therefore almost circular as each PRR level implies a number of CR or SIR 
nested levels.
Consequently,  we  could  also  say  that  identity is  the  expression  of  unity; 
difference is the tension of diversity towards unity, while diversity is the tension 
towards breaking the unity.
8.5 Statistical dimensions
After having introduced and developed the idea of pattern structure, we need 
now to deal with the kinds of sonic events that do not seem to easily fit within 
this framework. In fact, I have introduced patterns as a fundamental character 
of my narrative of listening, but not every configuration is recognizable and 
consequently  not  all  possible  configurations  are  patterns.  Let’s  imagine  for 
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example  a  virtually  endless  series  of  unpredictable  instances  of  a  certain 
perceptive dimension, let’s take as usual pitch, which falls in the SIR. 
Figure 9: a randomic succession of instances that fall in the SIR.
We can still recognize the intervals so that we can detect their order, but as the 
configuration of orders never repeats, we will be able to await a possible re-
proposition  of  instances  only  as  long  as  they  fall  in  a  constantly  moving 
memory window, the short term memory, which also depends on our cognitive 
skills.  But as soon as we can recognize the re-proposition of even a small 
number of instances, we will experience that wince of distinction, allowing us 
to separate the configuration between a before and an after; and a pattern, so 
to speak, will be born.
Let’s  imagine  this  configuration  is  realized  by  ordinary  tempered  pitches 
changing every 250 msec within a global range of an octave. After a while, the 
pitch  range moves to  the upper  octave without  changing time interval  and 
without losing the unpredictability of configuration. Yet we can distinctly detect 
the change in a certain given quality. Afterwards, first the pitch range returns to 
the original octave and then it  moves back to the upper one, repeating the 
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sequence every four seconds. Again, we can easily detect the pattern of the 
range movements, even if we cannot recognize any pattern of pitch instances.
Figure 10: a random succession of instances with a duration of 250 msec, that fall in  
the SIR, changing their range of intervals every four seconds.
What is happening? 
If we detect a change, it means that there must have been a constant instance 
of some perceptive dimension that changed into another constant instance of 
the same dimension and that the pair of dimensional and time intervals must 
have fallen in the SIR. What is the perceptive dimension that is involved in the 
SIR? I have mentioned pitch range, but because it does not change in width in 
our  example,  it  must  instead  be  a  value  that  is  related  to  the  average 
distribution  of  pitches.  It  is  not  even  the  “simple”  pitch  dimension,  nor  its 
differential  derivative,  pitch  interval,  because  we  can  imagine  a  transition 
between  the  two  ranges  that  does  not  need  to  imply  a  wider  interval  in 
connecting them, and nonetheless it is still very perceptible.
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It  is indeed possible to define a dimension of pitch range in terms of rules 
regarding the successions of intervals, such as the impossibility within a CR 
unit to connect two or more intervals in the same direction whose total width is 
bigger than the defined width, for example one octave, and so on. But, as this 
is  a  rule  for  building  a  target  sound  sample,  rather  than  a  description  of 
listening,  it  would presume that  our  perception  focuses  on the  absence of 
something, the forbidden series of intervals, instead addressing the verifiable 
presence  of  something,  on  the  positivity  of  recognition.  Therefore,  as  the 
totality of what is possibly absent is virtually infinite, while the recognition of a  
presence  can  be  shaped  by  memory,  it  seems  more  likely  and  consistent 
within the present framework to connect this quality change to the detection of 
an area over the dimension of pitches: a register. 
If  we can numerically  describe what  at  this  point  seems to be a statistical 
dimension of an interval range around a central pitch, nevertheless it is just an 
artifice of mathematics that might not correspond to the target of perception. In 
fact, how can we define the generator interval between two instances of these 
dimensions: as the difference between the central pitches in the interval range 
or as the difference between the lower or upper pitches of that range, or again 
as a difference between the value resulting from a linear combination of them? 
Maybe  the  experimental  research  on  the  amount  of  change  experienced 
between units with different central pitches and ranges will help to answer the 
question.  In  the meanwhile,  we surely  can build  complex structures  out  of 
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variations of the dimensions of pitch register, both in terms of pitch range and 
central value that fall in the SIR.
I claimed earlier that this dimension is a statistical one. I do not want to say 
that  statistics  are  constitutionally  inherent  to  this  dimension,  as  this  would 
imply that statistics are constitutionally inherent to cognition. Statistics instead 
emerge  as  a  discipline  in  the  complex  path  of  social  practices  that  enact 
cognition.  On  the  other  hand,  the  dimension  of  register  is  perceptively 
constituted from the succession of  unpredictable  instances of  pitch.  It  is  a 
predicted succession of constant, within the CR, degrees of unpredictability. In 
this sense, it can be described statistically as the set of probabilities of a range 
of pitches. Yet, statistics lies in descriptions and it has to be related, within the 
dynamics  of  cognition,  to  the  result  of  its  functioning  rather  than  to  the 
intrusion of a (metaphysical) property of the sound flow.
In the end, statistical dimensions seem to emerge from a cognitive activity that 
aims to detect patterns with any means. When no pattern can be found in the 
SIR along a dimension, the simple possibility of turning into CR units what 
cannot be distinguished, gives the cognitive process a game in looking for 
patterns along other derivative dimensions. 
SIR is therefore not only the threshold condition for recognizing patterns, but it  
is also the leading heuristic instrument for dealing with the dynamic world. On 
the  other  hand,  the  CR is  not  only  the  threshold  condition  of  recognizing 
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identities, but it is also the heuristic instrument to build the very instances that 
form configurations and possible patterns.
Conversely, we can consider statistical dimensions as the way that CR works. 
In  fact,  falling in  the CR means,  for  a collection of  instances,  that it  is  not 
possible to distinguish an order because the instances appear as equivalent 
with each other in expressing a quality. If the octave range in our example were 
reduced to a half-step and the pitches were consequently chosen microtonally 
within that range, the successions fell in the CR. 
Therefore, the distinction between a CR and its statistical SIR version seems to 
lie  only  in  the  relative  range,  together  with  the  impossibility  of  detecting 
repetitions.
In conclusion: the difference between CR and SIR seems to be in the openness 
of  a  window  related  to  the  perception  of  differences.  We  could  therefore 
consider a couple of instances that fall in the SIR as a successful detection 
through a window that is closed enough to only let the two instances pass.
This window, with its selective role, seems to be a proper image for attention.
8.6 Learning
The cognitive process of transforming patterns in objects needs a mechanism 
that involves memory, attention and expectation, and is able to transform the 
formless  sonic  flow  in  a  complex  structure  of  recognizable  elements,  ie. 
patterns.
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The  psychological  phenomenon  of  habituation  seems  to  be  key  to  this 
mechanism. This is usually defined as “a decrease in responsiveness resulting 
from the repeated presentation of an eliciting stimulus” (Huron, 2013, p.8), that 
Huron qualifies as “the most important mental mechanisms organisms have for 
ignoring stimuli”.  Habituation is  therefore an effect  of attention, which takes 
place when it addresses a constantly recurring stimulus, as it happens within a 
CR level of the pattern structure. 
While this topic is typically related to learning, especially in infants, everybody 
has had the experience of erasing from consciousness a car alarm constantly 
playing in the background, so that we suddenly realize its presence only when 
it finally stops. Habituation is such an important instrument for constituting our 
world,  that,  for  example,  the  AC  frequency  of  the  general  distribution  of 
electricity  is  able,  by  means  of  its  continuous  sounding  yet  habituated 
presence in our homes, to condition our emission of spontaneous pitches, as 
claimed by Murray Schafer (1993).
It  is  a  complex  phenomenon  that  is  ruled  by  perceptive  thresholds  and 
latencies,  which can be modulated by the processes  of  dishabituation and 
potentiation, depending on the details of pattern structures within the sound 
flow (see: Huron, 2013).
What  is  of  interest  here is  that habituation is  a  phenomenon that  arises  in 
presence  of  a  CR  level  that  lasts  long  enough  to  stimulate  it.  From  the 
perspective  of  expectation,  on  the  other  hand,  it  activates  when the sonic 
event  perfectly  matches  our  expectation,  so  that  there  is  no  longer  the 
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necessity to anticipate a change. Habituation is the sign of certainty or better: 
safety. So it is no wonder that when change happens we are hit by a strong 
physiological wince25 that is often accompanied by a sense of alarm. We could 
describe our expectations in terms of probabilities represented as a function, 
which  after  some  habituation  time,  reaches  the  zero  for  all  the  possible 
generator intervals in the focused perceptive dimensions, except for the one 
that falls in the CR, which has a probability of one.
Curiously,  such  a habituation  function  might  well  describe  the  process  of 
building a statistical  dimension, provided it is interpreted as the progressive 
opening up of the attentional window of the range of pitches. In fact, from the 
perspective of  expectation,  we can imagine that as long as the anticipated 
repetition of a pattern does not show up, the attentional window—that when 
dealing with SIR instances is open just enough to detect them in a possible 
repetition—will  progressively  open  to  intercept  the  instances  of  the 
configurations with the maximum success. 
This vision of expectation implies that the cognitive system primarily aims to 
minimize the use of resources, namely energy in the first place, and therefore is 
committed to maximizing the results of detecting changes even at the cost of 
expanding  the  focus  to  any  possible  change.  This  idea  is  based  on  the 
assumption that a precise detection, as obtained by a barely open attentional 
window is more valuable that a loose one, in which the window is wide open.
25See note 17 in Section 6.
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What happens in the initialization of a statistical dimension is that as soon as a 
configuration falling in the SIR has been detected a precise series of possible 
repetitions  is  immediately  expected.  On  the  contrary,  as  soon  as  it  is  not 
possible to detect  any repetitions,  an alternative system is engaged, to the 
energy-costly process of getting a precise but unexpected pitch. The range of 
possible  pitches is  therefore  gradually  increased until  all  the pitches in  the 
actual configuration are detected, so that they start falling in the CR under the 
mark of new statistical dimensions and the process of habituation can start.
What is interesting here is that if we turn to describing the path of expectation 
in terms of probabilities, the related function would once again start from the 
probabilities set by the memorized pitches, but after a while all the possible 
generator intervals of the statistical dimension will reach the zero, except for 
the one that falls in the CR, which will have a probability of one.
As we have seen, in order to interrupt this process, some repetitions in the 
dimension of pitch intervals need to happen. Or we might have a change in the 
dimension of pitch register or indeed, any number of events may happen. But 
what  I  want  to highlight  here is  that  both  habituation and the formation  of 
“statistical” dimensions share a similar process of dealing with CR levels, the 
first one by dismissing them from consciousness, the second one by creating 
them. 
In both cases a process starting from an uncertainty aims to minimize it. From 
this perspective, they both are related to learning.
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As concerns the wince, it seems that it can be connected both to the detection 
of an unexpected change in some perceptive dimension and to the detection 
of  the  unexpected  similarity  that  gives  birth  to  a  pattern.  While  from  the 
physiological point of view it seems that the sudden allocation of resources 
due to unexpected events might well be responsible for some of the correlates 
of that wince, nevertheless both cases relate to a discontinuity in the function 
of the probability of expectations.
As already mentioned in Section 7.4, the idea, according to which listening is 
adapted to the statistics of its object, has already been introduced in Leonard 
Meyer’s  research.  This  idea,  in the terms presented by David Huron (2006) 
states that learning is the preeminent source for auditory expectations and that 
the statistical proportions of sound expectations seem to match exactly and 
sometimes even against cultural common sense the statistical proportions of 
what has been listened to during an entire life. We can therefore call statistical  
learning a type of learning that is based on how frequently a particular event 
occurs, its non-contextual probability, or how tightly two or more events are 
correlated,  which  involves  a  conditioned  probability  typically  expressed  in 
terms of a Markovian stochastic process.
According  to  Huron  it  seems  also  plausible  to  link  unspeakable  subjective 
qualities to the statistical properties of the stimulus in particular contexts. The 
most important properties are: 
(1) the non-contextual probability, 
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(2) the first-order tendencies between stimuli and 
(3) the likelihood that no further stimuli will occur. 
We are normally told that there are five senses: taste, touch, smell, sight and 
hearing.  Over  the  past  century,  physiologists  have  established  that  in  fact 
many more than five exist. Equilibrium, for example, proprioception and the 
four distinct systems that seem to be entailed by touch: heat, cold, pressure 
and pain.  Huron suggests in addition to them, the existence of  a sense of 
future anticipation. Thinking of a feeling of probability, as a distinctive quality, is 
an interesting hypothesis that has the potential  to unify the perspectives on 
perceptive behaviours that apparently seem different from one another.
We have seen that  a  change is  detected  in  one dimension when both  the 
dimensional and time intervals between two instances, which are CR units, fall  
in  the  SIR.  If  we  consider  the  dimension  of  the  probability  of  expectation 
related to the single instances in a configuration and we assume that we can 
develop  a  subjective  dimension  for  it,  we  can  consider  both  a  perceived 
change and a perceived repetition as a change in that dimension which falls 
outside the CR. If we are expecting that the “habituated” probability will last 
longer, both a perceived change or a repetition will  violate that expectation, 
causing that thrill of surprise that comes with it. And the discontinuity of time, 
which is ultimately a part of the narrative device, can be connected with the 
discontinuity of winces expressing the unexpected. 
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Figure 11: the dimension of probability.
8.7 Misattribution
In this section a key-concept is introduced, which seems to be able to connect 
statistical learning to the construction of a world of object. But first we have to 
acknowledge  that  the  idea  of  a  fundamental  dimension  of  probability  of 
expectation suggests that the two phenomena that depend on it, namely the 
detection of a pattern and the detection of a dimension, might actually share a 
common root in spite of being apparently distinct from each other. If we want 
to determine its possible conditions and consequences,  we need to further 
develop the idea of dimension.
First  of all,  we already know that a dimension is expressed by an ordering 
relation within a set of possible instances, so that we can put two different 
instances related to that dimension in a succession from lower to higher in the 
dimensional scale. A first consequence is that we need to set an equivalence 
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relation between two instances in a dimension that we consider, more or less, 
equal to each other. In particular, if we have learned to use a dimension to 
detect qualities in the sound flow then we must have developed the ability to 
determine  if  two  instances  belong  to  the  same  equivalence  class  that  is, 
otherwise said, the ability to recognize the two instances as expression of the 
same dimensional value.
However, as the sound flow is continuous and never-ending, it means that in 
order to compare two equal instances along the dimensional scale, we have to 
detect two changes in the sound flow, which are necessarily not successive, 
otherwise they would “melt”  in  a single CR instance.  The key term here is 
“recognizing”: it implies that an instance of a dimension is itself some sort of a 
pattern, with the consequence that, what has been said so far about patterns 
of instances, can possibly be said about the instances themselves.
Moreover, an instance is detected as the expression of a dimensional value, if 
it  is  recognized as equal  to the possible sample of  that dimensional  value, 
where “possibility”  is  here the promise of  an experience,  the same kind of 
promise that links the locution “the sound of a piano” to the experience of 
listening to a performer playing something on a piano. A sample of a value in a 
dimension is therefore a fragment of the sound flow, that we can instantiate in 
sound, so that we can compare it to another fragment of the sound flow, in 
order to make sure that if both were occurring in immediate succession, the 
resulting configuration of the two fragments/instances would fall in the CR.
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Up to now I have dealt with the recognition of units in a level as a segment 
within the same pattern structure. In the attempt to go beyond the context of a 
“local”  structure,  Oackelford  distinguishes  between  intra-opus  and inter-
operative zygonic relationships. The former being related to the formation of 
patterns within a single music piece, such as a repeated motif or a theme, and 
the latter being involved among the recognizable patterns that can be found in 
different music works, such as the Alberti Bass but also the form of, let us say, 
a minuet (Oackelford, 1996, p.38). On the other hand, Candace Brower (2000) 
in  her  nearly  unique  attempt  to  develop  Howard  Margolis’ pattern  theory 
(Margolis, 1987) in musicology, lists intra-opus patterns, musical schemas and 
image schemas (Brower, 2000, p.324). While the first kind of patterns have to 
be identified with configurations connected to Oackelford’s intra-opus zygonic 
relationships, Brower’s interest in finding embodied meaning in music brings 
her to distinguish patterns that are common to different works, also referred to 
as inter-opus patterns, between schemas that refer to music conventions and 
schemas that, while being part of music conventions as well, are “abstracted 
from bodily experiences”. 
Image schemas in particular, by mapping bodily experiences of the physical 
world onto music, carry out the metaphorical concepts (Lakoff is here implied)  
of musical space, musical time, musical force and musical motion. 
By developing and combining image schemas with each other, Brower pushes 
their  range of  implications up to include melody, harmony, phrase structure 
and form.
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I will prefer in this context to use the term intra-opus patterns for addressing 
patterns that are introduced/discovered and repeated/recognized within single 
music works  and the term  inter-opus patterns  to refer  to  patterns that  are 
instantiated/recognized in different music works. These can be elements that 
are also repeated/recognized within the single pieces, such as the Alberti Bass, 
or can involve larger time spans and higher pattern articulation such as music 
form.
While  the connection  of  the concepts  of  music  theory  with  somatosensory 
experience is indeed full of interesting implications, it has to be noted that the 
verbal description of experience should not be confused with the institutional 
formalization of a practice, in the same way as the rules of music composition 
in some cultural context are different from their actual and individual realization 
by a composer, which also follows unwritten, and sometimes unwritable, rules. 
Metaphors are themselves linguistic patterns that can be used in addressing 
subjective experiences, as we have seen, but they are definitely different from 
the subjective experiences they label on one hand and with the practices that 
entail  the  experiences  on  the  other.  The  concept  of  “harmonic  tension” 
between  a  dominant  and  tonic  chord  indeed  shows  the  use  of  a 
somatosensory metaphor when labelling the practice of  connecting the two 
chords  by  justifying  it  in  terms  of  the  characterization  of  the  subjective 
experience of listening to the result. Nevertheless, if we would try to follow the 
somatosensory metaphor of looking for the place and shape of that “tension”, 
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we  might  be  tempted  to  build  a  metaphysics  of  harmony,  such  as  Hugo 
Riemann’s  opposition  of  dominant  and  subdominant  as  expression  of 
respectively harmonics and subharmonics (Riemann, 1991). In fact,  the only 
way  to  deal  with  “harmonic  tension”,  without  relating  it  to  some  “natural 
causes”  with  the  consequence  of  considering  the  music  expressions  that 
contradict  that  “tension”  as  unnatural,  is  through  the  cultural  and  social  
practices that have involved it in history and in the consequent expectations 
that have been statistically learned from the attendance to these practices.
Huron’s  ITPRA  model  of  expectation,  as  we  have  seen,  involves  some 
rewarding  mechanism  involved  immediately  after  the  confirmation  of  an 
expectation, in the prediction and reaction responses, in function of the degree 
of predictability of the expectation. As a consequence, we meet the exposure 
effects, stating that the probability of satisfied predictions are proportional to 
the  intensity  of  the  reward.  This  means  that  the  formulation  of  a  correct 
expectation is  open to the influence of  the  misattribution  effect,  that  is  the 
“tendency to associate the emotional state with whatever salient stimuli exist in 
the  environment”  (Huron,  2007,  p.136)  whenever  we  experience  a  strong 
emotion. Huron’s proposal is therefore that every time a prediction is satisfied, 
on one hand the predicting subject is awarded in such a way that he feels a 
possible violation of the prediction as unpleasant, and, on the other hand, he 
may tend to wrongly identify the pleasure of the satisfaction as a property of 
that particular prediction. The whole 9th chapter of Huron’s Sweet Anticipation 
is  devoted  to  the  “venerable  topic”  of  tonality  and  indirectly  exposes  the 
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foundational theories of western harmony as the result of an emotionally driven 
misattribution.  But,  we  should  not  look  for  its  effects  only  in  music 
theorizations.
In fact, the listening analysis of both Oackelford and Brower, together with a 
very  long  list  of  musicologists  and  researchers,  does  not  consider  what 
happens  outside  of  (mostly,  western)  music  as  relevant  to  understanding 
listening, and in this way they end up excluding from the analysis of listening its 
most relevant part.
8.8 Objects
Finally, we need to bring the constructive path begun with Chapter 7 to some 
advanced consequences, which includes the perspective of relating our world 
of  objects  to  the  complex  structure  of  pattern  that  each  one  of  us,  yet 
entangled in intersubjective interactions, has built through statistical learning.  
First of all, we have to put music back into the sound flow it belongs within: if  
we come out of the music context, little remains of the distinction between 
intra-opus and  inter-opus patterns. In fact, when we consider that the music 
patterns  we  find  as  notational  symbols  in  the  score  are  intended  to  be 
instantiated in performance, we can connect the recognition of patterns that 
we find in  the scores  of  different  works with the recognition of  the related 
patterns that are distinguished within the sound flow when we listen to those 
different  works  in  our  life.  The  difference  between  intra- and  inter-opus 
patterns are therefore based on a shift  in the levels of the pattern structure 
252
between the level of the composite unit of the single “opus” and the higher 
level of composite units that instantiate the opus pattern within the sound-flow. 
But the onsets of the instances of the  opus pattern point to distinctions that 
can be very distant in time from each other. If all the instances of  inter-opus 
patterns belong to the same pattern structure, we could say that the onset of 
each instance is included among the onsets within the composite unit including 
the  instance  as  the  composing  unit  that  falls  in  the  CR  along  the  binary 
dimension of “music presence”.
It seems uselessly complicated to consider what happens between the attack 
of  a  music  work  and  the  next  time  we  listen  to  a  music  work  as  the 
configuration  of  a  pattern,  because  in  the  time  between  the  two  music 
instances everything can happen. Moreover, the same can be said about intra-
opus patterns.  In fact,  between two instances of  the same chordal  pattern, 
such as the authentic cadence, everything can happen in a music work. But 
this is the consequence of avoiding dealing with objects, which need spatial 
bounds  in  order  to  be  dealt  with,  in  a  sensorimotor  way.  Patterns  are  the 
hypostatization of instants that bind our expectations one after the other in a 
tremendously  articulated  way,  but  still  without  losing  their  instantaneous 
character. 
In the wide context of the sound flow there is therefore no distinction between 
intra-opus and inter-opus patterns, but rather a possible difference of temporal 
range in which it is possible to detect instances of patterns. From the mere 
point of view of the most general pattern structure, or the “total personal sound 
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flow”, the sound flow in which a given person has been immersed during his or 
her whole lifetime, there is little difference if patterns can be found within the 
highly composite unit that we call a music work or in a wider structure that 
includes the recognized instances of a musical genre, but also of a particular 
“sounding” verbal expression, in a given moment of life of the listening subject. 
Nevertheless, we are used to dealing with pattern instances as objects, not 
only because our language of nouns constrains us to this, but also because 
sounding patterns drive our somatosensory metaphors.
In fact, when we deal with a sound object, we usually express it as a “bounded 
pattern”, a fragment of the sound flow that is distinguished as a “chunked” unit 
in the dimensions different from those making it a component of a unit in the 
higher level. In other words, we are dealing with qualities that are perceived as 
not changing for a while, in such a way that the fragment characterized by the 
non-changing  qualities  can  be  isolated  from  the  sound  flow  by  the 
discontinuities  that  bound it.  A  note,  as  a  sample of  the “note”  pattern,  is 
usually  expressed by a tuned sound that  is  attacked from “silence”  and is 
abruptly returning to “silence” when it is decided that it has been held enough. 
This  exhibited  discontinuity  at  the  “time  borders”  somehow  mimics  the 
discontinuity  of  matter  in  space  and therefore  seems  to  be  suitable  to  be 
considered as a proper sample. 
But the “real life of patterns” is usually completely different. A thematic pattern 
is usually not bounded at both “extremities” because what is important in the 
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first place in the music flow is to recognize the beginning of a pattern so that it 
can give rise to a distinction. In fact, if we change the head of a motive we 
might not be able to recognize it any more, while the end is often varied within 
a music piece, without affecting recognition.
With the possibility to instantiate a pattern as a bounded one, we have granted 
the  possibility  to  objectify  patterns  and  to  label  them.  As  a  consequence, 
everything we can name by listening is a pattern or better: it is a composite unit 
made of composing units that define it by changing some dimensions in the 
SIR.
Usually, in the grammar and the theory of the western music tradition, patterns 
are addressed differently according to the disciplines they are related to, such 
as harmony, form, analysis or the different instrumental practices. Sometimes 
discipline  specific  lexicons  are  so  separated  from  each  other,  that  it  may 
happen for a same word to be connected to completely different patterns, as it 
happens with the very ambivalent term “cadence”. “Pattern” itself, as we have 
seen, is sometimes used with different meanings in music, and therefore in 
music theory the word “schema” is often preferred to it.
Nevertheless,  schemas are usually referred to units that are in a given level 
within  the  composite  units  that  instantiate  the  “opus”  pattern  (Gjerdingen, 
1988). As I am dealing with the sound flow as a whole, patterns might be also 
present at higher levels of the “total personal sound flow” as well as, like we 
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will see soon, at levels that are lower than those dealt analytically by traditional 
notation.
We ultimately have patterns of all kinds. First of all, the named patterns that 
correspond,  in  case  of  music,  to  the  technical  terms  of  music  theory  and 
grammar. We could start, for example, from the biggest forms, with the highest 
number of levels, such as cyclical forms, and proceed to explore all the terms 
that define the sounding elements, which all together give rise to the final result  
of the cyclic form. From “expositions” to “metres”, to “themes”, “motivic cells”, 
“chords”.
Secondly,  we have  patterns  without  a  name,  which  are  in  most  cases  the 
instantiation  of  named  patterns:  themes  have  specific  roles  within  specific 
musical forms, but a specific theme is the typically unnamed melodic pattern 
that on one hand instantiates the theme pattern and on the other hand needs 
to be instantiated several  times within  the specific segment of  music,  as a 
requirement for being a theme. But from the point of view of the sound flow, 
not  all  the  specific  themes  are  instances  of  the  theme  pattern,  but  all  the 
specific themes that have been instantiated along the “total  personal sound 
flow”  are  connected  within  the  specific  music  works  in  which  they  are 
instantiated as composite units that instantiate the theme pattern. 
The  same  is  true  for  the  infinite  multitude  of  unnamed  accompaniment 
patterns,  such as the Alberti  Bass,  which populate the vast majority  of  the 
music works inside and outside the western tradition. However,  there is no 
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name for them as a general phenomenon, besides the simple and most general 
word “pattern” and some specific denominations that are related to specific 
genres,  such as  the “Amen break”  in  electronic  dance music,  “cascara”  in 
Salsa music and “Alberti Bass” in Classical period music.
I do not want to delve into the details here of an analysis of the different types 
of patterns in music and in the sound flow in general, as I am more interested 
in this context in proposing a general narrative that is open to composition and 
analysis, rather than in accomplishing the impossible and contradictory task of 
building a general theory of music. 
Nevertheless, I still would like to discuss a few interesting cases of patterns in 
order to deal with pattern objectification.
The first type of pattern is related to terms expressing basic elements that we 
are accustomed to taking for granted as primitive concepts, such as “note” 
and “timbre”. It is somehow unusual to express what we experience as a whole 
in terms of a composite unit, made by ordered components. But “if the listener 
is to correctly anticipate the progression of acoustical events, then she or he 
must  somehow  bracket  or  segregate  two  different  sets  of  expectations” 
(Huron, 2007, p.204). So, for example, it is often difficult to recognize the sound 
of  a  piano,  when represented by a  note played backwards.  In  general,  the 
recognition of musical instruments depends quite strongly on onset transients 
and on the temporal structure of the sound envelope. The research on sounds 
with temporally asymmetric envelopes has shown quite convincing results on 
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the  existence  of  patterns  that  act  under  our  threshold  of  consciousness. 
Listeners  were  presented  in  an  experiment  with  a  sine  wave  that  was 
modulated in amplitude by following an exponential function, in such a way 
that the final sound was presenting an abrupt raise (a “ramped” sound) or, in 
the backward version, a slow decay (a “dumped” sound).
The experimenter
reported that the ramped and damped sounds had different qualities. […] 
The damped sound was perceived as a single source rather like a drum 
roll  played on a hollow, resonant surface […]. The ramped sound was 
perceived as two sounds: a drum roll on a non-resonant surface […] and 
a continuous tone corresponding [to the sine wave]. (Moore, 1997, p.248)
We should not be surprised at the existence of unconscious patterns because 
our narrative of cognition cannot but be based on our narrative of the self, 
which is not capable of reaching the meta-position of the observer in order to 
detect what we are missing in our descriptions.
It is therefore almost inevitable that unconscious patterns, as the indicators of 
a  world  that  we  cannot  analyse  in  terms  of  articulated  experiences,  are 
constituted as objects/words, as a consequence of the misattribution effect, in 
such a way that it has become almost impenetrable by our analysis: it is not 
easy to think a note as a process instead of as a thing. 
When a pattern is objectified, it becomes available to enter different domains of 
descriptions. A note can be listened, written, played, read and all the actions 
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seem  to  share  the  sound,  the  notation  and  possibly  also  the  performing 
gesture as subsumed under the same word “note”. 
This ambiguity, which consists of the violation of the descriptive boundaries 
between domains of descriptions, is therefore a consequence of weakening the 
link  between  a  pattern  and  the  dimension  that  defines  it,  because  it  has 
entered the realm ruled by sensorimotor metaphors, the realm of objects.
But we have never exited such realm because, even if in the “isolation tank” 
mode we have  pretended to  act  as  an  “ear  without  body”,  we are  in  fact 
immersed in the synesthetic continuum, so that we might extend the idea of 
regions  of  modes  in  distinguishing  streams  of  senses,  according  to  the 
correspondence of simultaneous rhythms in different qualities of experience.
If we accept the narrative that enacts the separation of senses and turn to the 
relationship  between  visual  and  sonorous  rhythms,  identity (CR)  would 
therefore be entailed by distinctions in vision and sound matching with each 
other in time, so the two sensorial streams end up being connected as one 
sounding object. 
This multi-sensorial pattern is at the base of Chion’s idea of synchresis as “the 
spontaneous  and  irresistible  weld  produced  between  a  particular  auditory 
phenomenon  and  visual  phenomenon  when  they  occur  at  the  same  time” 
(Chion, 1994, p.63). 
Diversity (PRR) on the other hand results from non-matching distinctions in the 
two sensorial  streams,  so that the instances presented have no connection 
with each other.
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Finally,  difference  (SIR) connects the distinctions between the two sensorial 
streams as a composite unit made by the two ordered distinctions, in this way 
related with each other by an interpretation that depicts, for example, a causal 
correlation.
What  interests  me  here  is  that  objectification  is  directed  by  sensorial 
perception  as  a  whole  so  that  the  sound  pattern  is  directly  linked  to  the 
sensorimotor  phenomenic domain,  without  the need to go through a  sonic 
bounding process.  This  is  the case of  “naturalized”  sonic  patterns that  are 
labelled with reference to objects apprehended through other sensory modes 
such as vision.  We have seen in the beginning of the text how “timbre” in 
acoustic instrumental music is often described in terms of the instrument that 
produced it. It is also the case of objectified patterns such as “notes”. In the 
very moments they are dealt with, they are connected with visual-sensorimotor 
objects, such as the notational symbol or the instrument that plays them. 
This  is  ultimately  true  of  all  the  sounds  and  noises  that  are  normally  not 
considered  as  music,  unless  they  end  up  in  a  music  performance  of 
soundscape music, in which the audience has been convinced to discard their 
appearance  as  objects  in  the  world  to  become  what  they  already  were: 
interference patterns resulting from the process of distinguishing ourselves as 
a figure (a diversity) from a background (an identity).
In the process of being naturalized or objectified, sonic patterns have acquired 
an indexical property so that whenever I instantiate (in language, in vision or 
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other phenomenic domains) the objects connected to them, I can instantiate 
the  related  expected  sound  pattern  as  a  specific  anticipation,  that  is  “the 
subjective  experience  accompanying  a  strong  expectation  that  a  particular 
event will occur” (Huron, 2007, p.409). This communion between senses has 
been realized in the first place because sound and vision are part of a wider 
synesthetic continuum and therefore it is already there, connected with each 
other as two notes of a chord that we have (statistically) learned to expect.
The indexical relationship between object and sound is not that different from 
the ostensive gesture that associates a word to a specific action in the world. 
But a word is a sound pattern in the first place, which connects with other units 
that together form composite units and finally realize an entire pattern structure 
with  many possible levels  that  are  composed with rules,  that,  while having 
more  constraints  and  therefore  being  more  complicated  are  not  all  that 
different  from the  ways  that  we compose music.  In  the  context  of  pattern 
structures within the synesthetic continuum, a sentence can be described as a 
naturalized  pattern in  the sonic-sensorimotor  phenomenic domain,  which is 
connected with a pattern in another enacted sensorial domain in such a way 
that their discontinuity falls in the SIR, so that the connection between the two 
patterns is interpreted as an implication that we address as  meaning. In the 
history  of  our  exposition  to  language,  we  have  reached  such  a  strong 
habituation to the composite pattern made by the two sensorial patterns that 
we have objectified it and have started to think that the pattern in the sonic-
sensorimotor domain is identical to the pattern in the other enacted sensorial 
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domain, therefore evoked in the same way as, when we see a steam train, we 
can easily imagine its noise.
Music is ultimately not a language, but it is rather language that is built on the 
same matter music is made of. If language is a kind of music, it is therefore an 
objectified and naturalized one that we have forgotten to listen to as such, so 
that we rather direct ourselves towards its evoked ghosts of anticipations.
8.9 Meaning and emotion in listening
We have started, in Chapter 5, from a sound flow that was split by a well-
trained listener, although constrained as a “brain in a bowl”, in music emerging 
from the “noises” of a full theatre. Then we began a top-down path in which 
the listener  was shown as able to distinguish details  that  were increasingly 
miniscule  and  were  meant  to  show  the  pervasiveness  of  our  ability  to 
distinguish when it is well trained by a practice that is culturally situated. In 
Chapter  7,  we  followed  a  bottom-up  path  that,  moving  from  the  most 
elementary  experience  of  listening,  distinction,  engaged  a  constructive 
approach  in  order  to  build  increasingly  complex  experiences.  When  we 
introduced  the  pattern,  in  Chapter  8,  we  reached  the  tools  to  bring  that 
simplest  experience  of  distinction  to  account  for  the  complexity  of 
distinguishing  a  world  of  sounds  in  the  sonic  flow and,  in  perspective,  to 
distinguish a world of objects in the synesthetic continuum. 
At this point, I would like to take a step back from and dedicate a few words on 
how the narrative I proposed deals with musical meaning. Before doing this, I 
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need to summarize some important steps in the history of the discussion about 
the semantics of music. In fact, this topic has always been one of the most 
debated problems in the history of discourses about music, almost as if the 
music’s sonorous sister, that is natural language, was always trying to impose 
on music its logocentric version of naturalization by looking for some possible 
referent that could be linked to verbal descriptions of listening experiences, or 
to the terms of music theory and notation.
This  is  still  true  today,  with  the  introduction  of  a  more  culturally  oriented 
musicology,  the  so-called  “new  musicology”,  and  the  consequent 
fragmentation of musicological research in pursuing local contexts as rooted in 
social  structures  and leading to a  possible  premature death  of  a  theory  of 
music in place of a sociology of music.
On the other hand, the criticism has pointed out that the assumption according 
to which the 
social  structure  has  some  kind  of  objective  existence,  which  is 
represented through homology with the patterns of music […], giving in 
this way the “impression that social meaning is inherent in music [should 
be supported by an investigation on] how particular pieces of music might 
support particular meanings, and indeed whether there are constraints on 
the meaning that any particular piece can support (Cook, 2001, p.173), 
that is by a general theory of musical meaning. 
In  fact  there  are  at  least  three  reasons  to  discuss  the  status  of  musical  
meaning,  the  first  one  being  that  music,  as  early  as  the  beginning  of  the 
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musicological tradition in the half of the 19th century, has been regarded as a 
strictly formal phenomenon, as we shall see, in spite of the opposite popular 
belief.
Secondarily, 
common  sense  often  assumes  the  production  of  meaning  in  verbal 
language as an appropriate model, while it  is rather obvious that,  with 
respect to such a restrictive definition of meaning, music is not something 
that ‘speaks’. Finally, even in case we can admit that a certain musical 
work  has  a  ‘meaning’  or  is  characterized  by  intersections  of  different 
meanings, these appear to be too evanescent and fluid to deserve a place 
at  the  same level  of  direct  constitutive  elements  of  music.  (translated 
from: Nattiez, 2002, p.206)
If we examine how musical meaning has been dealt with from the historical 
point  of  view,  we  can  easily  notice  that  since  the  very  beginning  of  the 
discussion  around  music,  musical  aesthetics  seemed  to  oscillate  between 
“conceptions  centred  on  music  in  itself,  that  privileges  its  autonomy,  and 
conceptions that emphasize it  as a carrier  of  extrinsic meaning” (translated 
from: Nattiez, 2002, p.206).
On one hand, according to Pythagoras, 
music is the shadow of numbers and there is a certain correspondence 
between the harmony of universe and the harmony of music [so that,] as 
the soul is also harmony and numerical ratio, music can similarly influence 
and purify it. (translated from: Nattiez, 2002, p.208)
On the other hand, Plato, while maintaining the continuity with the pre-Socratic 
Pythagorean tradition, limited himself 
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at discussing [the] ethic and aesthetic character [of music] and its role in 
the paideia, the Greek education; for Plato, music was considered more a 
(perhaps pleasurable) threat than a virtue for a healthy society. (Oliveira 
and others, 2005, p.46)
Plato’s  concerns  are  mainly  addressed  to  connecting   music  with  social 
behaviour, which thus becomes, so to speak, its reference, even if a theory of 
meaning was defined only half a century after his death. But if musical meaning 
is  implicitly  or  explicitly  involved  in  almost  any  work  about  music  and 
philosophy,  we have to wait  until  the 17th century to have the first  explicit  
debate about music relata. The reference is now changed from ethos to text, 
and this is also due to a change of the social role of music, together with the 
exceptional importance that was granted to vocal music, as a consequence of 
its usage within the rites of Christianity.
This debate opposes the followers of  the so-called  seconda prattica  to the 
followers of the prima prattica. 
For old composers, who were all  polyphonists and were faithful  to the 
traditional  laws  of  counterpoint,  the  text  was  meant  to  be  just  an 
occasion,  or  at  most  a  cold  structural  platform,  for  polyphonic 
composition; for modern composers,  both in the context of polyphony 
and monody, each compositive choice - even the most transgressive one 
-  should  have  been  absolutely  determined  by  poetical  content. 
(Translated from: La Via, 2007, p.31)
When  the  most  important  function  of  music  was  to  provide  a  support  for 
sacred texts, the main concern in dealing with words was clarity, in order to 
support faith. And this was true also, in spite of the cases that did not fulfil  
such request, as in the polytextual motet.
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Once set free from dogma, the texts on which music was still mainly based 
started to demand to be accompanied by a music that was able to follow their 
content in order to enhance their expression.
La  Camerata de’  Bardi,  just  a few decades before the debate between the 
pratiche, develops an explanation for the connection between music and text, 
that relies on Plato and claims that the 
power of music to arouse the human emotion lays in the representations, 
by  melody,  of  human  speaking  voice  when  expressing  the  various 
emotions. (Kivy, 2002, p.17)
 
Ironically, the problem of following the text when composing music was drawn 
to  public  attention,  meaning  that  it  was  no  more  under  the  decree  of  the 
Church, just at the point that vocal music started to give way to instrumental 
music, where the problem lost direct relevance.
With the dismissal of text as responsible for a reference to music, the only 
candidate left  in the equation,  so to speak,  was emotion.  But first  of  all,  a 
theory was needed that would justify  the position of  music within fine arts, 
under  the  criterion  of  representation,  now  that  text  had  been  side-lined.  
The first attempt to found a new paradigm can be traced to Kant’s “Critiques of 
Judgment”, according to which music, with its representational content, is still  
included in the realm of fine arts, but it is “unable to excite a chain of aesthetic  
ideas by engaging the free play of the imagination and understanding” (Kivy, 
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2002,  p.59)  because  it  is  addressed  only  to  the  body,  in  the  form  of  its 
expressive properties, namely emotions.
From then on, music offered itself as the art of emotions. It was no longer in 
connection with cosmos and man through numerical ratios, no more mundana, 
but  rather  humana,  to  the  point  of  being  considered  a  secondary  art  that, 
according to Kant, was closer to ornamentation than to painting. But at the 
same time,  and thanks to its distance from the aim of  representing earthly 
objects, music is attuned to emotions and asked to represent as a “copy” of 
the will (according to Schopenhauer).
The  privileged  connection  between  music  and  emotions  received  its  first 
aesthetic  strike  only  in  1854,  in  the  form of  a  little  book  by  the  Viennese 
musician and music critic  Eduard Hanslick,  Vom Musikalisch-Schönen,  who 
earned the role of  representing a whole legacy of  musicologists and music 
theorists who wanted to recover the other pole of music thinking, which  took 
the name of formalism after Hanslick. 
In short, Hanslick’s thesis was that the ability of music to evoke emotions is 
just a collateral feature because:
a perfectly expressed musical idea is already an autonomous beautiful, it 
is its own purpose and not just a means or a material used to represent 
feelings and thoughts.  The content  of  music is  forms put  into  motion  
through sounds. (Hanslick, 1891, p.32)
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In  a  certain  respect,  by  refusing  the  idea  that  music  can  have  a  precise 
emotional content, Hanslick seems to turn his back on centuries of confidence 
in  the semantic  possibilities  of  music,  including vocal  music.  On the  other 
hand, his work has been interpreted as directing the reference of  music to 
music itself (what Meyer calls “inclusive meaning” and Nattiez calls “intrinsic 
meaning”) instead of directing it to elements of different nature (the “referential” 
or “extrinsic” meaning). Nevertheless, Hanslick’s ideas seemed to anticipate 
the musical formalism that became an important feature of 20th century music,  
from Schoenberg (who claimed music speaks in its own language made of 
mere  musical  matters)  to  Varèse,  Webern  and  Stravinskij  (who  held  that 
expression was never immanent to music). 
Leonard  Meyer  tried  to  mediate  between  the  two  tendencies,  starting  by 
articulating the positions of theorists with respect to the music reference as 
“absolutists” (those who insist that musical meaning lies exclusively within the 
context  of  the  work itself)  and  “referentialists”  (those  who contend that,  in 
addition  to  such  abstract  intellectual  meanings,  music  also  communicates 
meanings that in a certain way refer to the extra-musical world of concepts, 
actions, emotional states and character”).
 One  the  other  hand  we  have  formalism  (musical  meaning  is  primarily 
intellectual) and expressionism (musical meaning is primarily emotional). These 
four categories create a square of possibilities among which Meyer chooses for 
himself  the  position  of  an  absolutistic  expressionism.
268
Emotions are present, but they are generated by the formal structure of music. 
The  question  is:  are  we  still  talking  about  emotions?  Meyer  relies  on  a 
behaviouristic  update  of  John  Dewey’s  theory  of  emotion  when  he  states, 
“emotion  of  affect  is  aroused  when  a  tendency  to  respond  is  arrested  or 
inhibited”  (Meyer,  1956,  p.14).  Moreover,  he  claims  the  existence  “of 
intangibles, non referential affective states experienced in response to music” 
(Meyer, 1956, p.20). 
In the context of this text, I prefer to characterize the debate around musical 
meaning  in  terms  of  “objectivism”,  which  looks  for  musical  meaning  in  an 
abstraction of the measurable properties of a neutral level such as the score or 
the sound recording; and “experientialism” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980), which 
relies on experience in terms of the description of the experience of listening.
A third tendency has emerged more recently that is usually traced back to 
Adorno. The claim that music 
presents social problems through its own material and according to its 
own formal laws lies at the heart of his approach; Music contains these 
problems within  itself  in  the innermost  cells  of  its  technique.  (Adorno, 
2006, p.393) 
According to Cook, as the tensions and contradictions of society are defined 
as technical problems, then social meaning can be decoded by the appropriate 
analysis  of  musical  texts.  While  it  must  be  pointed  out  that  Adorno  never 
ceased  emphasizing  the  autonomy  of  art  in  the  dialectical 
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opposition/integration  of  autonomous  work  and  social  context,  the 
development of his ideas within the analysis of musical works, especially in the 
context of what was named “new musicology”, have often been criticized for 
letting an ideological view surpass the musical text. And in fact, the paths of 
study around musical meaning can be mutually exclusive to the point that, as 
highlighted by Cook, there may be no reference to the research in one direction 
in research that follows another direction (Cook, 2001 p.176). Cook himself, in 
his article “Theorizing Musical Meaning” omitted entirely research following the 
“experientialist” path.
In the end, if  objectivism  relies on the score, while  experientialism relies on 
subjective experiences of looking for meaning, we have a third direction, that 
considers both the neutral levels of music and the experience of listening as 
entangled in social practices, so that, in semiotic terms, music semantics has 
to be looked for in the pragmatics. But when we take the perspective of the 
ontogenetic constitution of  the synesthetic continuum in the “total  personal 
pattern  structure”  possibly  objectified  and  sensorimotor-visually  coupled 
(meaning that it has been naturalized) on some levels, there is no place for an 
ontology of meaning. In fact we need to take “meaning” out of a hyperuranic 
world with no space and time, and bring it back to the “praxis of living” in order 
to realize that “meaning” is a rhetorical device, an objectified pattern, that we 
involve when describing a specific action to which we are highly habituated. 
This action, as I said earlier, consists of filling an objectified composite unit that 
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is realized by a pair of units in different phenomenic domains, one of which is 
missing,  with  a  specific expectation  of  the missing instance in  the form of 
anticipation. This action is not necessary,  so it  is not realized whenever we 
meet such an incomplete unit: we do not necessarily have to imagine the noise 
of a train whenever we see one. But we can engage the anticipation, whenever 
we need it. The same can be said about language; and when we talk about 
meaning  we  are  always  talking  about  language.  But  meaning  in  terms  of 
anticipation is not always present in language: on the contrary they are there 
only when that specific action is required by the context. On the other hand, 
syntax is almost always present as the rules of connecting words, as patterns, 
within a complex system of liberties and constraints.
Again, meaning in terms of an act of anticipation is eminently related to the 
sounding instances we use to describe our experiences of listening. But, if we 
can definitely connect some instances in the music flow to instances in some 
other phenomenic domain, such as the vision of the performer outside of the 
need to deal with listening experiences through description, we mostly do not 
rely on verbal connections with aural experiences in our social interactions, at 
least if we are not musicians.
Therefore,  in  the  context  of  my  narrative  there  is  no  difference  between 
semantics  and  pragmatics:  this  can  instead  be  found  in  the  domains  of 
description  that  are  involved  in  dealing  with  the  experience  of  listening  in 
language.  As  a  consequence,  music  does  not  need  the  idea  of  meaning, 
because, the experiences of listening do not need language in the first place. 
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As  Huron  has  shown,  emotional  responses  merely  need  a  system  of 
expectation to reveal themselves. Music does not necessarily need to rely on 
words to stimulate emotional responses because the system of expectations, 
with its related emotional connections, articulates and evolves along the whole 
“total personal sound flow”. Moreover, music does not exist per se: it is always 
involved in a certain type of patterns, habits and rules that necessarily connect 
it to experiences in other sensorial domains, and to verbal descriptions that 
come from social interaction with their own repertory of emotional responses.
It is therefore difficult to detach the experience of listening from descriptions 
that  involve  metaphors,  objectification  and  ultimately  the  naturalized 
constraints and liberties, the ontology that we have built during our entire life. 
Nevertheless, we can deal with them by engaging an explanatory description 
or a narrative, as I am trying to do with my research, which may help us to get 
rid of the objectification, on one hand, by means of proper distinction of the 
domain of discourses, and of naturalization on the other hand, by means of the 
reintroduction of the subject in our discourses, in order to possibly escape the 
processes of subjection and engage non linguistic practices of listening and 
sounding.
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9. CODA: NOISE PATTERNS 
In  this  final  section  of  the  second part,  I  would  like  to  address  a  specific 
listening case that can be approached in terms of the proposed narrative. 
Let’s modulate in frequency a sine wave centred at 440 Hz, with a random 
signal that continuously interpolates random values that are chosen with the 
frequency of, let say, 500 Hz. When we slowly increase the range of random 
values  so  that  the  frequency  of  the  sine  wave is  stable  at  440  Hz at  one 
extreme and changes randomly between 1 and 1000 Hz at the other extreme, 
what we hear is a crossfade between the sine wave and some coloured noise, 
instead of hearing a continuous transformation between a sine and a noise. 
The problem arises because we can distinguish two overlapping streams in the 
middle of the process instead of just one—the sine wave and the noise—in 
spite  of  the  fact  that  the  process  of  synthesis  only  addresses  one  sound 
stream, the modulated sine. The perceptive illusion, so to speak, is relevant 
because at  slower  frequencies of  random generation,  let  us say at  200 Hz 
instead of 500, the transformation process is perceived as a continuous and 
unitary one. At no point  is there the impression of  hearing two overlapping 
sound identities.
Before  going  into  the  details  of  analysis,  it  is  important  to  distinguish  the 
different definitions of “noise”, so that we can properly address the problem.
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According to Nattiez (1990, pp.47-48), the word “noise” typically relates to any 
sound  that  shows  an  unpleasant,  unacceptable  character,  whatever  that 
means to us. This is indeed a definition that is in the first place based on a 
subjective uncontrollable sensation that is related to thresholds of tolerance 
and can lead to physical suffering. We can therefore say that it is a vegetative26 
use that  is  often informally  expressed as an opposition between  noise and 
sound. Nattiez also mentions the case “in which certain sounds accepted as 
‘musical’ by the composer are classified as ‘unpleasant’ by the listener (1990, 
p.46)”. We might say that the unpleasantness of noise is connected here to 
sentences like “this doesn’t say anything to me, it’s not music: it’s noise”. If a 
sound “doesn’t  say  anything  to  me”,  I  can  only  relate  it  to  the  cause  the 
produced it. In this case,  noise seems to therefore be connected to what we 
called in Section 5.2 the extrinsic meaning of a sonic event, which frames the 
sonic event as the effect of some cause, as opposed to the intrinsic one, which 
is rather related to the appreciation of sonic properties and relationships, as it 
typically  happens  with  a  music  work.  As  being  connected  to  judgments 
regarding the appropriateness of describing a sonic event or even a concert 
performance as music, we can characterize the use of the word “noise” as a 
semantic one, in  which noise is opposed to  music. While this second use is 
often conjoined with the first one, it is not necessarily a consequence of it.
We now encounter two technical usages: the first one originally comes from 
electrical engineering, but is also widely used in information theory and signal 
26The term “vegetative”, as in the “vegetative system”, is here used to address the 
uncontrollable and instincual character of the unpleasantness of noise
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processing,  while  the  second  one  is  mainly  applied  within  the  branch  of 
physics that studies sound, namely acoustics. As the two definitions may share 
a  lot,  mostly  due  to  the  fact  the  acoustic  measurements  are  realized  by 
electronic devices, we will focus on the differences between the two usages. 
According  to  the  first  technical  definition,  noise is  “any  interfering  signal 
adversely affecting the communication of the clean signal” (Dorf, 2000, p.406). 
This  means  that  noise is  opposed  to  signal and  has  to  be  considered 
connected to the intention of transferring a “clean signal” between an emitter 
and a receiver. We can thus consider this definition to be a  finalistic one. On 
the other hand, acoustics, in the attempt to be consistent with the related field 
of  architectural  acoustics,  explicitly  defines  noise in  terms of  a  subjectively 
unpleasant noise (Nattiez, 1990, p.47), but it often takes for granted that noise 
can usually be described in terms of oscillations that occur in a statistically 
aleatoric way (or in the corresponding terms of a continuous spectrum). By 
following  Nattiez  (1990,  p.47),  we  attain  a  physical definition  that  opposes 
noise to  sound as aperiodic versus periodic variations in the pressure of an 
elastic medium such as the air.
Among the different usages of the word noise, from the psychological one, to 
the semantic one, from the finalistic one to the physical one, the only definition 
that  is  not  depending  on  a  context,  be  it  social,  cultural,  psychological  or 
intentional that is related to the listener is the last  one.  Noise or  better the 
phenomenon  that  represents  it  at  best,  white  noise,  is  the  way  we  label 
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something that is physically measured as the most irregular variation of sound. 
So,  white noise is the most variable sound event and yet we have an aural 
experience of it as quite stable. How is this possible?
There is a simple answer. In white noise there is something that is statistically 
stable, at least to a certain extent: the spectrum. This is decoded by passing 
through  the  non-linear  peculiarities  of  cochlear  organic  processing  and  is 
transmitted to the brain by the organ of corti, with its hair cells. Nevertheless, 
we do not really have a direct experience of the spectrum, as this is essentially 
a mathematical abstraction. Moreover, as we have seen, the information of the 
sound pressure wave is maintained by the internal ear and is also transmitted 
to the brain, so, even if we accept the connection between the description of 
an experience of listening and the physiological measurements of the auditory 
system, there is not a direct and easy link from the variations of the air pressure 
to the experience of it.
According to  the definition  of  pattern,  the acoustic  event  of  white  noise is 
something that we can recognize by comparing the memory of a previously 
experienced white noise event with what we are listening to in the present. But 
what do we recognize when we listen to two samples of white noise? If we 
choose to rely entirely on the experience of the sound flow, we can answer that 
the high statistical dispersion of unconscious expectation is what characterizes 
the perceptive statistical dimension related to the white noise event, in contrast 
not  only  to  sound,  but  also  to  other  events  that  are  related  to  different 
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probability distributions such as coloured noise. Yet, the duration of the single 
instances  must  be  very  short  because  if  we  reduce  the  frequency  of  the 
random generator  from 500  Hz  to  100  Hz  the  specific  sensation  of  noise 
transforms into  something completely  different:  in  a  sort  of  fast  chirp.  This 
means that in order to recognize a coloured noise the instances need to vary 
within  the  statistical  range  that  defines  the  colour,  at  least  every  two 
thousandths of second.
Of course, it is very difficult to find in the vocabulary connected to listening 
experiences a dimension that is supposed to be distinguished at a speed that 
is  definitely  not  only  under  the  threshold  for  distinguishing  two successive 
attacks, but also under the threshold for detecting pitch.
It  seems therefore that the perception of (unconscious) patterns is engaged 
with very fast clocks, so that the sensation of coloured noise can be related to 
the  distinction  of  a  composite  unit,  whose components  fall  in  the CR in  a 
unnameable dimension that we could call  the  click  or  impulse  dimension, a 
dimension  in  which  we  cannot  distinguish  anything  but  a  gestaltic  quality, 
related to variations of a continuous spectrum. But we can assume that this 
very fast succession of distinctions is likely always present, as the surface level 
on which all the dimensions, all the pattern structures, are built and learned.
As a consequence, the experience of a cross-fade between a pitched stream 
and  a  noise  stream  can  be  interpreted  in  terms  of  a  PRR  of  a  statistical 
dimension because we can split the sound continuum in shorter instances, so 
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that  not  only  a  very  fast  succession  of  instances  is  thinkable,  but  even  a 
statistical dimension that, due to their statistical character, needs to involve the 
instantiation of several sub-units can foster distinctions.
The transition that we experience as a cross-fade is therefore describable as 
the PRR alternation of instances of a statistical dimension that capture large 
random  deviations  from  the  centre  frequency  and  instances  of  the  same 
dimension that are strict enough to capture small random deviations. As we 
can observe from Jones’ map of perceptive regions, at very fast speeds close 
to  that  of  the  impulse  dimension,  PRR  is  engaged  even  with  small 
discontinuities, so that the description of the experienced cross-fade between 
sine wave and noise in terms of a PRR seems viable. The perception of the 
centre frequency as a stream is ultimately the signature of a cognitive process 
that tries to maximize expectations events at very fast unconscious rates of 
distinction.
Finally, starting from the idea of a multi layered pattern structure of distinctions 
based on statistic dimensions and turning to the phenomenon of white noise, 
we can extend our observations to higher levels of pattern structure that are 
realized by low degrees of precise expectations.
In the end, the sonic identity of white noise seems to be characterized through 
the idea of the indistinct. At the lowest level of the pattern structure we do not 
even detect discontinuities, but on higher levels, the indistinct implies that we 
cannot distinguish the patterns that populate the lower levels of the structure 
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from each other. For example, if we listen to our heartbeat we can detect the 
typical repeating pattern of two close beats, but usually we are not able to find 
strong differences between each repetition of the pattern, unless we devote a 
pretty strong effort to this task. But as soon our attention fades, we quickly get 
used to it until we no longer hear it, unless we enter an anechoic room and the 
heartbeat again claims its presence in our sonic world. This happens for sonic 
events that have a constant presence, such as computer fans, the buzz of the 
alternate  current  or  the  noise  of  a  stream  of  water  we  live  nearby,  what 
Schaffer calls in his analysis of soundscape a keynote sound (Schafer, 1977).
This happens for everything that falls in the CR for long enough in some level of 
the pattern structure. Therefore, the utmost unpredictability of white noise on 
higher levels becomes the utmost unpredictability of certain patterns that need 
to be defined by statistical dimensions. Let’s consider traffic noise. It may be 
highly variable in the sonic content and it is unpredictable because its structure 
depends on the highly unpredictable structure of life: we cannot usually predict 
what  vehicle  will  pass  through  the  street  at  any  given  moment  and which 
precise sonic event it will produce with its engine. And we don’t care. But we 
can easily recognize the noise of a car, and we also know sound patterns like 
an accelerating car and the screeching of the brakes very well. Some people 
even develop the ability to recognize particular car or motorbike models by 
their sound and the engine noise can even become “music” for them. 
However, the statistical character I addressed to deal with the experience of 
“noise” is not only typical of acoustically noisy events: the same happens for 
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pitched sounds as well, as in the case of people talking in another room or with 
the sound produced by a drove of oxen with their cowbells. 
In general, these unpredictable layers of the sonic flow are put in the listening 
background and labelled as noise. And this term is more appropriate than it 
may seem at first, exactly because, as with white noise, the experience of the 
very  low  degrees  of  precise  expectations  of  these  sound  textures  is  a 
perceptive  dimension  that  falls  in  the  CR  of  the  pattern  structure.  It  only 
happens  in  higher  levels  of  the  structure  than  the  ones  involved  in 
distinguishing white noise. This is the domain of the indistinct with its character 
of  “predictable  unpredictability”,  which  corresponds  to  what  we  called  the 
extrinsic meaning of sound events, which is extrinsic merely because the only 
criterion of expectancy we possess, as a cultural practice, is demanded by real 
life contingencies. This case seems to express the semantic meaning of noise, 
that is something that does not say anything to us, apart from its functional  
extrinsic relationship with the object that produced it. 
On the other hand, music is “organized sound” that concedes to us higher 
degrees  of  structured  possible  expectations;  it  is  what  deserves  a  proper 
attention and allows a satisfying relationship between expectations and results. 
This is what is said to exhibit intrinsic meaning.
When something that we are not used to conceding our “intrinsic” attention to 
claims its right to resound in front of our ears, we feel easily daunted: not only 
for  the  effort  of  putting  attention  where  we  are  not  used  to,  but  also, 
sometimes,  for  the  indignation  of  doing  it.  This  is  not  only  the  case  of  a 
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psychological definition of noise, but also, for example, the motivation for the 
audience’s sounding opposition during the contemporary music concerts of 
the last century. And this is due to the fact that noise is often considered as the 
opposite  of  the  signal,  we  are  mentioning  here  the  finalistic definition: 
something that has to be eradicated in order to devote our attention entirely to 
something that somebody else, the emitter, decided worthy of consideration.
Finally, no wonder that noise, both present in the lower levels of the pattern 
structure as noise sample, in the higher levels as soundscape or in the many 
other possible forms has been charged with a subversive character (Nechtaval, 
2011). Noise always challenges us to cognitively break it down in patterns, in a 
process that subtracts noise from the naturalized world that surrounds us, in 
order to increase the consciousness of what we take for granted, in a never-
ending path of statistical learning. But whatever we do to contain the lack of 
sense, noise will always be there, to remind us that there is always something 
that was left out of our patterns.
281
282
PART 3
MUSIC
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10. ANALYSIS
10.1 Esthesic analysis
Much water has flowed under the bridge since the first attempts to investigate 
music listening. Since its very beginning, the analysis of  listening has been 
linked to music and driven by the assumption that listening par excellence is 
conducted by tracing the composer’s imagery in terms of traditional musical 
concepts. If starting from 1874, the year that marks the very first musicological 
research explicitly dedicated to listening, by Riemann (2010), the analysis of 
both music and listening was conducted by the traditional music system with 
its notation, at least since 1959, with Besseler’s classic book (1993), we are 
accustomed to considering listening in terms of a reception that is not only 
culturally  and  historically  dependent,  but  also  individually  modulated  by 
circumstances and intentions. 
However,  it  is  only  since  1966  that  it  has  been  possible  to  pursue  an 
investigation around a possible grammar of listening, to be used with music, 
independently  from  the  technical  and  notational  practices  related  to  its 
institutional aspects. With Pierre Schaeffer (1966), listening reached a sort of 
independence  from  what  we  could  call  the   academic  dictatorship  of 
composition  and  performance  and  was  finally  able  to  follow  John  Cage’s 
famous claim about the independence of composing, listening and performing 
from each other (Cage, 1961, p.15).
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Schaeffer’s  research  was  indeed  the  inevitable  consequence  of  the 
technological  and  technical  development  of  music  production,  that,  by  no 
longer being based on traditional notation, could not but appeal to an analysis 
of listening in order to recover the objectivity, that was lost together with the 
materiality of the score.
In this respect, the most important achievement in technologically driving the 
process of listening is Pierre Schaeffer’s concept of reduced listening, framed, 
as many of Schaeffer’s concepts, as one pole of an opposition whose other 
side is “ordinary” listening. Reduced listening is an attitude of “listening to the 
sound for its own sake […] by removing its real or supposed source and the 
meaning it may convey” (Chion, 1983, p.30).
The  act  of  removing all  our  habitual  references  in  listening is  a  willed and 
artificial  act  (a sort  of  phenomenological  reduction)  that allows us to clarify 
many phenomena implicit in our perception. That's why reduced listening has 
to be learned as a process of “deconditioning” from “ordinary” listening, with 
exercises and the possible help of technology.
Listening repeatedly to fragments, sections or to a whole piece of music may 
indeed work as  a  sort  of  a magnifying glass:  the interplay  of  memory  and 
attention puts in the background what we can already predict, the higher CR 
levels, and focuses on changes in the details, the SIR levels.
Schaeffer’s analysis by listening is directed, as is already clear from the title of 
his  “Traité”,  to  detect  sound  objects  within  the  frame  of  their  internal 
components, and their  function as components of  bigger structures,  as the 
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result of the practice of the so-called typomorphology. This could be already a 
problem, because there are as many objects as the number of ways in which 
we can distinguish them. Therefore, a selection has to be made and this is 
already an aesthetic statement.  No wonder that, as Nattiez observes (1990, 
p.95),  Schaeffer’s  objects  seem  to  be  relevant  mainly  in  strategies  of 
composition,  as  “they  do  not  emanate  from the  perspective  of  habituated 
ordinary  hearing,  which  Schaeffer  himself  favours  as  very  different  from 
specialized hearing”.  And in  the end,  Schaeffer’s  “Traité” is  therefore  more 
similar to a handbook of composition than to a research on listening.
As the one who brought Schaeffer’s work to the English-speaking world, it is 
worth mentioning Denis Smalley, who studied in France with the pioneer of 
concrete music, Francois Bayle. 
In  his  famous  article  “Spectromorphology  and  the  structuring  process”, 
Smalley (1986) introduces an important shift to Schaeffer’s system under the 
name  of  spectromorphology,  claiming  it  as  an  improvement.  In  the  whole 
article there is no referral  to the notion of intention or to  reduced listening. 
Neither there is an intensive use of the word “object”, often substituted by the 
word “unit”, and when it is present, the concept of “object” is not defined and 
it is taken for granted.
There is not even a trace of some sort of typomorphology. Rather, a different 
taxonomy is proposed that uses acoustical analysis to expand the “terminology 
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of qualitative descriptions in order to deal more comprehensively with aspects 
of spectral space” (Smalley, 1997, p.119).
While  appealing  for  the  need  to  refer  to  the  listening  experience,  Smalley 
always  clings  to  the  visual  paradigm  of  the  spectrum  as  it  appears  in 
sonograms, and to words and concepts that come directly from acoustics. In 
this  respect,  his  work,  while  very  important  for  the  electroacoustic  music 
analysis, is not entirely relevant to the issue of an analysis by listening.
Almost  a  decade  after  Schaeffer’s  classic,  Jean  Molino’s  semiotic  model 
(Nattiez,  1990)  succeeded  in  restoring  a  semantic  independence  between 
composing and listening, by characterizing the production of meaning in terms 
of strategies depending on social and cultural roles.
His semiotic tripartition changes the direction of the arrow, which in the classic 
model of communication proposed by Shannon and Weaver, used to directly 
connect  the  sender  to  the  receiver  in  one  direction.  Molino  breaks  the 
communication arrow into two connectors that, starting from the two exemplar 
typologies  of  actors  involved  in  the  process  of  musical  signification,  the 
composer and the listener, point to the score as a neutral level of semiosis. The 
unity of signification, which in the classic model was related to the optimization 
of the coded transmission of messages through ether, is therefore lost in two 
strategies  of  signification,  at  least.  A poietic  strategy  is  directed  to  the 
construction of the material, and therefore  neutral, element, the score or the 
support  containing  the  sound  data,  according  to  meaningful  practices.  An 
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esthesic strategy is, on the other hand, directed to the articulation the process 
of listening, as inserted in meaningful social practices.
But what can be told about a music work, by an esthesical analysis, if each 
listener  is  different  from all  the  others  and  the  analysis  does  not  want  to 
privilege a particular one over all the possible ways of listening, the correctness 
of  which is  certified by an homogeneous set  of  listeners,  such as the one 
composed by  musicians and musicologists?  Nattiez  himself  has  expressed 
some doubts about  the epistemological  value of esthesical  analysis and he 
often turned himself to the analysis of specific works in terms of their  neutral  
levels, by following a paradigmatic analysis of score fragments.
As a possible solution, François Delalande proposed to open music listening to 
a taxonomy of “conducts” (conduits musicales)27,  addressing analysis to the 
adaptive reactions of listeners in responding to sound, as strategic behaviours 
that are capable of driving the listening practices and engaging, for example, 
emphatic, figurative or taxonomic listening (Delalande, 1993).
Specifically, taxonomic listening, defined as the segmentation “on the fly” of a 
sound flow during listening, seems, as noted by Stéphane Roy (Roy, 2003), to 
resemble a practice that was introduced by Schaeffer in his treatise, under the 
name of gestaltic or morphological listening. 
27We have already met Delalande’s “conducts” when we were dealing with the references of a 
theory of listening in Section 3.5, where it is possible to find definition by the author. 
289
This  consists  in  the  search  for  perceptive  units,  which  are  hierarchically 
organized  by  the  repeated  reduced listening  of  some  music  fragments. 
According  to  Roy,  gestaltic  listening has  the  potential  to  base  an 
epistemological value of an analysis by listening. Otherwise said: appealing to 
a  conduct  that  is  directed  to  the  distinction  of  perceptive  (gestaltically 
determined)  units  in  the  sound  flow  might  be  able  to  found  an  analytical 
discourse on music listening that is shareable. This is because it can connect 
the  detected  units  to  their  trace  in  the  neutral  level.  On  the  other  hand, 
Delalande is sceptical of the possibility for a repeated and fragmented listening 
such as the reduced one, which is therefore extremely skilled and directed, to 
detect those elements that are pertinent to listening as a live social practice 
and are therefore detected, for example, by occasional listeners.
In  the  end,  both  Delalande and Nattiez,  who focuses  on the  musicological 
consequences  of  Molino’s  semiotics,  relate  the  analysis  in  terms  of  the 
esthesic process to the information gathered from listeners’ answers to the 
experimenter’s questions. In particular, the investigation of music conducts is 
drawn on a maximum of three listening sessions (Delalande, 1993, p.193). As a 
consequence  of  such  a  provisional  relationship  with  the  music  work,  the 
adherence  with  the  text  is  likely  to  be  lost.  Consequently,  the  object  of 
research  seems  to  be  more  the  analysis  of  listening,  than  the  analysis  by 
listening.  For  example,  an  interesting  problem  is  related  to  how  much  a 
listening strategy changes depending on the number of times it is applied to 
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the same work. In fact, as soon as a conduct goal has reached a satisfying 
threshold,  any subsequent  application  of  the same conduct  might  result  in 
deviating the listening to secondary goals,  such as the memorization of the 
work  (a  goal  that  Delalande  only  assigns  to  the  taxonomical conduct). 
Moreover,  music conducts seem to rely too much on a cultural concept, the 
one of music, in such a way that when dealing for example with soundscape or 
background music genres, the number of detected conducts might increase in 
an  unpredictable  way  and  their  targets  might  fade  from  music  to  all  the 
possible targets that are addressed by listening in our general “praxis of living” 
(in Maturana’s terms).
The idea of sound pattern may suggest an alternative approach in a listening 
strategy directed to music analysis than Schaeffer’s and Smalley’s search of a 
sound  vocabulary  of  objects/words.  If  we  focus  reduced  listening on 
discontinuities, instead of on objectified “bounded” patterns, we may avoid the 
constructive appeal of poietics on one hand, and the arbitrariness of individual 
conducts on the other hand. At the same time, the structure of discontinuities 
in levels, whether nested or not, emerges spontaneously without privileging a 
level for objects. That is because a discontinuity in one parameter (as a set of 
perceptive  qualities  that  can  be  related  to  a,  not  necessarily  strict,  order 
structure) immediately qualifies what is there before and after it, as continuities 
in that parameter, which in turn can be further distinguished by discontinuities 
in another parameter or minor discontinuities in the same parameter.
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In the terms of Mari-Riess Jones’ labels for discriminative regions, an esthesic  
analysis of a work might therefore consist in the detection of: the elements that 
are  relevant  to  break  down  the  work  in  a  multi-layered  structure  (i.e.  the 
dimensions that change in the SIR); the elements that characterize the work as 
a chunk that is distinguished from what is there is before and after it in the 
sound flow (i.e. the dimensions that change in the CR); and, if pertinent, the 
elements that are useful to distinguish the work in streams (with changes in the 
PRR).
First  of  all,  it  is  evident  that  detecting discontinuities  by listening might  be 
arbitrarily driven. For this reason, the adherence to the neutral level, is always 
necessary: a change must always be linked to something in the score or in 
some acoustical analysis of the sound flow, that may lead to the instantiation 
of that change, in any parameter at any degree of complexity, in the sound 
flow. Therefore, if a perceived change in the recording of a music work cannot 
be  traced  back  to  any  element  of  the  score  (according  to  its 
semiographic/semiotic  status),  it  must  be  referred  to  something  else,  as 
background activity that does not need to be accounted in a strict analysis of a 
music work, such as the unwanted creaking of a musician’s chair. The same 
guiding  role  can  be  given  to  other  traces,  such  as  the  spectrogram,  the 
sonogram or the sound wave data, which represent the objective material side 
of a music work.
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In  this  respect  it  is  easy  to  understand  why  Nattiez  considered  reductive 
listening as part of the neutral level, as this kind of listening seems to avoid the 
variety of approaches of conducts in selecting the relevant parts of experience 
they react  to,  so that  it  settles in a matter-like objectivity  open to semiotic 
interpretation. 
Indeed,  a score or a spectrogram must be perceived as such (for example 
visually)  before  it  can  be  used as  a  score,  in  the  same way  that  a  sound 
vibration must be perceived and transformed in aural sensations before we can 
talk about music. Nonetheless, we are definitely in the domain of listening in 
precisely  the  way  described  by  Delalande’s  paradigm  of  conducts  as 
selections of pertinencies—only that pertinencies are here aural distinctions in 
the most general way.
We have thus a listening strategy among the others, but a special one, which is 
strictly linked to visual traces (scores and so on) and therefore can serve as a 
platform to build other listening strategies as functions of this reduced strategy, 
a meta-conduct.
On the other  hand,  an  analysis  is  necessarily  a  translation of  the pertinent 
distinctions in a phenomenic domain that is able to surpass the limits imposed 
by the irreversibility of time. It would be interesting indeed to communicate the 
results of an analysis, as a sounding instance, matching in time the relevant 
discontinuities of a music work that can be listened to as a simplified version of 
the work. Nevertheless, it’s the graphic transposition of time, as Bergsonianly 
projected in the perceptive dimensions related to space, that is often invoked 
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in  communicating analyses of  music.  If  the communication of  analyses has 
now  earned  the  possibility  to  submit  the  arrow  of  time  to  a  repertory  of 
transformations  that  include  reversibility  and  enlargements,  the  qualitative 
experiences of listening are now objectified in pictograms, ideograms and also 
logograms. There is therefore a graphemology of inscriptions (Levy, 2004), that 
needs to be properly  instantiated as a materiality resulting from the  poietic 
strategies  of  the  analysing subject,  in  order  to  orient  the reader  within  the 
interference  between  the  specific  peculiarities  of  the  music  flow  and  the 
specific  peculiarities  of  the  repertory  of  listening habits,  that  constitute  the 
analysing subject as a listener.
In this section, I proposed how focusing on discontinuities, i.e. changes, within 
a layer of the sound flow, i.e.  the recording of the performance of  a music 
work,  instead  of  appealing  to  the  gestaltic  units  of  morphological  listening 
(Schaeffer)  or  gestaltic  conduct  (Delalande)  has  the  potential  to  build  a 
discourse on music listening related to a specific music work (i.e. an esthesic 
analysis), that is shareable, open to discussion and validation, and therefore 
has a potentially high epistemological status. This is the result of being able to 
link the experience of listening, in terms of the detection of discontinuities, to 
specific points on the neutral level, i.e. the timeline related to the audio track, 
without having to rely on a sensorimotor paradigm of sound objects.
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In the following sections, I will present two examples of esthesic analysis that 
will  show  different  ways  to  set  up  a  possible  visual  representation  of 
discontinuities in music listening.
10.2 Ligeti’s “Lontano”
The first example is related to Giörgy Ligeti’s “Lontano”, a work for orchestra 
that was composed in 1967. This piece is well suited to exemplify this kind of  
analysis as it was conceived to study the mediation between continuity and 
discontinuity  by  using  a  sort  of  sound  blurring  effect,  so  that  the  task  of 
detecting  discontinuities  is  challenged  from  the  very  beginning.  The 
observations about listening are related to the famous recording by Baden-
Baden’s Sinfonie-Orchester des Südwestfunks under the direction of  Ernest 
Bour, which was published by Wergo.
First of all, this is a work for orchestra, that, as usual, separates itself effectively  
from a silent background thanks to the presence of  orchestral  instruments. 
This might seem obvious, but the deceptive use of fading-in or out respectively 
from or to the listening environment, as we have seen in the second part of this 
text,  has been used several  times along the history of  western music as a 
quasi-theatrical effect. Even if “Lontano” is not difficult to distinguish from a 
silent listening background, it nevertheless shows a rhetorical use of such an 
emergence of sound from the background in the form of a slow ending fade-
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out al niente and a fade-in-like beginning, which emerges from a solo flute and 
two cellos’ harmonics in unison (with four p).
In between, a collective orchestral  texture grows and transforms in a rather 
continuous way, giving us only two major discontinuities (bar 56 and bar 120), 
that,  by  falling  in  the  SIR,  divide  the  work  in  three  parts  with  compatible 
durations: 3’28”, 4’ and 3’.
What is at the base of the two discontinuities is a big change in the dimension 
of  presence,  in  which  something  ceases  and  suddenly  something  new 
appears. They are really evident discontinuities, which only the concert hall’s 
reverberation can try to hide. And they appear to happen within the general 
continuity  of  the  work,  together  with  the  major  discontinuities  of  the  very 
beginning and the very end of the work, in such a way that their chunking 
process  bound  the  music  flow  into  durations  of  a  same  degree.  We  can 
therefore perceive the whole work as realized by an ordered succession of 
three parts. In other words, we can integrate serially the discontinuities, which 
therefore appear to be in their SIR region.
I have said that the change happens in the dimension of presence, but in this 
complex context it is easy to analyse the general dimension of presence as the 
composite  result  of  simultaneous  changes  in  different  dimensions.  For 
example,  we can easily detect the first  discontinuity at  least in its timbrical 
qualities  (brass  and  contrabassoon  vs.  strings),  in  register  (mainly  low  vs. 
medium) and in the unison vs. chord opposition, whose dimension we should 
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Figure 12: the analysis of macro-formal discontinuities in György Ligeti’s “Lontano”.
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not call “degree of polyphony” or “degree of consonance” or even “harmonic 
function” without understanding how this “nameless” dimension works before 
and after the discontinuity.
If we take the first segment, from bar 1 to 56, we can see that on one side this  
forms a whole in opposition to the other parts, while at the same time we can 
find discontinuities inside it, which might let us distinguish parts in it, belonging 
to a lower level of the general structure. 
We meet  the first  considerable discontinuity at  bar 41 on the dimension of 
dynamics and extension of register. What is important here is however not the 
dimension in  itself,  but  rather  the character  of  discontinuity,  that,  as  being 
much stronger than what happened before, if we exclude the attack at the very 
beginning, we can use to mark the distinction between what is there before it 
and what is there after it.
This discontinuity separates the first part in two sections lasting 2’30” and 1’, 
that is in two durations, which express a ratio of 1/2,5.
Let’s take the first section. Here the discontinuities are softer and less evident.  
Nevertheless we can often hear discontinuities down to the emission of the 
single  instruments.  We  could  therefore  put  the  discontinuities  heard  in  a 
hierarchical  structure,  so  that  we  could  possibly  distinguish  sections  and 
sections within the sections, down to what in our analysis we consider the 
lowest meaningful level of discontinuities, the level which is the nearest to the 
surface and fastest level.
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In the analysis of “Lontano”, we could well express the detection of single note 
discontinuities, or at least a number of them. 
Nevertheless  this  would  be  relevant  only  within  an  analytical  narrative  that 
includes  those  discontinuities  in  that  dimension,  as  important  ones  for 
communicating  our  understanding  of  the  work.  So,  it  is  obviously  not 
necessary to express all the discontinuities we would possibly detect, because 
in that case the “map” would coincide with the “territory” and the reader would 
be lost in data. 
So, in this first section we can consider as relevant discontinuities, the sudden 
pitch overture at  bar  13 (which might remind us of a perfect  cadence),  the 
voicing closure (preceded by a static moment) at bar 19 and the appearance of 
the note that will result in the general unison at the end of the section. About 
this last discontinuity it must be said that it is nearly impossible to position it 
correctly at the first listening session. In fact, it gains relevance only within the 
perspective of the final phase of the process towards the unison and of course 
it is not possible to predict during the first listening where a process will bring 
the listeners. But at a second or a third listening session the discontinuity is 
already  there,  exactly  in  the  same  way  the  discontinuities  caused  by  the 
recognition of a theme would not be there without already knowing that theme.
In the end, it appears that one of the main segmenting dimensions in this first 
part is the pitch range of a collective sound texture that starts with a single 
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note, gradually opens up to the first noticeable discontinuity, the one in bar 13, 
and from bar 30 gradually turns back to unison.
Another important dimension is the one of loudness. This is useful in detecting 
the discontinuity in bar 19, resulting from a clear global inversion of trend, a 
diminuendo after the initial crescendo that will  bring, after a static region in 
loudness again to a crescendo starting from bar 30. So these four sections 
(related to bar segments: 0-13, 13-19, 19-30 and 30-41) are mainly marked by 
two  different  dimensions,  such  that  gestaltically  it  is  quite  difficult  to 
understand whether the three discontinuities are able to group together the 
adjacent sections in different ordered degrees of a same dimension. It is likely 
to hear a continuity from the beginning to bar 19, with a minor discontinuity at  
bar  13,  and  then  another  chunk  from  bar  19  to  bar  41  with  a  minor 
discontinuity at bar 30, but the problem is that the discontinuity at bar 19 does 
not seem to be big enough to satisfactorily separate what is before from what 
is after. In other words, the discontinuity in bar 19 falls at the border between 
the CR and the SIR.
Of course, there are also other dimensions in play, such as the diatonic vs. 
chromatic harmonic fields and the smooth vs. rough (with tremolo) textures. 
These are helpful at various degrees in distinguishing the sections at different 
levels of the sonic structure, but they do not seem to be treated in such a way 
to make them essential to distinguish the structure, that we have simply traced 
in this brief presentation. But if we can hear them, they are there somewhere 
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and help us characterize the structure at some level; therefore, they could be 
relevant in distinguishing chunks within the work, but also in linking the work to 
other works in terms of quotes, forms, styles, repertories, genres and so on.
Finally, I have mentioned the difference in duration between the two sections of 
the first part of the work, that is the one from the beginning to bar 41 and the 
other one from bar 41 to bar 56. As the discontinuity at bar 56 is stronger than 
the discontinuity in bar 41 we can quite naturally consider them as units of a 
same whole, namely the first part. But the difference in their durations might 
not let us feel like we can consider them as having the same importance. We 
might rather consider the shorter unit as a sort of articulation of the bigger one: 
something that is very clear at faster speeds, such as in an acciaccatura or a 
mordente at the head of a longer note or a decay at the end of a note. In this  
slower case we might choose to consider bars from 41 to 56 as a sort of a 
coda section, but we could also leave the shorter section its autonomy with 
respect to the longer one. As Kofi Agawu points out (2004), analysis is after all  
a kind of art in itself and at the same time a way to direct listening. Therefore, 
perhaps the decision to link the short section to the longer one in such an 
ambiguous temporal  range has to  be done after  a  broader  analysis  of  the 
whole work in order to see if the detection of the coda in the first part of the  
work is a relevant listenable pattern in “Lontano”, regardless of whether it has 
been made on purpose or not.
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10.3 Romitelli’s “Nell’alto dei giorni immobili”
After this generic approach to esthesic analysis, which has served the purpose 
to  introduce  some  general  issues,  I  would  like  to  show  a  more  detailed 
analysis.  This  is  taken  from my analysis  of  Fausto  Romitelli’s  “Nell’alto  dei 
giorni immobili”, a work for flute, also piccolo and alto, B flat clarinet, also bass 
clarinet,  piano, violin,  viola and cello that the composer wrote in 1990. The 
source of  the analysis  is  the recording of  the work by the American Talea 
Ensemble, that is included in their 2012 album Anamorphosis.
Let’s start from an excerpt, that in the score corresponds to the bars from 21 
to 33, starting from about 55”5 from the beginning of the recording. These bars 
are delimited by two strong discontinuities in dynamics, the first one being very 
uncommon in the work as the sound emerges abruptly from silence with a slap 
tongue played by the flute. The second one is a pretty loud chord and a sort of  
reverberation-like chord, while being much more common within the work than 
the  former,  it  is  also  very  strong.  The  duration  of  the  performance  of  this 
section is about 16 seconds. 
The figure 13.1, represents the discontinuities detectable by listening, with a 
reference to their possible source in the score. I decided not to show those 
discontinuities  that  are  too  soft  to  be  considered  as  relevant  or  with  an 
interonset interval shorter than 100 ms, such as in tremolos. These are in fact 
accounted for in the graph, more as a sound quality than as a rhythmical figure. 
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Some distinctions are  marked in  white  as  they could not  be  connected  to 
distinctions in the score and they are most probably artefacts resulting from 
the  complex  instrumental  writing  and  from  the  consequent  unpredictable 
resulting sound, as it happens for harmonic tremolos. While these, so to say 
neglected discontinuities are still important in shaping the listening experience, 
it is paramount for the analysis to connect listening detections to the  neutral  
level of  the  score,  in  order  to  reinforce  the  epistemological  status  of  the 
analysis  on  one  side  and,  as  we  will  see,  to  define  the  work’s  dialectics 
between score notation and performance.
Therefore, for now, these white discontinuities generally will not be considered 
in the analysis, even if, within the turbulent section marked with the dashed 
oval, they can be pretty strong.
The distinctions marked in the figure 13.1 are mostly based on discontinuities 
in three sound characters: loudness, as a continuum between silence and the 
loudest sound, movement, as a continuum between being still and being the 
most turbulent as possible, and pitch range, as the continuum between just 
one tone and a white noise cluster.  A discontinuity in one quality,  or better 
“dimension”  may  come  from a  sudden  change  in  quality  or,  in  case  of  a 
continuous change, in the direction of change.
The figure 13.2 shows how distinctions are related to the three dimensions.
These dimensions are far from being obtained by objective measurements as 
they are the result of evaluations, by listening to this section over and over.
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Figure 13: four analytical schemes of bars 21-33 of 
Fausto Romitelli’s “Nell’alto dei giorni immobili”.
They rather serve the purpose to express the intuition of the listener on his 
experience and to stimulate the intuition, and of course the criticism, of the 
researcher. Moreover, they are certainly not the only dimensions involved in the 
experience  of  listening  to  this  section.  Timbre,  for  example,  is  also  very 
important in defining the pattern structure. But they are what I have considered 
as most relevant in defining a common ground for changes in listening qualia,  
so that in the end they can account for a perceptive structure of the section.
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In fact, we can try to organize the discontinuities in a hierarchy, according to 
the number of dimensions involved and to the degree of changes. This is not 
an  easy  task,  as  some  distinctions  are  more  comparable  than  others. 
Moreover,  in  this  particular  section  something  apparently  strange  happens 
besides the already confusing part  included in  the dashed oval.  From 1’7” 
onwards, some distinctions appear that should not be there according to the 
score.  For  example,  the  viola  chord  is  already  there  while  the  turbulent 
movement  is  still  going  on.  In  the  score,  the  chord  appears  as  a  static 
presence only when all the other instruments are also still, while in the seconds 
before, the chord should be played with fast tremolo. I do not know if this can 
be ascribed to  an  imprecise performance,  but  this  can be confusing when 
comparing distinctions. For this example, I decided to accept this unexpected 
sound result as part of the work.
In the figure 13.2, I decided to show the main hierarchical distinctions, similarly 
with  the  analysis  of  “Lontano”,  with  vertical  lines  crossing  the  graph.  The 
thicker the line is, the more important the distinction.
Now we can organize the hierarchies in a graph that corresponds to the figure 
13.3, showing the pattern structure in terms of units and levels.
When comparing this section to what follows, we can immediately recognize 
the repetition of some elements that become actual components of a pattern.
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To show this, I used a very different kind of graph. The figure 13.4 still shows 
the same section, but with a different graphic interpretation. The vertical line 
represents the strong attack in the beginning, but in general the thickness of 
lines and shapes shows intensity and pitch range. Zigzag lines are turbulent 
moments while shapes represent static chords even when they are overlapped 
with zigzag lines.  Dashed vertical  lines are actual  signals,  single notes that 
emerge from the sound flow and may lie within its range, as it happens with the 
first one and not marked by any letter, or as they isolate themselves in the 
lowest register, as it happens with the cello (marked by the letter C) and with 
the  piano  (letter  P).  They  are  the  most  recurrent  elements  of  the  work, 
something like a one-note figure that grounds the development of the sound 
continuum to its foundation—or better, to its fundamental tone. The curved line 
represents a simple glissando element. The thicker line at the end represents 
the static chord performed by strings, this time in the right position that is  
shown in the score. 
What we have presented so far seems to be a pattern that is repeated three 
times along the bars 21 to 64 of the score (figure 14).  
What  we previously interpreted as a sort  of reverberation of  the last  chord 
seems in fact to be the beginning of the repetition of this sort of pattern. This is  
a kind of rule for the whole work, as patterns/sections connect with each other 
in a continuous manner that is not clearly distinguishable. However, we have a 
very soft change of timbre that can help us to distinguish the end of a section,  
306
represented by a dashed line, from the beginning of the next one, which is 
represented by a continuous line.
Therefore,  in  the second section (figure 14.2)  we see the disappearance of 
some elements,  such as the attack and the beginning tremolo, the glissato 
moves upwards and the central part is realized by static chords instead of a 
turbulent  texture.  Considering  that  the  notes  and the  chord  are  in  general 
different,  we can still  find a strong resemblance between the two sections, 
especially in the general shape. 
The third section (figure 14.3) is still  quite similar to the first one, but at the 
same  time  it  starts  to  go  in  other  directions,  so  to  speak.  Moreover,  the 
introduction of a loud quasi-solo part of the bass clarinet, which can be 
Figure 14: bars 21-64 analysed in terms of the repetition of a pattern.
analysed in terms of a repeating pattern itself, adds a new level to the sound 
structure. 
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We have seen thus far a set of distinctions that on one hand seems to be 
constraints for a transformation of sound qualities in what in electronic music is 
called  an  envelope,  while  on  the  other  hand  it  appears  as  recognizable 
elements,  signals  along  the  timeline.  The  envelope’s  shape  with  its  six 
segments is a repeated pattern whose starting point can be considered both 
as the ending point of a section and the beginning point of the next section, 
while signals reinforce the identity  of  the pattern and the recognition of  its 
repetition. 
In the fragment we have presented, the pattern is instantiated three times. But 
along the whole work we can recognize a number of patterns like this. In the 
following  figure,  with  the  analysed  section  in  relief,  the  entire  lowest  level 
grouping is done according to a common pattern. Nevertheless, in the units 
from bar 166 to 185 it is not easy to recognize an explicitly repeated pattern,  
thus they are grouped following a different criterion. 
Figure 15: the pattern structure of the whole piece.
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Perhaps  the  most  striking  aspect  of  this  work  is  the  dialectic  it  exhibits 
between flux and structure, the former emerging from the continuum of sound 
transformations in a blurring gestaltic texture and the latter fragmenting the 
sound surface in crossing references by the recognition of resemblances. We 
can  see  this  dialectic  on  all  levels,  such  as  in  the  opposition  between 
envelopes and signals, or better between metamorphic turbulent textures and 
well recognisable events such as single notes with a sharp attack.
But at a higher level too, we find the continuity with which the climax chords 
rise in the first  part  of  the work up to the master  climax chord in bar 132, 
followed by an attempt of a descent in the first following sections from bar 161.
From the structural side there seems to be a general tendency in discovering 
that both envelopes and signals are patterns, only they belong to different time 
levels.  
And this is the premise to the emergence of all kind of temporary structures 
between the fastest signal level and the slower section pattern level, such as 
the quasi bass-clarinet solo in bar 59 to 61. This process will bring us to the 
final section, in which the pattern first presented in bar 245 and then repeated 
and varied in bars 297 and finally in bar 350, is already structured in pattern 
levels so that,  for  example,  its  first  component from bar  245 to bar  254 is 
already made by three presentations of a single pattern originally lasting four 
and a half measures.
Therefore,  the  dialectics  between  flux  and  structure  is  also  dramatically 
realized as a transformation from flux, passing through a short blurred zone 
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between bars  166 and 185 to  a  structure,  defined by an increment  of  the 
pattern levels.
But it would be completely incorrect to think of “Nell’alto dei giorni immobili” as 
a work built on a narration: every passage of this dialectics is hidden. All we 
have are clues, often quite clear, but mostly in disguise, often contradicted, as 
happens with the major  discontinuities expressed by waved lines. For example 
the two seconds of silence that separate two sections in bar 188 with a strong 
discontinuity  is  compensated  by  a  quasi-chromatic  descending  connection 
between  the  climax  chords  of  the  two  sections  in  a  way  that  suggests 
continuity.
In the end, despite the tension between spectralist thinking on one hand, as it 
is  explicitly  stated  in  the  foreword  of  the  score,  with  its  idea  of  sound 
continuum, and a more traditional way of building form from pattern structures 
such as repeated cells and phrase organization on the other hand, this work 
seems to find a third way in a chaotic and yet static world, the constant low G 
takes care of that, where form constantly struggles against the flowing matter 
in  order  to emerge and to build temporary  shapes that  are  destined to be 
absorbed again in the ever changing flux. And in the meanwhile, the dialectics 
between continuity and discontinuity offered me the opportunity to illustrate 
how  graphic  elements  may  engage  different  visual  relationships  with  each 
other in order to express an analysis whose elements are specific to the single 
works.
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11. COMPOSITION
11.1 Sonifying Perseus
Over the years, I have applied the framework of pattern structures on a variety 
of occasions related to the composition of works for acoustic and electronic 
instruments,  to  the  production  of  installations  and  to  the  didactics  of 
composition, during my years of teaching at the Conservatory “C.Monteverdi” 
of  Bolzano,  Italy,  at  the  Conservatory  “G.Verdi”  of  Milano,  Italy  and  in 
workshops and courses both for professional and amateur musicians.
I will start by presenting a very general topic related to the pattern structure, 
namely dimensions. While the definition of the composing dimensions, in terms 
of the “out-time” parameters (Xenakis, 2001) are primary in setting up a pattern 
structure, there are situations in which the “in-time” structure is derived from 
the  parametric  analysis  of  non-musical  systems  or  depends  upon  the 
organization of the “out-time” parameters.
I have dealt many times throughout the years with the elements of the celestial 
vault as a source of data to be somehow translated in sounds. In particular, the 
installations  “Ordo  Coelestis”  (Celestial  order)  and  “Andromeda”,  and  the 
works “Costellazioni” (Constellations) in the versions for alto flute or piano and 
electronic  sounds  and  “Carillon”  (Music  Box)  for  Piano  four  hands  were 
directed to translate the positions of the stars into musical elements that could 
be  perceptively  related  to  them.  In  these  cases,  we  could  speak  of 
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“sonification”, which is the “the technique of rendering sound in response to 
data and interactions” (Hermann, Hunt and Neuhoff, 2001, p.1) and is at the 
core of Auditory Display, a field that aims “to enable a better understanding, or 
an  appreciation,  of  changes  and  structures  in  the  data  that  underlie  the 
display”.
However, these projects are not intended to help the detection by listening to 
patterns that were not easy to detect in other phenomenic dimensions, as it  
would  have  been  if  I  were  following  the  directives  of  Auditory  Display. 
Nevertheless, the data set I used when dealing with stars, challenged me to 
find a structure of the sonic dimensions that could possibly be compatible with 
the peculiarities of  the visual  dimensions related to star  data. For example, 
magnitudo,  which  is  related  to  the  brightness  of  the  stars,  is  perceived 
differently from the dimension of loudness, which we likely would automatically 
involve in the translation of magnitudo due to the effects of the objectification 
of  sound  as  the  sensorimotor  paradigm  that  connects  brightness,  size, 
proximity  and  loudness  with  each  other.  In  fact,  our  sensitivity  to  the 
differences of loudness cannot easily be related to our sensitivity to different 
degrees of brightness without involving sound masking. As a consequence, a 
possible translation has to follow different criteria.
I  will  only  present  the  case  of  “Ordo  Coelestis”  here.  This  audiovisual 
installation for eight screens and eight loudspeakers was realized in 2014 at the 
ExpoGate in Milano to celebrate the passage of the Perseid Meteor Showers 
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(Viel,  2017a). The sound part  of the work is the sonification of the 20 most 
visible  stars  in  the  Perseus constellation,  for  which  the  stars’  position  and 
brightness become the sounding elements of a planetarium for listening. As in 
the  visual  part,  occasional  electromagnetic  swarms  in  the  form  of  radio 
interferences interrupt the rational order of the cosmos.
The sound was realized by mixing the stars’ sonification, realized by a Max 
software  patch,  with  some  interference  material  deriving  from  signals  and 
noises that were recorded from an AM radio receiver.
The data set to be sonified includes the position of the stars in the sky, in terms 
of their spherical equatorial coordinates (declination  and right ascension) and 
their magnitudo. The in-time structure is based on the effects of translating the 
equatorial  coordinates,  which  are  independent  from  the  observer  and  are 
based on the celestial  equator,  into  the horizontal  coordinates  that,  on  the 
contrary, depend on the position of the observer on the Earth. This means that 
once the latitude and the longitude of the listener have been set in Milano for 
the  whole  duration  of  the  exposition,  the  apparent  position  of  the  stars 
changes in the sky depending on the time. In order to let the listener perceive a 
significant movement of stars in about half an hour of listening, I decided to 
accelerate the 24 hour cycle of star movements in four layers that were related 
to the four different couples of loudspeakers, so that it was possible to hear at 
the same time the complete revolutions in 41, 89, 149 and 181 minutes.
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This sonification is based on two main ideas. According to the first one, the 
horizontal position of the stars is translated by their position within the stereo 
panorama, so that each star, during its cycle oscillates along a segment whose 
width depends on its position along the vertical coordinate. 
On the other hand, declination involves the dimensions both of frequency and 
timbre. In fact,  the sound of a single star is obtained through an amplitude 
modulation between a sine carrier  and a modulating signal that is obtained 
through  frequency  modulation.  The  frequency  of  the  carrier  oscillator  was 
constant during the exposition, as it is related to the latitude of listeners. The 
modulating signal is realized by a sine wave whose frequency depends on the 
star declination. This is also rescaled in order to engage a cycle of frequency 
modulation  that  can  represent  the  star’s azimuth,  which  is  the  vertical 
coordinate  that  depends  on  the  position  of  the  observer/listener  and  the 
equatorial declination of the star.
The second idea is that the vertical position of the star, which changes along 
the line that connects the centre of the earth to the celestial  pole, the  axis 
mundi, is expressed as a harmonic partial of a fundamental that changes with a 
one-year cycle and therefore depends on the day of presentation. The idea of 
connecting  the  axis  mundi to  harmonic  partials  is  taken  form  Marius 
Schneider’s analysis of the sounding practices in shamanic cultures (1970). In 
this  case,  the position of  the stars  is  translated with a  complex perceptive 
dimension that lets the data related to the listener (latitude and time) interact 
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with each other,  so that  a range of  spectra  are  offered to the stars,  to be 
selected by their vertical position.
Magnitudo is  finally  expressed  in  two  ways:  the  first  one  is  by  trivially 
connecting it with a small change in loudness. The second and most important 
one, is realized by relating  magnitudo to the speed of the repetitions of an 
amplitude envelope. While the proportion between magnitudo and speed is a 
direct one, the proportion with loudness is inverse, so that the fainter stars 
cannot be easily masked by the faster repetition of brighter stars.
As a result, the starry sky is translated by a multitude of sorts of bells that, with 
their repeated short rings represent a variety of brightness.
This installation is just one example of how dealing with perceptive dimensions 
can  be  important  not  only  in  setting  up  a  pattern  structure,  but  also  in 
translating the most various data sets into sonorous instances. 
Of  course,  I  did  not  limit  myself  in  just  having  to  do  with  the  simple 
data/dimensions  related  to  position  and  brightness:  in  “Andromeda”  for 
example, an installation for electronic music boxes in which each box is related 
to  a  star  of  the  Andromeda  constellation,  I  used,  besides  position  and 
magnitude, the distance from the earth, the spectral class and a sample of the 
Cosmic Background Radiation.
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11.2 Pattern Composition
If we move from dimension to patterns, an immediate development of pattern 
structures cannot but go in the direction of writing and producing music with 
patterns, in the most common definition.
In my courses, the topic of pattern is framed within the wider topic of what I  
call the linear function, a perhaps unfortunate term that should not be confused 
with  the  correspondent  mathematical  concept.  My  idea  of linear  function 
emerges in the context of Boris Porena’s concept of poli-linearity  (1983) as a 
fundamental character of music. This concept refers to the idea that music is 
primarily  comprised  by  overlapping  linearities,  ordered  series  of  musical 
elements that are not yet Jones’ SIR levels, but are rather conceived in terms 
of streams that can be represented by the staves on a score.
Starting from this, I decided to organize my teaching path in composition by 
following  the  possible  roles  that  these  linearities  can  play  in  the  full  poli-
linearity of music. I am merely listing the full set of linear functions I deal with in 
teaching “music composition for pedagogy” or other basic courses/workshops 
here, without presuming to present any sort of ontology: they are simply a first 
tool  to  allow  the  student  to  engage  in  the  practice  of  composition. 
Nonetheless, this approach has proven some degree of effectiveness over the 
years. 
We start with the melodic function, as enacted by the main melody in a poli-
linear texture. We can have then a secondary melodic function that can act as 
a synergic melody, expressing the heterophonic function, or as an antagonist 
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melody, that aims, so to speak, to overstep the melody in order to become the 
main  one.  This  is  the  (pedagogic)  way  in  which  I  teach  counterpoint  as  a 
general function enacted by several  antagonist melodies. Then we have the 
harmonic  function, which has the sole purpose of expressing and supporting 
harmony without any melodic or rhythmic intent. Finally, we have pattern, as a 
function that is eminently expressed by consecutive repetitions of the same 
figure. 
Each one of these functions has its own rules and peculiarities. When we come 
to  patterns, we explore these rules by writing or producing music solely with 
the use of patterns. We start from writing music for the simplest instruments 
such  as  hands  beating  on  a  table.  Then  we  move  to  voice  and  body 
percussion.  And  finally  we  may  involve  the  entire  range  of  pedagogic 
instruments first and then the traditional instrumentation of the entire orchestra. 
Depending  on  the  occasion,  it  has  also  been  possible  to  use  electronic 
instruments like drum machines (I have built a sequencer application just for 
the purpose of teaching pattern composition) and even circuit bended radios.
A variation of the TUBS (Time Unit Box System) notation can be used to a 
certain extent, by people not able to write or read traditional western notation. 
On the other hand, TUBS prepares to bring the concept of pattern composition 
to drum machines. My sequencer application has been created in order to link 
the  TUBS-like  notation  of  drum  machines  with  the  letter  notation  of  the 
traditional analysis of musical form, so that once a repertory of patterns has 
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been created and each pattern is identified with a letter, the user can write a 
sequence  of  letters  in  the  proper  text  field  that  will  represent  the  pattern 
structure of the composition and, at the same time, will serve as the reference 
for instancing patterns that will be played by the sequencer.
The rules I provide for learning how to deal with patterns are ultimately aimed 
towards  developing  a  technique  of  composition  that  mimes  the  esthesic 
strategies of the listener, provided that there must be a model of the listener. In 
this respect, I try to force the students, at least in the beginning, to follow some 
rules that define, with some strictness, the idealized listening strategies.
For  example,  I  propose a  certain  set  of  requirements  for  building  patterns 
“correctly”,  such  as:  a  pattern  cannot  be  made  by  the  exact  repetition  of 
subpatterns, so that it  can exhibit  a figural significance as a unit, or that a 
pattern, at least the first pattern that is instantiated in a composition, cannot 
begin with a pause.
Secondly,  as  recognition  does  not  necessarily  mean  exact  instantiation,  I 
require that, at least for the first experimentations, an instance must be exactly 
identical to the pattern, at least in the way it begins, in order to avoid the risk of  
being improperly recognized.
Finally, the different layers that realize patterns of the same length have to be 
considered as a multi-layered pattern, so that the students possibly avoid the 
temptation of exchanging layers between patterns and therefore of addressing 
the topic of resemblance among patterns prematurely.
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Figure 16: the pattern machine I have realized for my courses.
As soon as possible, I introduce the first technique that is used for building 
pattern structures, namely the contrasting technique.
This  is  realized  when  a  series  of  instances  of  a  pattern  are  followed  by 
instances of another pattern. The technique aims to create in the listener a 
distinction between a before and an after that is represented by the instant of 
the  beginning  of  the  first  instance  of  the  second  pattern.  Clearly,  what  is 
presented here is a narrative for engaging a composing practice. As we have 
seen, the discontinuity that is shown by distinctions always occurs before the 
actual  moment  of  distinction  and  is  therefore  the  result  of  an  articulated 
process rather than being the simple expression of an instant. We always have 
to keep this in mind and we always have to repeat it to the students: we are 
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following a narrative for pedagogical purposes that needs to be abandoned as 
soon as we have assimilated it in order to maintain the process of pedagogical  
construction-deconstruction.
We develop the contrasting technique when building structures, especially the 
binary structure, in which each unit is made by two sub-units from the total 
layer down to the surface layer, by first involving the idea of patterns made of 
instances  of  patterns.  We  therefore  spend  some  time  in  verifying  that  the 
structures built by students use the instantiation of patterns in such a way that 
a possible listener cannot distinguish the pattern structure as a different one. 
I have learned not to be too strict in giving rules on how to combine patterns 
and letting  the  students  simply  find their  own rules  by  deriving  them from 
discussions in the classroom. 
However, I have developed a generative system that is able to automatize the 
construction of  a pattern structure by following a grammar of substitutions, 
which proceeds in a top-down direction. Nevertheless, for teaching purposes it 
might be too strict to foster a creative approach to composition.
In  developing  the  contrasting  technique,  we  gradually  move  from rhythmic 
patterns that are made by non-tuned instruments to figural patterns that are 
based on rhythms and pitches. 
As  concerns  these  aspects,  the  discussion  about  the  difference  between 
scales and modes is introduced together with the criteria that can be used in 
creating one’s own scales.
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Then  it  is  time  for  the  second  technique:  the  marking  technique.  This  is 
typically realized when a series of instances of a pattern is followed by a single 
instance of another pattern, afterwards followed by a series of instances of the 
first pattern or of another one. 
The idea of marker comes from the practice of breaks and fills in popular drum 
techniques, so that its role is to mark the end of a unit at a certain level. In 
brief, a marker might also be instantiated as a marker in other units, possibly on 
the same level. But it also can be presented just once, as it happens for the 
marker that is dedicated to the end of a work, which I call, more as a tribute to 
formal language theory than to science-fiction movies, the terminator mark. 
Of course, on one hand an on-time-only  marker is not a pattern, but, in the 
composition narrative, it can be (objectively) treated as one, and for that reason 
it has earned the right to be named after a categorical label such as “fill”. On 
the other hand, markers are the occasion to talk about inter-opus patterns, and 
to show how styles and genres are typically involved in using repertories of 
patterns that characterize them.
The next step is related to the discovery of different levels’ markers, which are 
not only used specifically for units on some level, but that are made by patterns 
themselves. In this way, a connection is made between the two techniques of 
pattern composition.
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The final part of the course is dedicated to one of the most important problems 
that presumably emerges along the whole path and regards the relationship 
between what we have called in the last part the difference and the identity of 
patterns. 
A pattern is defined in terms of the ordered elements that build it, the units that 
fall  in  the  SIR  along  the  dimension  (or  dimensions)  that  define  their 
configuration as the pattern. This is what we can call  the  difference that is 
invoked by SIR.  On the other  hand,  there  are  certain  qualities  that  do not 
change along two contiguous instances of the same pattern. First of all, they 
constitute the identity of a pattern, a set of qualities that, as we have said, are 
more relevant within a series of repetitions and are involved in the process of 
habituation.  These  are,  for  example,  the  instrument  playing,  the  general 
loudness,  the  position  in  space  and  so  on,  with  the  infinite  procession  of 
Goodmanian resemblances. 
We could think of  a number of  patterns that might  be different  only  in  the 
instrumentation,  or  that  might  be  composed  for  just  one  instrument  that 
occupies a place in space that is different for each pattern, or again they could 
be written for only a whistle and differ from each other only in their dynamics. 
And  the  resulting  pattern  structure  would  equally  engage  the  proper 
distinctions,  allowing  the  listener  to  detect  the  same  structure,  although 
differently realized.
What we have here is the contrast between the dimensions that fall in the SIR 
among  the  pattern  components  and  the  dimensions  of  the  same  pattern 
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components that fall in the CR and therefore constitute the identity of patterns 
as simple units, as chunks.
As a professor, I can only leave the students with a possible rule, according to 
which,  in  order  to  preserve  the  distinction  of  a  pattern  structure,  the 
discontinuities  in  identitary “chunking” dimensions  should  be  proportionally 
related  to  the  highest  level  in  which  they  appear,  that  is  the  highest  level 
inclusive of the unit that starts with a discontinuity as a composing unit. And 
the lower that level is, the closer it is to the “surface” level, the smaller the 
discontinuity should be.
Of course, the path of pattern composition ends with the reassurance that in 
the end there are  no rules,  but  only  codes of  conduct  that  are  sometimes 
useful in reaching some goals and sometimes need to be broken in order to 
invent new goals.
11.3 Presences
If the pattern composition is essentially conducted by interactively connecting 
the composition of single patterns and  markers with an abstract structure of 
patterns  both  in  writing  scores  and  in  letting  a  computer  automate  the 
procedure, there are still different possibilities of dealing with the elements of 
our narrative.
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“Presenze” (Presences) is a concept related to the construction of an electronic 
instrument for live performance and to a possible narrative to be implemented 
in performances and fixed media. In “Presenze”, the pattern structure becomes 
a system of triggers that launches patterns in the form of samples. The live 
performance of “Presence” is done by operating an instrument, which is an 
application realized with Max, and by choosing on the fly both the structure 
and the set of patterns that realizes it.
A pattern structure in this context is a tree-like structure in which each unit is 
composed by two or three sub-units. The extension of the structure is up to 
seven levels, from zero to six, starting from the surface level units, which have 
no sub-units, up to the sixth level, which is the highest one. We therefore have 
64 possible structures, according to the choice for each level to be expressed 
by units that have two or three sub-units.  
Moreover,  it  is possible to set the degree of certainty of having exactly the 
chosen number of sub-units for the units of all the levels from one to six, so 
that  a  minimum degree  of  certainty will  result  in  having the number  of  the 
relative sub-units, randomly changing between two or three, for each unit of a 
given level.
A sub-level  number of  three on a given level  means that when the sample 
related to a unit of that level is triggered, the samples of all the lower levels are 
triggered as well, but it is necessary to wait for two more triggers of the units 
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belonging to the immediately lower level, in order to for it to be possible to 
trigger the sample related to the next unit, that, again, will be simultaneous in 
all the triggers on the lower levels.
In “Presenze”, we can use up to two pattern structures at the same time, which 
can also be synchronized with each other in beat.
Figure 17: the user interface for the live realization of “Presenze”.
For each set of seven levels (a pattern structure) we have:
- a structure number (from 1 to 64)  that will set the number of sub-units in the  
units of each level; 
- the bpm value that will be related to the units of the surface level, the level 
zero; 
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- the range of possible variations in time of the bpm value so that the clock 
driving the structure can be expressed on a range from the most precise one to 
an  almost  random one,  within  a  certain  degree  that  maintains  an  average 
speed;
- the general volume of the structure.
For each level, we can set:
-  the certainty degree,  according to which the number of  sub-units  will  be 
exactly in the number related to the structure;
- the set of samples that will be triggered by the structure units of that level;
- the number of samples (from one to nine) that will be randomly chosen and 
triggered by the structure units of that level;
- the volume of that level;
- the position in a quadraphonic panorama of the sound layer of that level;
- the degree of precision according to which the sample trigger will match the 
clock, so that, for example, the triggers that are supposed to by synchronous 
with each other can be varied in that degree of synchronization.
In this way, it is possible to mediate between a most clear structure of triggers 
and a totally chaotic structure that still maintains the organization of levels as 
independent streams. Moreover, by setting the volume independently for each 
level it is possible to instantiate the structure only partially so that some levels 
are  unexpressed.  With  the possible  erasure of  a  level  that  is,  for  example, 
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between two instantiated levels, we can obtain a level including units that have 
between four to nine sub-units. In fact, let us say that the sub-units number for 
the three levels, from the highest to the lowest is 2-2-2. This means that each  
unit of the highest level will have two sub-units, each one of which will have 
two sub-units. The highest-level unit will be connected to four sub-units of the 
lowest  level.  If  the middle level  is not instantiated then each sample of the 
highest level will  be triggered, with every four triggers corresponding to the 
samples of the lowest level. In case of a 3-3-2 structure with a non-instantiated 
middle level, on the other hand, for each sample of the highest level we will 
have nine samples of the lowest level. 
With  the  “trick”  of  non-instantiating  one  or  more  levels,  we  can  reach  an 
extreme pattern structure of seven levels. While having a sub-unit structure of 
3-3-3-3-3-3, by instantiating only the highest and the surface levels we will  
obtain  that  for  each  trigger/unit  of  the  highest  level  we  will  have  2187 
triggers/units of the surface level.
Finally,  as  each  sample  has  its  own  structure  that  can  be  more  or  less 
articulated, the possibilities of realizing pattern structures seems to be limitless. 
In the example I provide (Viel, 2007b), which is the beginning of a performance 
I realized in July 2016 in Brescia, Italy for the “Materia Sonica Festival”, the 
structure number four, 322-232, is instantiated in such a way that the fifth and 
the fourth levels show a minimum degree of certainty of the sub-units number. 
Each level uses an entire set of nine samples, but in different ways: the highest 
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level,  that  is  used  alone  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  excerpt,  has  a  very 
electronic sound, mostly made by wide spectrum energy noise that is filtered in 
different ways, and a internal structure that is independent from the general 
pattern structure. The other levels that are instantiated one after the other in 
this excerpt, are the lowest four, each one with a sample set that is relative to 
an acoustic percussion sound. The random and ever changing choice of the 
sample to be played within a set for a specific unit has the purpose here of 
rendering an acoustic-like performance, in which every beat of the percussion 
is slightly different in timbre and volume.
What are the dimensions at play in this work? They might be volume, and pitch 
or even timbre: it really depends on the character of the sample sets. The most 
general  dimension  is  therefore  the  “presence  of  a  pattern”.  In  fact,  in  the 
excerpt, especially when percussions enter, it is the presence of a particular 
instrument/sound/pattern,  as  possibly  falling  in  the  PRR  and  therefore 
distinguished  as  streams  within  the  whole  music  flow,  that  allows  the 
perceptive articulation of the structure in such a way that listening entrainment, 
that is, as we have seen, expectation in terms of enaction, is possible.
But,  of  course,  if  the samples  are chosen so that  each sample in a  set  is 
completely different from the others of the same set, we would need to use 
other elements to preserve entrainment, such as a length of the sample that is 
shorter than the time interval between two successive units in the same level, 
or other “tricks”.
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Finally, “Presenze” has an extremely wide potential of realization, that depends 
on the formal setup of structures, for example in terms of the timeline, and on 
the sample set that can be used, from electric to acoustic sounds, to found 
recordings, music samples and so on. It cannot therefore only be a “work in 
progress”, which is instantiated in fragments. I hope that in the near future I will  
have  the  chance  to  build  a  sounding  “wheel  of  structures”  as  a  range  of 
possibilities that is able to entangle pattern structures to sample sets with each 
other,  in  order  to  present  the  work  as  fixed  connections  that  can  be 
instantiated  and  performed  in  sections  or  as  a  whole,  depending  on  the 
contexts of performance and music distribution.
11.4 Cluster
Over the years, I have developed the narrative of pattern structure in every sort 
of compositional context from audiovisual performances to the realization of 
scores for  acoustic instruments and the production of  electronic music.  To 
show the extent of using the concepts that I developed in the second part of 
this  text,  within  the  context  of  composition,  I  have  chosen  to  analyse  the 
poietic strategies of   “Cluster  (for  Demetrio Stratos)”,  a 20 minute work for 
electronic sounds with optional video, that I realized between 2011 and 2014 
(Viel, 2017c).
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This is a work that is entirely based on recordings of Demetrio Stratos’ voice, 
which I received permission to use. The starting idea is connected with the 
image of a star cluster, a sort of spherical mini-galaxy that in about 10 to 30 
light years gathers from ten thousand to several million stars. The individual 
character of stars and their massive presence suggest to me the idea of a high 
polyphony, which on one hand is perceived as a whole and on the other hand 
is composed by layers that maintain a recognizable individuality. “Cluster” is 
therefore  a  study around the  permeability of  sound textures in  the Ligetian 
sense (Ligeti, 1964). From the point of view of imagery, a cluster becomes a 
metaphor  of  the  chaotic  polyphony  of  the  contemporary  hyper-connected 
world.
At the same time, this work is a tribute to the voice of Demetrio Stratos, who 
was a singer and lead figure of the Italian experimental scene of the 70s and an 
expert in the extension of vocal techniques. The recordings of his voice are 
therefore best suited to represent an expressive range that is able to connect 
the human voice to electronic sounds.
For that reason, I decided to multiply Demetrio Stratos in a polyphony of 12 
parts,  organized  in  three  quartets  according  to  vocal  types.  These  types 
metaphorically develop the Medieval categories of musica humana (the human 
voice, symbolized by the letter V), musica instrumentalis (the human voice that 
is still recognized as such but is somehow transformed in an instrument of in a 
non-human  voice  by  sampling  techniques,  symbolized  by  S)  and musica 
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mundana (the human voice that is no more recognized as such and is therefore 
transfigured besides the organic, symbolized by E). 
Regarding the out-time organization of the dimensions involved, each quartet 
has a functional relationship with the other two quartets; moreover within each 
quartet the four layers/voices engage functional relationships with each other. 
The  relationship  among  quartets  is  defined  in  terms  of  foreground  versus 
background that is connected inside each quartet with the distinction between 
active and inactive parts. 
Within each quartet, one active voice performs the main signal, while the other 
possible active voices perform a range of functional relations with the signal 
that  can  be:  homophony,  parallel  heterophony,  temporal  heterophony 
(homorhythm) or an independent and contrasting signal, which are respectively 
represented by the letters O, P, T and C.
As regards the  in-time  organization, “Cluster” comprises 20 sections, whose 
structure  is  differently  realized  depending on the dimensions involved.  This 
means that the different pattern structures, all entailing 20 surface units, are 
instantiated in such a way that we have a sort of “structural polyphony”, whose 
dimensional streams are chunked together only at the “total level”.
The duration of each section is set in a rather flexible way so that it is chosen 
among the possibilities of 40”, 50”, 60”, 70”, 80” and 90”, that correspond to 
the range of four to nine that we have already met as the possible sub-units of  
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a higher level unit, whose immediately lower level has not been instantiated. 
The  only  requirement  is  that  the  succession  of  two  sections  with  a  same 
duration should be avoided. 
There  are  other  elements  that  are  left  to  the  extemporaneousness  of 
production,  as  dynamics  and  the  transition  between  contiguous  sections. 
Nevertheless, each passage of the “Cluster” realization is carefully conducted 
within the techniques of a post-serial, parametric thinking in order to realize the 
details  of  pattern  structures  in  nearly  the  same  way  it  has  been  done  for 
“Presenze”. I will show here only some exemplary details of the realization of 
“Cluster”  that can possibly show the parametric  instantiation of  the pattern 
structure.
First of all, the roles among the quartets in each section are decided according 
to an arbitrary structure on four levels (total and surface levels included) that is 
expressed  by  the  variation  of  a  dimension  that  expresses  the  number  of 
quartets in the foreground, and therefore leaves the remaining quartets for the 
background.
The structure is  defined in  the same way as  in  “Presenze”  but  follows the 
graphic convention of indicating the units of the first level, which is just above 
the surface level, with their sub-units number. The units of the second level are 
expressed by single parentheses. A further parenthesis includes the complete 
series of units in the total level.
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The  dimensional  realization  of  the  structure  follows  a  different  graphic 
convention, for clarity, in which the space separates the units of level one and 
the dot separates the units of level two. 
The pattern structure of foreground quartets is therefore ((23)(233)(223)) and is 
realized by the dimension with the values 1, 2 and 3, that refer to the number of 
quartets in the foreground, as: 12 221.21 223 123.12 21 321. In total there are 
20 numerical instances corresponding to the 20 sections.
How is the structure realized by the proposed instantiation? Each unit realizes 
a pattern with its sub-units that can be rising, steady or falling. If we take the 
units of level one we can see four rising units: 12, 223, 123, 12; and four falling 
units: 221, 21, 21, 321. If we go back to the instantiated structure, 12 221.21 
223 123.12 21 321, and take the first value out of each unit of level one we can 
see the generator intervals of units of level two: 12-221-123. If we take out the 
first  values  of  these  last  generators,  we’ll  see  that  the  resulting  generator 
pattern of the unit of level three, 1-2-1, that indeed forms an arch-like pattern. 
This  may prevent  the possible distinction of  the structure as composed by 
three  units  of  level  two.  But  I  need  to  say  that  I  realized  these  possible 
difficulties, that are met only in particular cases, only after having composed 
the piece, and moreover while they might be a problem for the implementation 
of the theory in the composition, they surely do not impede a fruition of the 
piece as a work of art.
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The resulting scheme of foreground quartets is as follows:
A similar process, which is realized independently for each quartet, determines 
the number of active voices within the quartets in a dimension from one to four, 
which directly corresponds to the number of active voices.
Here is the resulting scheme:
In the next phase, the previous scheme is freely adapted to give each part the 
same average activity along the whole work.
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 In  general,  the  process  is  conducted  in  the  same way  for  all  the  involved 
dimensions.
For  example,  the previous scheme is  modified with  the instantiation  of  the 
degree  of  polyphony  in  terms  of  different  and  contrasting  signals  that  are 
present in the active voice of the single quartets.
We  have  therefore,  once  again,  different  structures  and  independent 
instantiations. However,  in this case as the number of active parts and the 
number of signalling active parts are calculated independently from each other, 
it may happen that there are inconsistencies between the dimensions that are 
resolved by filtering: two signals in a section with only one active part means 
that there is just one signal.
Here are the structures and schemes relative to signalling voices.
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In the end, the scheme is completed, after the involvement of a calculation that 
I do not show here, with the role of each one of the 12 parts within the 20 
sections, which are expressed by the following symbols: 
- ∑ is the main signal; 
- ∑O, ∑P, ∑T is the heterophonic or homophonic version of the main signal that  
is expressed by some other part; 
- S is a contrasting signal; o are long notes expressing inactive parts; 
- >S means that a signal in the previous section is still going on in the present 
section; 
- the hyphen  “-”  is related to parts that were filtered away in assigning signal 
and therefore might be expressing non-active though “restless” parts; 
-  X  characterizes  parts  that  are  dedicated  to  O,  T  or  P  textures  that  are 
determined in another way; 
-  finally,  empty  parts  are  just  inactive  parts  that  are  silent  or  present  a 
continuous very soft tone.
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Here is the completed scheme:
In the end, in the whole work we have 46 signals that are presented in each 
section in the following numbers:
I should now introduce the criteria that were adopted in constricting signals. 
These are Chomskian structures, meaning that they are constructed from a set 
of  nonterminal  and  terminal  symbols  with  rules  for  connecting  symbols  in 
words and words in sentences. It is not important here to go into the details of 
signals composition. Nevertheless, I would just like to mention that signals are 
composed by a  main note,  that  is  different  for  each signal,  and,  when the 
signal is not simply made by the main note, a set of one to four secondary 
notes. 
A  main  note,  which  only  changes  when  the  functional  relationship  also 
changes, is given to each part of all the three quartets, in each section and is  
chosen among one of three scales. The basic pitch structure of the work is 
therefore similar to a chordal piece made of 20 chords. The three scales are 
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obtained from the harmonic series on a E note in such a way that, given a pitch 
range that is more or less correspondent to the human voice’s one for the V 
parts and is a wider one for the S and E parts, the difference from scales one to 
two and three corresponds to a proportional increase of dissonance, which 
comes  from relating  the  notes  expressed  by  the  scales  to  a  fundamental 
whose octave register is lower and lower.
Figure 18: the three scales of “Cluster”.
Figure 19: the general scheme of pitches connected to main and secondary roles.
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Of course, there is much more to say. The reason I mention this is because the 
choice of  the scale  for  each part  in each section follows an arch-like  path 
through  the  piece  that  is  still  modulated  by a  pattern  structure,  both  as  a 
dimension and as the interference of the parts’ functional role in the quartet.
Finally, the process of composition, in this context, even when it starts from a 
moment of  sonorous imagination,  is  involved in a process of  analysing the 
evoked sonorous image in terms of the qualities, be they simple or complex, 
that it exhibits so that they can be resolved as (parametric) dimensions. Some 
of these dimensions might be involved in characterizing the composition as a 
whole, and therefore are instantiated by discontinuities that fall in the CR. On 
the other hand, other dimensions, the ones I want to change in the course of 
the work, will necessarily fall in the SIR and, by doing this, will be presumably 
involved in a pattern structure. This pattern structure, however articulated, is in 
charge of managing the discontinuities so that, for example, the articulation of 
the work in sections must deal with the instances of those dimensions that, by 
falling in the SIR, allow the listener to distinguish those sections. In order to 
obtain this, a top-down path of composition could be engaged by starting from 
articulating the general  form in two or three sections, then articulating each 
section in two or three composing sections and so on up to the shortest units 
that are supposed to enter the planned pattern structure. But a bottom-up path 
could  be  engaged  as  well,  so  that  units  are  connected  by  instances  of 
dimension at higher levels and so on. Moreover, a pattern structure could be 
339
complicated  at  will  up  to  involving  polyphonic  or  even  counterpoint-like 
structure  textures.  In  the  end,  what  is  important  in  this  technical  frame of 
pattern structures, is that the poietic strategies of the composer/producer/artist 
are directed to mime the esthesic strategies of the listener. This means that the 
compositional  practice  is  driven  by  an  “esthesic  reference”  in  terms  of  a 
structure  of  the  detection  of  changes,  which  is  based  on  dimensions  and 
patterns  that  can  be  set,  although  always  experimentally,  according  to  a 
specific perceptive target.  The idea of an “esthesic reference” seems to be 
important in teaching composition because it helps to capture all the possible 
creative outcomes of the students within a net of meaning—the changes in the 
score/production that can possibly be detected by a listener—that can help in 
selecting a direction for creativity. But this is also important for artistic practice.  
On one hand, it fosters a proper analysis of the target listener in terms of the 
repertory of learned patterns and dimensions, which can help the composer to 
deal with the ivory tower of the repertoire of patterns and dimensions that she 
has developed in a lifetime of practice without forcing her to feel that he is 
hostage  to  a  mass  audience.  On  the  other  hand,  it  can  help  to  positively 
determine  the  criteria  for  analysing  the  connection  between  poietic  and 
esthesic strategies, and in setting the basis of a meta-composition practice.
But  whatever  aesthetic  or  commercial  strategy  is  involved  by  the 
composer/producer, a technique of composition based on pattern structures 
will  inevitably  engage  an  interaction  with  the  listener,  with  his  or  her  past 
experiences  and  his  efforts  in  distinguishing,  in  terms  of  the  interference 
340
between the pattern structures of music and of the listener; and in the end it 
will compel the artist to take a position on his relationship with the listener in a 
media culture, by constricting with him a relation of difference, instead of the 
happy subjection of identity and the solipsism of diversity.
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12 WHAT WE TAKE FOR GRANTED IN THE SOUNDS 
AROUND US
To engage a general  discourse about the soundscape,  we have to start  by 
remembering John Cage’s  description of  his  experience inside the Harvard 
University’s anechoic chamber in 1951 with the discovery of the endless sonic 
flow we are immersed in.28 As Cage stated, an immediate consequence is that 
any  experience  of  silence  is  functional  and  emerges  through  a  cognitive 
process of distinction between a sonic plane, that is different each time, and 
the plane of its absence. Silence is the result of a way of listening.
When  we  turn  to  the  soundscape,  John  Cage’s  experience  brings  some 
important consequences. As it has been pointed out (Kelman, 2010), in spite of 
the  success  in  a  wide  area  of  studies  of  using  and  abusing  the  term 
“soundscape” since it was introduced by Murray Schafer (Schafer, 1969), not 
only a general consensus about a possible standard definition has not yet been 
reached, but even the question has been raised whether it is time to abandon 
the term for good (for example: Ingold, 2007 and Helmreich, 2010).
Defining a keyword in human sciences is often more the final result of research 
than its starting point. No wonder then, if a number of texts includes the word 
“soundscape” without referring to a precise definition and leaves the outlining 
of  its  semantic  field  to  deduction.  Such  use  of  a  word  may  resemble  the 
implementation of an apparatus (I refer to its definition by Giorgio Agamben, 
which was included in section 1.2.3) in spite of its involvement in discussions 
28For a more detailed description of the experience, see Section 2.2.
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about music and environment as a technical  term. The word “soundscape” 
acts in these texts as a device or a label, if not a brand, that on one hand has 
the capability of capturing meanings that determine the blurred boundaries of 
research, while at the same time identifying a corpus of works, scholars and 
institutions  that  strategically  define  a  disciplinary  domain  that  is  inevitably 
inscribed in a play of power.
On the other hand, the attempts to define the soundscape answer to the needs 
of institutionalization of the term, and for that purpose aim to legitimate it, by 
connecting  it  to  supportive  disciplines,  that  have  possibly  a  strong 
epistemological statute.
Murray Schafer’s well-known definition of soundscape as “any acoustic field of 
study” (Schafer, 1993, p.7) already points inclusively to the academic world as 
a  topic  that  apparently  encompasses  all  the  studies  of  acoustic  related 
subjects. If the utility of a definition consists in its ability to exclude the possible 
misuses of a term by delimitating its semantic domain, we could say that this 
function is here accomplished by referring to a “field of study” in the first place 
and secondarily by the word “acoustic”. The possibility of a clear distinction 
between  the  appropriate  and  inappropriate  uses  of  the  word  is  here 
guaranteed by the discipline related to the term “acoustic”, namely physics.
Another example comes from the composer Pauline Oliveros, who describes 
the soundscape as “all  of the waveforms faithfully transmitted to our audio 
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cortex by the ear and its mechanisms” (Oliveros, 2005, p.18). This definition 
updates, so to speak, Schafer’s board of guarantors by adding physiology and 
leaves the role of managing the connection between the semantic domains of 
medical and physical sciences to the word “faithfully”. However, it is not clear 
how the one-dimensional  parameter  of  faithfulness can  match the complex 
transduction operated by the listening system and in what form it is able to 
account for sound cognition. But the main problem is that not only does this 
definition encompass everything from a Beethoven symphony, to the noise of a 
passing  car  passing,  to  the  cochlear  echo  caused  by  them,  but  it  also 
sacrifices on the altar of the “objective” aura of scientific data the way we use 
the word soundscape independently from the topics of  sound waves or music.
The Careggi Declaration29 seeks a more usable and shareable definition of the 
soundscape  as  “the  acoustic  property  of  every  landscape  according  to  a 
species’ specific perception”.
In this case, the relativism of a “species’ specific perception”, which is open to 
post-human directions, is balanced by the word “acoustic” that on the other 
hand  seems  to  allude  to  the  physical  properties  of  sound.  Moreover  the 
difficulties  of  defining  the  soundscape  are  delegated  to  the  concept  of 
“landscape”,  which  has  its  own  history  of  debate.  Nevertheless,  what  is 
important here is that the relationship between soundscape and perception is 
29The “Careggi Landscape Declaration on Soundscapes - June 2012” is a document that was 
made available on the occasion of a Third Careggi Seminar on Soundscapes organized by 
UNISCAPE,  the  Network  of  Universities  dedicated  to  the  implementation  of  the  European 
Landscape Convention.
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finally stated in an explicit way. This moves the whole question of defining what 
is a soundscape to a matter of distinctions as the perceptive domain of two 
species may in fact overlap to a certain degree or be disjointed, but above all it  
poses  the  issue  of  the  presence  of  an  observer,  who  measures  “acoustic 
properties” and relates to the perceptive experience of a species.
Bernie  Krause  tries  to  solve  the  dilemma  by  shifting  the  definition  of 
soundscape towards the definition of sources and splitting what we usually 
deal with as a whole in geophony, biophony and anthrophony, respectively the 
sounding signatures,  or better  the traces,  of  non-biological  natural  sources, 
non-human and non-domestic biological sources, and human sources (Krause, 
2012). On one hand, this distinction bounds itself  to serve as a criterion of 
categorization that, by implying a distinction between human and non-human 
beings, refers explicitly to an unavoidable human perspective, as observers of 
the sonic world, without necessarily drawing into play essentialist or religious 
justifications.  But,  by  relating  to  sources,  this  classification  points  to  the 
practices that generate sounds and noises as a criterion to distinguish them. In 
this  respect,  it  is  not  clear  how  relying  on  the  dynamics  of  an  engine  to 
understand the accidental, so to speak, antrophonic noise of a passing car, is 
equally as significant as relying on the dynamics of a bow stroked on a violin’s 
string  to  understand  the  not  at  all  accidental  antrophonic sounding  of 
J.S.Bach’s “Ciaccona”. 
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A definition of  soundscape cannot avoid stating the difference between what 
we call “music” and what we call “soundscape”, without risking a poor use of 
the word “soundscape” to simply refer to all possible acoustic events.
Let’s finally take a last classic definition. Barry Truax defines soundscape as 
an environment of  sound (or sonic environment)  with emphasis on the 
way it is perceived and understood by the individual, or by a society. It 
thus depends on the relationship between the individual and any such 
environment. (Truax, 1978)
We can notice here several improvements on the previous definitions. 
First of all, the observer is submitted to quantification: from a single one, an 
“individual” (the researcher?), to “a society”, which is a collectivity that exhibits 
not only an internal organization ruling the interactions between individuals, but 
also a relationship with the space of these interactions, which constitutes an 
environment. We are far, here, from relying on an objectivist theory that states 
the existence of an external word that is independent from observers: the word 
acquires a structure, in the form of a relationship, as the result of an act of 
observation. Secondly, this relationship extends its scope from perception to 
understanding—that is, from a relationship in terms of the bodily organization 
of sensations to one in terms of the organization of meanings. This last part of 
the definition points to the active role of observation that not only creates the 
soundscape as such, but also inscribes it in a narrative and ultimately within an 
academic path.
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We can now get back to John Cage and his lesson about listening. If acoustical 
silence can never be experienced, not even in an anechoic chamber, then our 
ordinary experience of silence, together with any other aural experience, needs 
to  be  constructed  out  of  a  never  ceasing  aural  sensation.  Geophonies, 
biophonies and anthrophonies are only possible if we are able to refer to the 
sources of the aural sensation because we have investigated them in the first 
place or because we have learned to detect them during our life experiences or 
listening exercises. John Cage ultimately teaches us that if we want to define 
what a  soundscape is, we need to understand in the first place the way we 
distinguish it within the sound-flow, which also includes the sounds produced 
by the listening system itself.
Of course,  Gestalt  laws and the principles  of  the so-called,  auditory  scene 
analysis state the strategies we activate in segmenting and segregating the 
endless sound-flow in order to distinguish in it layers (events that overlap in 
time) and sections (events that occur in time one after the other), that only later  
we might be able to list in categories such as biophonies and so on.
But how do we choose the correct strategy to apply case by case? There is a 
gap  to  be  filled  between  the  physiological  acquisition  of  a  continuum  of 
auditory stimuli and the psychological application of strategies of perception.
The  idea  of  Umwelt  shows  us  why  addressing  ontologies  of  sources  and 
objects that are a complex final result of the cognitive process is not of any 
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help  in  understanding  the  constitution  of  the  soundscape  from  within  the 
sound-flow. The Umwelt (a German word often translated as “environment”) is 
here intended as the technical term first proposed by the biologist Jakob von 
Uexküll that responds to the observation that “‘no animal can enter into relation 
with an object as such’ but only with its own carriers of significance” (Agamben 
2002, p.42). We could here substitute objects with sound objects or even with, 
so to speak, sources related sounds. But what is the Umwelt? According to a 
definition of Giorgio Agamben, it is 
the environment-world that is constituted by a more or less broad series 
of elements that are […] ‘carriers of significance’ (Bedeutungsträger)  or 
‘marks’ (Merkmalträger), that are the only things that interest the animal. 
(Agamben 2002, p.40)
We have moved from a sound-flow to a sonic-Umwelt, the system of the units 
we can distinguish by segmenting and segregating the sound-flow, as far as 
they are relevant to the operations we enact with our body and therefore define 
the world we live in.
As a consequence, there must be a different  Umwelt for each different living 
being: a particular man’s Umwelt is different from a particular cat’s Umwelt and 
both differ from a particular amoeba’s Umwelt. At the same time we can group 
the Umwelten that emerge from similar bodily operations in such a way that the 
individual human being’s Umwelten can be considered as singular expression 
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of the general human Umwelt that is determined by levelling all the individual 
differences. 
All animal subjects, from the simplest to the most complex, are inserted 
into  their  environments  to  the  same degree  of  perfection.  The  simple 
animal  has  a  simple  environment;  the  multiform  animal  has  an 
environment just as richly articulated as it is. (von Uexküll, 1934, p.50)
We are now back to the position of an observer who evaluates the degree of  
complexity of animals’  Umwelt from its meta-Umwelt. This includes what the 
observer identifies as the surroundings of single animals and “simpler” species, 
what  Uexküll  calls  Umgebung.  As  a  consequence,  our  Umwelt seemingly 
shows  an  organization  of  Umgebungen that  are  partially  overlapping  and 
whose extension is related to the complexity of animal cognitive behaviours. 
These  Umgebungen are  what  we  can  access  of  the  animals’  Umwelt,  the 
image of their  Umwelt form our point of view. If we turn to the experience of 
sound, we can therefore define a sonic-Umgebung of a living being as our 
aural experience of its surroundings. But the organization of  Umwelten like a 
series  of  Chinese  boxes,  with  us  representing the top-level  box,  is  just  an 
illusion that comes from the fact that we cannot escape our Umwelt. We can 
therefore suppose that the real organization of Umwelten must be more similar 
to  a  scattered  rhizomatic  system  over  different  planes  of  Umgebungen 
amongst which there might possibly be an unknowable meta-Umgebung.
This means that the position of an observer is never neutral, not even when he 
appeals  to  disciplines  with  a  strong  epistemological  statute,  because 
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“everything said is said by an observer to another observer that could be him 
or herself” (Maturana, 1988, p.27).
But  the  Umwelt is  not  really  something  we  are  in:  it  is  rather  the  space 
recursively defined by the interactions between our bodily actions against, we 
could call it, a substrate, that is unreachable outside our possibilities of action.
In the words of Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, the Umwelt is our 
cognitive  membrane,  whose  integrity,  the  defence  against  the  possible 
disruptive  results  of  our  actions,  is  the  very  concern  of  our  life.  This 
corresponds to the analysis of living beings that Maturana and Varela proposed 
in 1974 as the autopoietic model (Maturana, Uribe and Varela, 1974).
Moving  from  the  Umwelt  to  the  membrane is  here  an  important  passage 
because  it  allows  us  to  characterize  the  constitution  of  the  Umwelt as  an 
endless process of surviving in the substrate by acting recursively to repair it 
from the damages caused by the unknown. 
Maintaining  the  membrane  is  therefore  a  continuous  operational  loop  of 
detections and reactions that we, as observers, can describe on one hand as 
the structural coupling between the organism and its  Umgebung, and on the 
other  hand,  in  considering it  as  the process  of  constituting  the organism’s 
Umwelt, as a constellation of loop patterns or cognitive habits that give rise to 
signification. As stated by Francosco Varela: 
signification  arises  in  the  emergence  of  a  viewpoint  proper  to  the 
autonomous constitution of the organism at all its levels, starting with its 
basic autopoiesis. (Varela, 1992)
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This is the level at which automatic mechanisms of cognition, such as Gestalt 
laws, emerge as complex epiphenomena of autopoiesis in order to satisfy the 
need of survival so that distinguishing, as the tool for meaning construction, is  
finally possible.
But  distinguishing is just a word for an extremely intricate process that in the 
cognitive  domain  of  description  involves  high  order  processes  such  as 
attention and memory.  Jones’  regions of  distinction seem in  the end to be 
attentional spans driven by the dynamic and recursive process of attending in 
which no cognitive effort is made unless a significant change is detected that 
eludes the cognitive prediction,  exactly in the same way as the autopoietic 
organism  entails  repetitive  routines  of  maintaining  the  membrane  until  an 
emergency  occurs.  The  cognitive  condition  related  to  the  routines  of 
maintaining  the  membrane  is  known  as  habituation  and  is  related  to  a 
reduction of attention at the point that a threshold of consciousness may be 
crossed, in which case the object of perception may disappear in front of our 
eyes, like the so-called “lazy eye” or amblyopia, or, what is a well-known aural 
experience, when we might stop hearing, as it happens with a constant noise 
or  a  car  alarm  playing  for  a  long  time.  On  the  other  hand,  the  cognitive 
condition  related  to  emergency  situations  is  known  as  arousal and  is 
accompanied  by  an  increment  of  attention  and  a  strong  consumption  of 
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energy.  The  two  conditions  engage  a  complex,  mobile  and,  so  to  speak, 
competitive articulation of foreground and background that develops during 
our entire lifetime and constitutes (always already) the Umwelt. 
As we have seen: we do not perceive, to a certain extent, what we are used to,  
because the constants of our aural experiences, on any level of our structure of 
distinctions, fall  in the CR and are submitted to  habituation.  But  habituation 
conceals itself as an action that unfolds in time: as the action that defines the 
limits of our  Umwelt and offers itself to us as a presence, is the process of 
misattributing (Huron,  2006)  our  distinctions  to  the  world’s  objects  as  their 
properties.
Our  recursive  experiences  in  listening  are  stretched  between  the 
disappearance of conscious sensations and their constitution as presence in 
our sonic landscape. We are therefore oriented to the new by forgetting what 
we are used to  in  terms of  events,  in  order  to  constitute  them as  objects 
(“chunks”). This means that, by losing consciousness about what we are used 
(or habituated) to, we embody it and project it as a presence in our Umwelt, in 
our surroundings. In other words, we are (read as “we build our identity on”) 
what we cannot (consciously) listen to any more (CR) and consequently what 
we started to perceive as a quality of what we consider our environment. On 
the other hand, what we (consciously) listen to (SIR) points us to the different, 
to the other, to what in fact opposes our identity and eventually changes it as 
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soon as it becomes a recursive experience and therefore reaches the CR at 
some level.
The most important critics of the “abusers” of the term “soundscape” accuse 
them  of  engaging  the  evanescent  experience  of  sound  in  a  process  of 
objectification mostly driven by an incorrect association of the “scape” part of 
the word to a visual explanatory paradigm30. In general, an opposition is drawn 
between soundscape and sound so that as a solution it has been proposed to 
re-define the research on  soundscape as a research on “listening against”, a 
sort  of  a  new listening  mode (Helmreich,  2010),  or  on  “background noise” 
(Kelman, 2010).
As  we  have  seen,  these  critiques  have  a  strong  foundation  in  the 
objectifications operated by the principle of  misattribution that is enacted by 
our description of the sonic-Umwelt when it naively incorporates the illusion of 
a word of objects.
Besides,  the  proposal  of  turning  to  the  “background  noise”  also  has  a 
legitimate reason:  we usually  consider  music  as  opposed to the noise that 
surrounds us, as the SIR opposes to the CR or better the constitution of a 
foreground opposes to the constitution of a background. This is the opposition 
that is often removed, as we have seen, from the definitions of soundscape and 
yet it is vital to understanding the subject. 
30While being associated with the visual term “scope”, the actual etymology of “scape” is the 
Dutch schap, “cognate with the English suffix ‘-ship’, referring to a fellowship or community of 
persons with a commonality of land, law and custom” (Ingold, 2007).
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We listen to music because we seek the thrill of surprise that is provided by the 
arousal condition,  the  process  of  detecting  within  the  SIR,  even  if  it  is 
nevertheless oriented by the possible routine of going to concerts, listening to 
the mp3 player and so on, that express a CR at some pretty high level. On the 
other hand, what we usually consider as the background noise disappears as 
the result of the process of habituating to a CR in a relatively low level of the 
structure of distinctions: we usually do not pay attention to the ordinary noises 
that surround us, unless they deviate from the range of our predictions. 
This does not mean that we are totally deaf to them: our capability to turn our 
attention  to  CR level  depends  on  the  time span  of  those  levels  so  that  a 
constant buzz, that expresses a very fast CR level, will be more likely to vanish, 
or better to be embodied in our identity, than a regular event that occurs, let us 
say, every year. This happens because the larger the span, the more SIRs will 
be included in the faster levels of the structure. On the contrary, the process of 
habituating takes time, so that for higher levels, for longer time spans, a lot of 
time will  be needed to get used to recognizing the CR as a constant in our 
lives.
Nevertheless it is not yet the time to get rid of the word “soundscape”. In fact, 
the discovery, so to speak, of the soundscape corresponds to the discovery of 
noises and sounds in the background that surround us, the aural experiences 
we tend to ignore because we are habituated to them and they have become 
part of who we are. 
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The soundscape is therefore the process of getting in touch with our cognitive 
membrane in the domain of language, the exploration of  sonic-Umwelten  in 
terms  of  the  sonic-Umgebungen  that  surround  individuals,  cultures  and 
species.  It  is  the  process  of  translating  the  CR  levels  of  the  structure  of 
distinctions  into  SIR  levels  in  some  possible  explicative  dimension  (verbal, 
graphical and also in scientific data). Not only this: the practices related to the 
research on the soundscape have brought us to listen to recordings of our and 
other’s soundscapes. Of course, we are not habituated to exotic soundscapes, 
so no wonder if  these practices have potential  in bringing the CRs of other 
cultures  into  our  SIRs  and  eventually  to  the  creation  of  a  music  genre, 
soundscape music.  But  soundscape is  opposed to  music  and the research 
around  the  soundscape is  different  from  musicology because  it  considers 
music only  in  relation  to  its  CR levels,  such as in  background music  or  in 
general acoustic content of music. 
On the other hand, the topic of  soundscape is aurally related to the effort of 
bringing CR levels into SIR levels, in our own structure of distinctions, in our 
own  sonic-Umwelt.  This is the most difficult  process of all  and is the most 
revolutionary aspect of soundscape studies because they aim to recover what 
we cannot hear any more, what we have taken for granted and has become, 
willingly  or  not,  part  of  our  identity;  they  aim towards change and for  that 
reason they have a fundamental visionary attitude towards the development of 
self consciousness. 
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We have interpreted the constitution of the subject,  similarly to Bachelard’s 
metaphysic of the Instant and to Howard Margolis’ analysis of the subject in 
terms of strategies of choices (Margolis, 1987), as the result of a narrative that 
is  grounded  on  a  bundle  of  habits.  Our  word  is  ultimately  built  from  the 
patterns  that  have  been  habituated  and have  “solidified”  during  our  whole 
lifetime, so that they have become the background, which is always renewed 
as such, of our action in the world. Consequently, this world/background is 
different  for  each  subject.  But  by  being  at  the  same  time  entailed  by  the 
recursive  interactions  of  a  social  context  of  subjects,  linguistic  interactions 
included, and by being entangled by them, we can deal with our world in the 
language we share as well as with the subjective experiences of our “praxis of 
living”,  so  that  in  the  end  we  end  up  being  involved  in  a  Wittgensteinian 
subjective  understanding,  according  to  which  we  attach  to  our  discourses 
subjective experiences that we erroneously suppose we are sharing. And in the 
end,  we can  all  pretend to  live  in  the  same world  of  objects  that  we can 
address with our public language.
However, the narrative of pattern puts the constitution of the subject, of our 
identity, in the context of the interplay between memory and expectations, as 
statistically learned. This also means—I am following here the conclusions of 
my article “What  we recognize”  (Viel,  2016)— that  our  identity  is  somehow 
related to the frequency of the occurrences of our experiences. 
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We are therefore defenceless in front of the forced exposition to practices that 
constrain us to recognize, to embody and finally to slot in our consciousness, 
the patterns that have become objects and consequently are guarantors of 
objectivity, of an irrefutable Truth (translated from: Viel, 2016)
In the end, who has the control of the statistics of our experiences, also has the 
control  of  what  we  learn  from  them and  therefore  is  able  drive  us  in  the 
constitution  of  our  identity.  In  such  a  condition  within  a  media  culture, 
Bachelard’s call for progress is more important than ever.
In order to maintain the possibility of acting in the world as creative subjects, it  
is always necessary to engage new patterns, to drive our attention towards 
new  recognitions,  so  that  on  one  hand  we  can  keep  looking  for  SIR 
configurations where a narrative of CR is proposed to us, and on the other side 
we can neutralize, at least in part, the objectifying power of coercive processes 
of identitary formation and subjection. 
It is therefore necessary to realize the active role that each one of us has in  
building  our  own  repertory  of  patterns,  by  driving  the  statistics  of  our 
experiences. We need to recover the responsibility of our distinguishing acts, 
by  driving  them towards  targets  that  are  alternative  to  what  is  offered  by 
media. We need to engage strategies of perceptive subversion that redesign, in 
an  unpredictable  and  experimental  way,  the  pattern  structures  that  we 
consider objectified and naturalized. We need to throw ourselves into the most 
insignificant statistical  occurrences.  And, surely,  no matter what obsessions 
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and memes media will tempt us with, nobody will ever be willing and able to 
take them away from us.
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